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Mobile communications and applications play an important role in connecting people ubiq-
uitously across different domain spaces due to their portable nature and easy accessibility.
Mobile applications have drastically changed the way businesses are run by bringing them
closer to their customers. Businesses today are connected to cloud based-tools, which
makes it easier to start and run a business. Furthermore, mobile applications have changed
the way we communicate with each other in our daily lives. They have increasingly been
deployed by companies to help with, among other things, the management of business
efficiency, ease in accessing information, simplifying communication and the provision of
user-friendly applications. The number of mobile devices is increasing exponentially, it is
estimated that 1.5 billion devices are available to the public worldwide. In addition, there
is a multitude of operating systems running on these devices, all running on different
architectures and configurations. The diversity of the different versions of applications
that need to be constantly updated as they become outdated makes mobile applications
highly susceptible to security and privacy flaws. Until recently, privacy has not been the
main centre of interest within the design of mobile applications. Although, a number of
privacy preserving solutions have been developed to improve privacy, existing research
solutions adopt static design models which are not suitable for mobile applications. There
is a significant gap between having common practices for designing and implementing
privacy-preserving methods due to the cross-disciplinary nature of mobile applications.
Most importantly, personal data are constantly collected and shared with unknown recip-
ients. This is a challenging problem as users are not aware of how their data is used and
shared without their consent. Furthermore, existing privacy policies are not stringently
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implemented during application development. Application designers do not comply with
regulations envisaged by data protection regulation bodies. To investigate the problem
domain, this thesis takes a bottom-up approach and contributes by analyzing current
mobile applications to determine the integration of privacy mechanisms and privacy
policies at the application level. We should however note that, the focus of this work
contributes to the knowledge related to designing of holistic privacy preserving mobile
applications and not the implementation aspect. Furthermore, this thesis introduces
a novel privacy trade-off analysis framework that enables the design of privacy-aware
applications. A privacy trade-off analysis generates a design solution that best suits
an application’s privacy goals and requirements. To demonstrate the privacy-aware
framework, TRANK, two prototypes in the eHealth domain and the V2X Telematics
domain, that integrate privacy-preserving technologies in modern mobile applications
have been implemented and tested. Our implementation takes into consideration the
trade-off between privacy, functionality and performance to provide a better privacy-aware
application. The resulting system enables users to choose which data are to be collected
about them. In this way, users can easily opt in and out of the application without having
to give up all their personally identifiable information whenever they choose to, thus,
enhance their overall privacy preservation. To the best of our knowledge our framework
and the results in this thesis out perform the existing state of-the-art privacy preserv-
ing solutions. The privacy-enhancing technologies employed and the privacy-by-design
mechanisms introduced at the initial stages of development thus, aid the improvement of
privacy in mobile applications.
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Mobile applications are used for a range of online services across private and commercial
domains. These domains need to be secured and resilient to face challenges of privacy
leakages, privacy misconfigurations, cyber security attacks and system failures. Current
mobile applications have, however, faced a lot of criticism about unauthorized and
unintentional transfer of sensitive data due to misconfigured back ends, data sharing and
transfer to third-party service providers. In particular, the range of beneficial opportunities
and functional properties offered by mobile applications such as communication through
OSNs, easy accessibility, better functionality, business enhancement, introduce a number of
privacy and security vulnerabilities. An indirect drawback lies within mobile applications
dependency on the Internet where privacy protection has been extensively studied but
still faces setbacks.
Data privacy in mobile applications significantly depends on how applications are
designed and implemented. Mobile applications generally operate using operating systems
that are installed on handheld devices (e.g. smart-phones, tablets, wearables, smart-
watches e.t.c) with a plethora of programs running on them. The handheld devices
employ various sensors ranging from geo-location sensors (and other sensors e.g., cameras,
microphones, accelerometers, motion sensors) to heartbeat sensors as depicted in eHealth
Chapter 1 Aims
applications. These applications acquire a lot of personal and sensitive data from their
users. This data is often transmitted to large service providers and third parties without
users’ knowledge leading to a variety of data privacy concerns. Such type of data can easily
be intercepted if not securely transmitted and stored leading to massive data breaches.
In addition, due to the different applications that run on these devices e.g. geo-location
applications, users are easily tracked based on their daily movements. Furthermore,
an immense amount of data is transmitted to online data collection companies e.g.,
OSN companies and users have been subjected to total surveillance [Bat19] Most of
the applications are connected to the Internet, with a constant connection to various
applications like search engines, geolocation applications and Online Social Networks
(OSN) companies like data brokers and third-party service providers use the collected data
to provide targeted ads. Consequently, there has been a surge of privacy data breaches
in recent years due to the huge volumes of data collected and the high numbers of users
connected to such networks. This thesis aims at enhancing privacy preservation in current
and future mobile applications by introducing a privacy design framework which employs
privacy-by-design through the whole application development lifecycle.
We introduce a trade-off analysis framework that aids application designers in con-
sidering the tradeoff between privacy and functionality during system development in
an attempt to deliver privacy aware applications that minimize data collection while
maintaining application functionality. This way privacy challenges in current mobile
applications can be solved to protect user privacy.
1.2 Aims
Future mobile applications must be designed in such a way that privacy enhancing
mechanisms are integrated at the go and are pro-active and not only re-active to any data
breaches that occur. Users should be aware of the data they provide to data processing
companies and should be able to consent to which data they provide. The aim of this
thesis therefore is to:
• Create user awareness about the data being collected in mobile applications.
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• Create a framework that designs privacy-aware applications to reduce the amount
of personal data collected by mobile applications.
• Aid application designers in decision making about privacy preservation in the early
stages of system development.
• Aid developers improve the privacy-aware design of mobile applications.
• To expand and contribute towards transferable knowledge in the context of privacy
and particularly for data privacy in mobile applications
For the above aims to be achieved, the main technical objective of this thesis is
to present a framework that aids application developers in designing privacy-aware
applications at the initial stages of system development. In the following, we elaborate
on some of the challenges and privacy breaches that have manifested in modern mobile
applications.
1.3 Motivation
Mobile communication systems are composed of voice and multimedia data transmitted
over wireless communication technologies. In recent years, we have seen a surge of privacy
and security attacks in mobile communications leading to both financial and personal
information loss. Mobile apps are the main focus of this research because of their evolving
nature. Due to their rapid development they require special attention because they run
on multiple platforms that are often hard to operate on various devices. This pervasive
property of mobile applications therefore, makes the development of privacy and security
across the multi platforms very challenging.
Although organizations are constantly improving their systems in terms of privacy
preservation, data breaches have continued to occur. This may occur when privacy
attacks are caused by a third party or through breaches of privacy trust by data collectors.
Privacy attacks caused by third parties are illegal whereas the breach of privacy trust by
data collectors is permissible under the terms and conditions of the agreement with the
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company. This is usually included in privacy policies and often read by users or generally
accepted without knowing the consequences.
We consider both aspects of data breaches similarly as they all lead to damage and
privacy abuse. The cost of damages caused increases continuously. It is estimated that
the average cost of a data breach in 2017 was 3.5 million dollars. This was explicitly
depicted by the drop of Yahoos market price by 350 million dollars when Verizon bought
it in 2017 after it was reported that, 3bn records had been stolen by hackers [2].
The records included personally identifiable information such as names, telephone
numbers, dates of birth, email addresses, hashed passwords and security questions and
answers to the questions. The breach was done by using false cookies which gained access
to users accounts without using a password. Hackers were able to impersonate themselves
as the owners of the email accounts leading to massive data theft. To date, this is regarded
as the worst data breach in history [3]. The past years have proved that online data we
assume to be in safe hands is not as safe as we thought it to be. We have seen massive
record theft from big companies ranging from Online Social Networks to business and
medical bodies. In the following we elaborate on major data breaches that have occured
in recent years.
Online Social Networks: Online Social Networks(OSN) have increased in the last
decade e.g., Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat which have a large number
of users, however, these have been targeted as they do collect a lot of personal data. The
interconnection to friends profiles’ allows hackers to extract large amounts of data from
the network. One of the major OSN data breaches was hit by Facebook in 2018 when 50
million user accounts were harvested by Cambridge Analytica a data analytics firm and
used to manipulate voters during the 2016 US election campaigns and the Brexit vote [4].
This caused a market share price drop of 3% on the stock market [5].
In another OSN incident, Myspace reported that approximately 427 million records
were leaked accessing usernames, passwords, and email addresses in 2016. Although
Myspace is considered as a dormant OSN, unfortunately, user data is never deleted and
data breaches may occur without users actively using the OSN. Not only do data breaches
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occur in large data housing companies, in addition to this some companies do not disclose
the data breaches to their customers. Google+ exposed 497,000 data records in 2018,
which consisted of full names, birth dates, profile photos, places lived, occupation and
relationship status. The data breach enabled third-party applications to pull data from
users and their friends. As a result, all user functionality was closed down. Nevertheless,
Google+ chose to cover up the data breach to avoid any regulatory scrutiny.
Medical data breaches: In the medical sector, it is estimated that securing healthcare
systems will gradually increase and exceed 65B [6] in an effort to avoid being attacked.
Medicaid, one of the Centers for Medicare and Medic agencies in the USA has been a
major target for attacks. In 2017, Molina a Medicaid insurer, shut down its patient portal
after a major data leak exposed patients records. A total of 4.8 million records were
compromised which included, diagnosis, medication, dates of birth, names, and addresses.
This follows that, whoever, had access to these records is able to identify the patients’
addresses and their diagnosis [7].
In a similar incident, 21st Century Oncology a cancer healthcare provider based
in Florida was targeted by hackers who stole 2.2 million patient records. The records
included names, physician names, treatment plans, social security numbers, and insurance
data [8]. In May 2018, UnityPoint Health based in Iowa reported a data breach caused
by an email phishing attack which affected 1.4 million records. This is so far the largest
medical data breach in 2018. Emails accounts were compromised and were responded to
by staff therein giving away a lot of sensitive data to the hackers. MyHeritage genealogy
site was hacked in 2017 and 92 million user accounts which included email addresses and
hashed passwords. The compromised data was found on a private server under a file
name called "MyHeritage". Although MyHeritage acted fast in informing its users, the
data set can still be used for illegal purposes. Not only private companies have been a
focus of such data breaches, but government bodies have been targeted as was seen in
Singapore. This attack led to 1.5 million patients being compromised including those of
the prime minister from the Singapore government’s health database [9].
Interestingly, some of these attacks are done by well-known hacker groups who are
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hard to stop and prosecute. In the UK, a group called Dark Overload comprised celebrity
and Royal family data records from a prominent surgery facility called the London Bridge
Plastic Surgery Clinic. Intimate health records such as plastic surgery before and after
images, genital modification images, breast enhancement information were sent to the
media to prove that they had stolen the data [10].
What is worrying about the scale of health data theft is that patients suffer from
data breach consequences and the physical pain of the illnesses they are diagnosed with,
which are sometimes terminal. In addition, health care data is permanent and cannot be
changed like in the case of passwords or credit card numbers. This explains why medical
data is sold at a higher price on untraceable black market websites like the Darkweb.
Dating sites: Dating in the 21st century has changed in various ways but the most
significant of all are the mushrooming mobile dating applications online e.g. Bumble,
Happn, Hinge, Badoo, Tinder, Grindr, Match, eharmony to mention but a few. These
dating sites collect a lot of intimate data used to match users with best-qualifying
partners. Data collected includes geo-location data for matching users with partners in
the neighborhood, pictures, interests, particulars of partners one is interested in, Facebook
IDs, names, email addresses, facebook likes e.t.c. This type of personal data easily attracts
hackers and if not properly secured can be leaked to the public as intruders are constantly
searching for loopholes to compromise the networks.
In 2014, Tinder a major mobile dating app exposed the geo-locations, Facebook IDS,
gender, birthdates, and username of its customers. Tinder connects to Facebook to mine
data from users and their friends’ profiles. This interconnection makes personal data
susceptible to a lot of data breaches that may occur both in Facebook accounts as well as
Tinder accounts.
In another incident, the gay dating app Grindr was reported to have exposed the HIV
status and geolocation data of its customers to third party companies. Its surprising
to know how much private information users are willing to submit on dating apps. For
example, Tinder asks for the details of HIV prevention and exact HIV status which in
turn is used to match with others. Details of the medication users are on, or if the viral
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load is low and HIV can’t be transmitted are also required. This means that whoever got
access to this data could identify the exact location and HIV status and medication used
by the individual [11].
Fitness application data breaches: The emergence of eHealth apps or mobile
health apps has created new revenue generating opportunities for medical companies in
fields like diabetic management by enabling consumers to monitor their health status
continuously. These apps are a big relief to customers and offer very good services towards
health care management. However, current medical apps have continuously collected
personal and sensitive data without traditional scrutiny from medical bodies. The most
used eHealth apps are fitness apps. Several data breaches have been reported in fitness
apps. The Under Amour data breach from its fitness nutrition app MyFitnesspal exposed
150 million data records. The app however exposed partial information of the dataset
comprising of usernames, passwords, and addresses. Other identifiable information like
location information and credit card numbers was not leaked thus reducing the damage
caused [12].
Another fitness app that has reported data breaches is Pumpup, which exposed 6
million records of user data like health data, emails, credit cards, location data, facebook
accounts, private conversations. The data sets were stored on Amazon cloud infrastructure
through an insecure server [13].
In November 2017, Strava a fitness tracking app released a heat map which shows the
activity of its users online. This, however, raised a lot of privacy concerns. The app was
able to expose the activity of military personnel in military bases of war tone areas like
Afghanistan. Thus, endangering personnel in case of a counter-attack from terrorists [14].
Most of the fitness apps are connected to Online Social Networks (OSNs) which are
used to register users. A good example of users’ unawareness is that of a Reddit user. He
asked for advice from Fitbit users about his wife’s device which was faulty due to changes
in the Fitbit tracking measurements. He was surprised to be informed that his wife might
be pregnant which was revealed to be true [15]. This indicates that users are not well
informed about the implications of the data they provide to app companies.
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Privacy concerns also emerge from data collection done in weightloss apps which
provide solutions to weight loss using genetic data. EnbodyDNA a product of the
weightloss app Lose it!, promises weight loss by determining the gene responsible for losing
weight. However, the field of personal genetics is unregulated and users do not understand
who owns the DNA information. The gene information is sent by post without any
information about who has access to it. It is reported that most genetic testing companies
sell user data to third party service providers although users assume its protected [16].
Business domain data breaches: In the business entity, several companies e.g.
E-commerce companies have been hacked into worldwide, for example, banks, online
businesses, credit card companies, ticket vending companies, airline companies, telecom-
munication companies e.t.c. E-Business and E-commerce applications have exponentially
increased in past years. We have seen a rise in Online shops of 80% for internet users in the
UK alone with key major players like Amazon, eBay, Alibaba, Rakuten, Etsy, Craigslist,
eBid. These applications require personal private data in order to do Business-to-Business
(B2B) and Business-to-Customer (B2C) transactions.
Some of the data collected include credit card numbers, products bought, email
addresses, delivery, and payment addresses e.t.c. Companies like Amazon have increased
their advertising potential by using initiatives like amazon prime which also has led to
the increase in customers and thus buying online. The gradual increase in the number of
online customers and online shopping has led to many of the small retail stores on the
high-street closing down.
However, apart from this concern, users are getting troubled about the data being
collected while shopping online. The information collected is used to tailor users preferences
according to details like credit card numbers, postcodes, products bought online e.t.c.
The profiling is used to send tailored adverts to users’ websites and mailboxes. This is
mainly done by third parties. It is not yet clear how large data collection companies on
the market deal with user data. These companies sell user data like browsing history,
online shop email accounts, credit card history, marital status, postcodes to third-party
providers and data brokers for the purpose of advertising. Concerns over the trading of
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credit card details on the black market and on illegal sites like Dark Web for as cheap as
£11 are increasing [17].
The credit monitoring company Equifax faced one of the major data breaches that
exposed a lot of information. Hackers compromised 146.6 million records including social
security numbers, credit card numbers, birthdates, drivers license numbers, passports.
This is half of the US population. This leaked information may affect customers who
need verification from financial creditors to acquire loans once the data gets manipulated
[18]. Another major e-business domain worth mentioning is that of online banking. More
banks are encouraging customers to sign onto online banking. Customers download online
banking apps on their mobile phones regularly and banks encourage customers to sign
onto online banking.
Although mobile banking apps are secured, fingerprinting methods can be used to
track user behavior online using features like the operating systems, email addresses,
gadget type, screen size e.t.c. Certain plugins are able to track user behavior between
different browsers, for example, some banking institutions are known for using cookies
that could potentially distinguish where a customer has a second bank account based on
the browser information and activity.
Most users are not aware of this and are constantly monitored without their permission
and knowledge. Therefore, users have to take caution in what type of information they
provide in online banking and how they do online transactions keeping in mind the data
privacy preferences.
The banking sector has been actively targeted, as was reported in May of 2018 by
two large Canadian banks Simpli Financial and Bank of Montreal. The two banks were
hacked and its estimated that a total of 90,000 clients lost their data which included
personal and account information [19].
Airline companies have also been a target of online hackers. In the summer of 2018,
British Airways was hit by a data breach which saw 380,000 transactions made through
BA.com while making bookings and changes compromised. Holiday makers were disrupted
by the data breach as they were advised by BA to contact their banks or credit card,
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providers. Data stolen included email addresses, names, credit card numbers, CVV
numbers found at the back of the credit cards and expiration dates. Customers were
advised to either close their credit card accounts or monitor transactions on their accounts
closely.
In general, there is a lack of privacy regulation and controls while designing mobile
applications as we have seen in the above-mentioned data breaches. In for example, the
eHealth domain, medical apps have been introduced to aid in patients analysis and disease
management. The major concern though is that many of these apps do not go through
stringent traditional quality controls and scrutiny from medical organizations, although
they do collect a lot of private and personal sensitive data.
Similarly, modern apps e.g. vehicular applications are composed of inbuilt sensors
which are capable of tracking location, social behavior and monitoring of day to day
activities. The collected data is used to infer personal and social movements thereby
generating a lot of privacy concerns. In addition to the sensor data, Vehicle-to-Everything
(V2X) systems have introduced apps to offer services like telematics insurance to their
customers. However, no limitations are put in using geolocation data.
Telematics insurance apps: Another emerging automotive technology is that of
telematics insurance. Telematics insurance applications are on demand as they provide
cheaper alternative insurance policies compared to the traditional car insurance policies.
Privacy concerns have arisen as users are of the opinion that telematics insurance companies
are constantly tracking and monitoring them. Additionally, drivers have concerns about
their data being sold to third-party service providers without their consent. In this thesis,
we focus on telematics mobile applications and investigate the privacy concerns related to
using mobile applications.
In practice, apps have to follow stringent privacy requirements by providing privacy
policies and open privacy practices. However, a major privacy concern that arises is
whether current apps depict what is in the privacy policies they provide to their users? It
is reported that privacy policies of tech giants like Yahoo, Facebook and Google are still
not GDPR compliant much as the GDPR was enforced in May 2018.
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Due to the data breaches named above, privacy awareness has become a major concern
in recent years as companies continue to collect data without users consent. There is
continuous monitoring of users through third-party companies which are outsourced to
provide services to Online Social Networks (OSN).
User’s location and demographic location have been used to profile users as has been
seen by the Cambridge Analytica data scandal [20]. In this work, we investigate current
privacy breaches in mobile apps and aim in finding solutions to existing privacy challenges
faced in designing mobile applications.
1.4 Problem statement
Mobile applications and smart devices have become household items for the majority of
the population. It is estimated that more than 60% of the world’s population owns a
mobile phone. Consequently, there has been a multitude of mobile applications developed
and uploaded on to the Android market known as the Google Play store. However, these
mobile applications come with privacy-related challenges. Android applications may
reveal private data to both third-party applications or app developers.
Android apps use permissions to implement security and privacy. Much as the
permissions are well structured in restricting the apps not to access user’s data, some
apps leak personal data to third-party service providers [21]. Furthermore, users are not
aware of how this data is used by app designers and third party applications.
Users are advised to authorize third-party service providers before their personal
data is shared as envisaged by the EU 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). Such privacy preserving measures have been enacted by the EU legislative
bodies. However, data brokers and third-party service providers continue to share and
sell customers personal and private data [22]. Users are not explicitly told of the data
and the implications of this data being collected.
The key problems of current mobile application development considered in the scope
of this research therefore are:
• A lack of privacy awareness and user empowerment in mobile applications
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• A lack of transparency from the mobile data companies that collect and store the
data and subsequently share it with third parties without users consent.
• Lack of privacy policy implementation and control both at the application level and
requirements and goals development level.
• Improper application design which does not integrate privacy enhancing technologies
and privacy-by-design methodologies at the initial stages of system development
There is a significant gap in the way applications are designed and how users data
is transmitted, stored and managed. The above incidences highlight the need for the
design of less privacy-invasive applications. In this work, we address these challenges
by investigating data collection, privacy policies, and privacy control measures to get
an insight into the design and privacy implementations employed in current mobile
applications. The main purpose of our study is to provide a framework named TRANK,
for designing privacy-aware mobile applications. Through the TRANK framework we
will expand and contribute towards practical knowledge on designing and implementing
future mobile applications.
In detail, the framework;
• Defines privacy, functional and performance goals and designs privacy requirements
using the privacy-by-design notion of the planned application.
• Reviews and redesigns conflicting goals and requirements to meet privacy preserving
standards.
• Performs a functionality, privacy and performance trade-off analysis.
1.5 Thesis Overview
This thesis is structured as follows: In chapter 2 we present the background and related
work of the research we have done in this thesis. Chapter 3 elaborates on the research
methodology and provides the research methods used. Chapter 4 presents the contributions
presented in this study which involve two major empirical studies based on two case
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studies; the eHealth case study and a telematics case study used to investigate current
mobile applications on the market. Chapter 5 presents a privacy aware trade-off analysis
framework (TRANK) which is the core of this thesis. In chapter 6 we provide the technical
implementation of TRANK in form of two mobile applications that act as a proof of
concept for the framework and further presents an evaluation of the research done in this
thesis considering the state-of-art of current mobile applications and the design of privacy
aware applications. Finally chapter 7 gives conclusions to this thesis and future prospects
that need to be considered while building privacy-by-design mobile applications.
1.6 Summary
This chapter provides an introduction to this thesis which attempts to address privacy
and security challenges of current mobile This chapter provides an introduction to this
thesis which attempts to address the privacy and security challenges of current mobile
applications. The motivation section identifies our focus on the privacy-related data
breaches that have occurred in mobile applications. The data breaches have been reported
both in the media and by regulatory bodies. We elaborate that all technology-based
domains are affected by privacy and security flaws that influence both user privacy and
the way businesses are done. In particular, we have discussed the major breaches that
have affected user privacy and security which are caused by systems not being properly
designed and secured. This section presents an extensive discussion of the data breaches
and emphasizes that measures have to be taken to address these issues in an attempt
to reduce the data breaches. In the Problem Statement section, we identify the major
problems faced through the use of mobile applications followed by the Aims and Objectives
of this thesis. Next, we present a Thesis Structure of this work and finally we conclude
with a brief summary of this chapter.
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Background and related work
This chapter presents background information on privacy-preserving mechanisms applied in
general privacy research, which we think plays a great role in designing mobile applications.
Privacy research: One of the most influential definitions of privacy in previous research
is that of legal scholar Alan Westin. He defines privacy as: “the claim of individuals,
groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others” [23]. Considering this definition, we
need to understand how privacy is achieved. Privacy has been extensively discussed in
previous research because individuals are becoming increasingly concerned about their
personal data. Researchers have come up with various approaches to address this, such
as the use of Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) used for encryption [24], firewalls [25],
intrusion-detection systems [26], privacy-by-design [27]( that is privacy-by-architecture
and privacy-by-policy) approaches or privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) [28] to ensure
privacy.
Although these approaches have been commonly adopted, experience has shown that
IT infrastructure systems cannot be protected by such defences alone. We have seen
significant numbers of privacy breach incidents in social media, credit card corporations
etc. Social media companies are attacked repeatedly; for example, in 2013, nearly 2
million accounts’ user names and passwords were reported stolen from social media giants
Facebook, Google, Yahoo and LinkedIn, and other websites. Similarly, almost 40 million
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credit cards’ and debit cards’ personal identification numbers (PINs) were stolen from
the second-largest American retail corporation, Target [29]. Such privacy breaches have
led to the adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies. A privacy-enhancing technology
(PET) can be defined as: “ a system of Information Communication Technology (ICT)
measures protecting informational privacy by eliminating or minimizing personal data
thereby preventing unnecessary or unwanted processing of personal data, without the loss
of the functionality of the information system” [28].
PETs include, among others, data-anonymization methods, data-separation methods
and authorization concepts that are decided upon by users and access controls. PETs
allow individuals to make decisions about how their personal data can be processed
and, most importantly, accommodate the principle of data minimization for personal
information. Next, we present the background concepts and terminologies related to this
thesis.
1. Goal modeling: One of the biggest challenges of privacy modeling is related to
the adequate identification of privacy goals that do not negatively interfere with
the functionality of mobile applications. To date, existing approaches have focused
on goal oriented frameworks in the security domain, for the analysis and design of
system software. These include UML, the Knowledge Acquisition in Automated
Framework (KAOS) [30], the i* framework [31], Tropos and NFRF framework as
explained in [32]. Our research focuses on privacy goal modeling to analyse privacy
goals and concerns in mobile applications.
2. Privacy requirements modeling: Several privacy requirements methodologies
have been employed in the literature, for example, LINDDUN [33] and Pris [34].
However, designing systems to meet privacy requirements is challenging and this is
why privacy modeling is inevitable. Initiatives like the The fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPP) privacy guidelines [35] are therefore important to ensure that
privacy measures are met. FIPPs are used as a guideline to protect privacy especially
how online companies collect and use personal data. Our approach however uses a
privacy and functionality trade-off matrix to improve privacy design in mobile apps.
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• Requirements modelling in Automotive industrial standards: Common prac-
tices in requirements engineering focuses on functional requirements, functional
safety requirements and security requirements. In the automotive industrial
settings, goals are defined using Automotive SPICE which is a status deter-
mination and risk assessment tool [36]. In addition to these methodologies,
requirements engineering management is performed with the management tool:
IBM Dynamic Object Oriented Requirements Management System (DOORS)
Next generation. We employed IBM DOORS for requirements management in
V2X telematics application design.
• Requirements modelling in eHealth apps: Google Play Store has guidelines on
designing privacy policies for all apps that are to be published on the Google
play website. We observed a variety of tools used to design requirements in
current apps ranging from using mockups tools like mockplus [37] to using
wireframes with tools like Balsamiq [38] for designing the requirements speci-
fication document. We applied mockplus to model requirements for eHealth
applications. However, more research is required to design privacy requirements
during the initial stages of eHealth app development.
3. Trade-off analysis methods: A trade off analysis explores situations in which
factors are not attainable at the same time. This must be solved by balancing
two opposite situations or qualities to get a best match. Several approaches have
been proposed to model and analyse architectural and security requirements trade-
offs. These include the Architecture trade-off Analysis (ATAM) [39], and the
Security Verification and solution Design Trade-off analysis approach (SVDT) [40].
However, managing privacy trade-offs has not been extensively studied in existing
literature. Our approach focuses on the design of a privacy trade-off at the initial
stages of mobile applications development with a focus on app functionality, data
collection and privacy policies and how these impact privacy preservation in modern
applications.
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2.1 Privacy-by-design concepts
This section presents three major privacy design concepts which are based on the paradigm
of designing mobile application by implementing privacy-by-default. The term privacy-
by-default in this thesis, relates to designing mobile applications according to privacy-by-
architecture and privacy-by-policy. These privacy design concepts are crucial in imple-
menting privacy and data protection at the initial stages of system development. They
are part of the privacy and data protection law and emphasize that privacy should be
considered upfront while designing mobile applications. Technical and organizational
measures should be implemented in advance in the development life-cycle to ensure user
privacy is protected. In particular this means that companies have to integrate privacy
protection technologies through the whole system development cycle. Privacy has to be
integrated by default in the seven phases of the development life-cycle which are; system
planning, requirements analysis, system design, system development, testing, system
deployment and system maintenance. Companies and organizations that collect, store,
control and process data must be committed to establish a privacy aware culture through
out the whole companies processes. This must be done for example, by training staff on
privacy protection measures and techniques. The privacy-by default concept, therefore,
plays a significant role in designing current mobile applications due to the massive data
collection involved. To curb privacy concerns significant efforts have been made in research
and development to improve these concepts [27] [41], [42]. This thesis, explores to which
extent these concepts have been implemented in current mobile applications. In the
following, we will elaborate in detail on these concepts to clearly understand the related
background terminologies used. First, we outline some of the organizations and bodies
that regulate privacy development.
Privacy regulation bodies and principles There exists a number of privacy regula-
tion bodies and privacy principles that have been developed to assist in the implementation
of privacy in both industry and legal frameworks. The most recent development that
has attracted major attention is the introduction of the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) 2016/697, in May 2018. GDPR is discussed extensively in section
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2.4. Several other principles also exist, these include Fair Information Practice Principles
(FIPPs). FIPPs are a set of standards used to monitor the collection of personal data
across different countries. They comprise eight major principles which guide companies on
how they may use personal information in business transaction processes. Another privacy
implementation body’s principles worth mentioning are the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) privacy principles, which consist of privacy and
data protection laws agreed upon by OECD member countries. Similar principles have
been generated by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). APEC devised the
APEC privacy framework to safeguard information privacy across its 21 member states.
The protection of privacy has become a major concern, especially as companies have
continued to collect users’ data without their consent. The current increase in privacy
breaches has, therefore, resulted in governments and legislature bodies, working in part-
nership with commercial bodies, intervening in order to protect user data. A set of key
principles that have been adopted are the Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPPs)
[43]. GAPPs were developed by a privacy task force of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants to address
the challenges companies were facing through privacy breaches. GAPPs comprise 10
major principles which organizations can use to protect user privacy, especially personal
identifiable information and protected health information.
These organizations play a major role in regulating privacy preservation on a general
basis, we will now give an overview of the privacy-by-design concepts used in this thesis
in detail, that is privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy.
2.1.1 Privacy-by-architecture
Privacy-by-architecture approaches aim at protecting data by using techniques like cryp-
tography, zero-knowledge proofs and pseudonyms, that prevent attackers from accessing
data. A pseudonym is an identifier of a subject, in the setting of the sender or recipient,
other than one of the subject’s real name. A subject is pseudonymous if a pseudonym is
used as an identifier instead of one of its real names. Pseudonyms are a set of short-term
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identifiers that ensure privacy of the user by hiding the real identity of the sender. The
privacy-by-architecture approach was initially introduced in [27]. Spiekermann and Cranor
presented guidelines for building privacy-friendly systems using privacy-by-architecture.
The method for addressing privacy-by-architecture minimizes the collection of personal
data and emphasizes randomization, client-side data storage and processing. This involves
using client-centric architectures which embed anonymous transactions that prevent
adversaries from performing unauthorized access controls. Privacy-by-architecture em-
ploys anonymity based technologies which focus on protecting user identity. In practice,
pseudonyms is used to protect Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
Data obfuscation technologies are further used to prevent linking PII to individuals.
This may be done by creating ambiguous applications to prevent reverse engineering
applications and linking information back to the source. Several research approaches
have been proposed to design systems using privacy-by-architecture techniques especially
pseudonyms. There are four major categories of pseudonym schemes, namely: (1) based
on asymmetric cryptography, (2) based on identity-based cryptography, (3) based on
group signatures, (4) based on symmetric cryptography. In the following we elaborate on
some of the research where pseudonyms have been used to design applications based on
the privacy-by-architecture concept in the vehicular communication domain.
Petit et al. [44] conduct a survey of pseudonym schemes in vehicular networks. The
authors categorize pseudonym schemes based on the cryptographic means they employ.
The four major categories are schemes based on asymmetric cryptography, schemes based
on identity-based cryptography, schemes based on symmetric cryptography and group-
signature schemes. They propose an abstract pseudonym life cycle, make a comparison of
the various schemes and present their advantages and disadvantages. However, there is
no detailed discussion of multi-domain privacy in this work.
Feiri et al. [45] outline problems specific to the real-world deployment of pseudonyms in
vehicular networks. The authors find that using pseudonyms does not guarantee privacy, as
vehicles are attached to short-term identities to provide accountability and non-repudiation.
Although passengers expect privacy in the form of anonymity, pseudonym-change strategies
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only offer unlinkability with small immobile adversaries. They stress that it might be
necessary to find out whether the cost and complexity of using pseudonyms is worth the
limited level of privacy achieved. This paper does not provide any evaluation concerning
privacy in cross-domain settings of V2X communication.
Fonseca et al. [46] propose a multi-layer scheme which provides privacy at different
layers and packet-forwarding schemes that employ packet-caching. Their scheme employs
an extended location service which uses a secure routing protocol to provide message
authentication based on digital signatures and asymmetric cryptography. They present
four major solutions based on: (1) a cross-layer addressing concept (2) an extended
location service (3) pseudonymity-enhanced packet forwarding and (4) link-layer callbacks.
Their proof of concept of an OBU communication system observed that a delay in the
packet forwarding-process during pseudonym changes can be reduced to enable unicast
communications. Although this approach offers an enhanced packet-forwarding scheme
based on pseudonym-caching, this may lead to an increase in the communication overhead.
In addition, it employs a unicast wireless multi-hop connection between two nodes and
geocast broadcasting of data packets, which are susceptible to geo-location tracking, thus
endangering users’ privacy.
Foerster et al. [47] present three privacy-preserving approaches, namely, the basic
pseudonym scheme, the PUCA scheme and a credentials-based approach. The PUCA
scheme implements full anonymity and uses anonymous credentials for privacy-friendly
authentication with back-end providers when requesting pseudonym certificates. A
question left unanswered is how privacy-preserving mechanisms used to protect back-end
servers, especially for users data traversing multiple domains, are to be implemented.
Armknecht et al. [48] propose the use of PKI+ as a solution to enhancing cross-layer
privacy. They observe that the use of PKI+ has an advantage due to the small data
size resulting from the revocation of all its certificates, thus size of the communication
overhead. Using PKI+ provides users with anonymity by applying OBUs that are linked
to GIDs by an authority. Tracking is avoided by changing pseudonyms frequently, and
since vehicles generate there own pseudonyms an adversary cannot link old pseudonyms
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to new ones. Though this paper claims good cross-layer privacy results by employing
PKI+, the paper does not provide an evaluation of the approach.
In [49], the Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Authentication (PPAA) scheme based on a
group-signature scheme is proposed, in which a VANET is considered to be a P2P system.
PPAA focuses on privacy and accountability; more notably, both clients and servers
are peer users with privacy concerns. The study’s major contribution is that peers are
pseudonymous to one another but are anonymous and unlinkable to other peers in the
network. This results in a high level of anonymity between peers, though a question that
remains to be answered is how the revoking of misbehaving vehicles is to be solved.
Sun et al. [50] propose a pseudonymous authentication scheme (PASS), which reduces
the revocation-cost and certificate-updating overhead by using hash chains to reduce the
certificate revocation list (CRL). Their approach employs a proxy re-signature technique
used for updating certificates. The authors disclose that in comparison to other related
schemes, their approach has the smallest communication overhead and provides unlinka-
bility between RSU and vehicles. However, it is not clear how the certificate authority
(CA) is to manage issued certificates without having full control. The problem of having
a single point of failure at the CA, which may be used to attack the system, still exists.
Weimerskirch [51] distinguishes privacy in two major categories: Privacy against 3rd
party entities and privacy against authorities. Privacy against 3rd party entities involves
the use of pseudonyms to ensure anonymity and unlinkability. Privacy against authorities
involves sharing of power by V2X authorities (e.g. certificate authority and registration
authority) to enable the recovery of privacy-sensitive information. The paper neither
provides an implementation nor an evaluation of the solutions mentioned, merely outlining
concerns over privacy deployment in V2X systems.
Widersheim et al. [52] present an exploratory study of an attacker using a Multiple
Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) approach to vehicular networks. The results show that even
with changing pseudonyms, an attacker is able to track vehicles and relate pseudonyms to
specific drivers, even under noisy data, thereby raising questions about the effectiveness
of pseudonymous schemes in V2X networks and the level of achievable privacy protection.
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Lu et al. present. [53] a pseudonym-changing strategy (PCS), which aims to achieve
a high level of location privacy in areas where a lot of vehicles gather, for example at
intersections, in parking areas or at traffic lights termed social spots. They develop
anonymity-set analytical models and employ game theory to investigate the privacy levels
attained by using a PCS strategy. Though their evaluation of changing pseudonyms at a
small social spot (e.g an intersection) and a large large social spot ( e.g a parking area),
they attempt to assess the problem of location privacy; however, there is lack of detail to
solve the problem of privacy protection in mixed zones for both small and large social
spots.
Qu et al. [54] present a review of VANETs and outline methods for providing vehicles
with changing pseudonyms, which include preloading pseudonyms in tamper-proof devices
(TPDs). The authors point out that these mechanisms are insufficient because vehicles need
a large storage capacity to keep anonymous public keys. In addition, revoking malicious
nodes uses a large storage space. The paper further notes that having pseudonyms using
RSUs is insufficient if the limited wireless channel bandwidth is taken into consideration,
because transmitting hundreds of certificates is difficult, especially with peak vehicle
densities. The authors observe that using authentication to secure VANETS poses privacy
risks to users and that many privacy protocols improve privacy at the cost of safety, as
demonstrated by random silent periods. The paper conducts a review and provides no
evaluation of the proposed methods for changing pseudonyms.
Feiri et al. [45] outline problems specific to the real-world deployment of pseudonyms in
vehicular networks. The authors find that using pseudonyms does not guarantee privacy, as
vehicles are attached to short-term identities to provide accountability and non-repudiation.
Although passengers expect privacy in the form of anonymity, pseudonym-change strategies
only offer unlinkability with small immobile adversaries. They stress that it might be
necessary to find out whether the cost and complexity of using pseudonyms is worth the
limited level of privacy achieved. This paper does not provide any evaluation concerning
privacy in cross-domain settings of V2X communication.
Song et al. [55] explore challenges and solutions arising from using pseudonym
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technology for privacy protection in e-services. Their paper examines two types of
pseudonym-technology requirements, namely, privacy-related requirements and security-
related requirements. Under privacy-related requirements fall pseudonymity, unlinkability
and property-sharing resistance. Security-related requirements, on the other hand, include
authentication, security of users’ secret keys and the security of protocols. The paper
further lists important pseudonym technologies, such as e-cash, e-ticket and e-voting, and
describes privacy applications that have been implemented in these systems to provide
anonymity and unlinkability. However, there is no evaluation of the privacy technologies
applied.
Karragianis et al. [56] undertake a detailed analysis of vehicular networks, including
their characteristics, standardization efforts, projects undertaken (in Europe, Japan and
USA) and finally the challenges faced in vehicular communication environments. Among
other details, the authors observe that one of the solutions of solving linkability between
pseudonyms is to use silent periods and the creation of groups that prevent messages sent
in one group being listened to by vehicles in another group. The second solution given
is to use mixed zones, which share a secret key. If vehicles leave the mixed zone, keys
are exchanged, thus protecting location privacy. This survey, however, does not take into
consideration the issue of data privacy in multiple domains of vehicular communication
components.
Analogous to the vehicular domain, current mobile applications gather a lot sensitive
data and face numerous privacy challenges. There is growing concern about the immense
amounts of private data being collected and processed; thus, in an attempt to reduce
potential privacy risks, the key challenge is to safeguard personal data during data flows
across mobile application processes. This is the major drive behind this thesis. Much
as anonymisation techniques have been used in other domains like mobile networks
and Intellectual property to protect privacy by privacy-by-architecture, data collection
companies continue to collect PII without such measures being put in place. The major
drive behind this phenomenon is the use of online target advertising which greatly
compromises user privacy. Therefore, we advocate for mobile application designers to
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consider privacy protection while designing mobile application that involve sensitive
data traversing multiple sources and domains during system development. Subsequently,
mobile application development has to be regulated by legal entities that ensure that
they are built based on standardized solutions to close the gap of building applications
without integrating privacy-by-architecture.
2.1.2 Privacy-by-policy
Privacy-by-policy as described in [27] focuses on the notice and choice principle. Notice
is the presentation of terms used in a document which may be presented as a privacy
document with terms of the agreement or a privacy policy. Choice on the other hand is
the the action of accepting the terms and conditions offered in the privacy document or
policy by either signing the privacy document or clicking on an agree button e.g in an
privacy policy given to data subjects online. User privacy depends on how the policies
governing a system are integrated and managed in an organization. The notice and
choice principle involves notifying data subjects of how there data is going to be used.
They have a choice to either consent or decline. This highly depends on the way the
system is designed and managed by system operators to enable user control, access control
to collected data. In practice, companies tend to employ privacy-by-policy ordinarily
than privacy-by-architecture as system administrators often lack the knowledge to design
privacy preserving technologies. Therefore, there is a gap in educating system managers
on how privacy can be enhanced in mobile applications. The other major gap facing
current mobile applications is the assumption that the giant data collecting corporations
can be trusted to protect the data they collect. Likewise, data subjects assume that
the documents they sign while providing PII e.g. privacy policies can be enforced by
government legal entities. This is not always the case as we have seen a number of privacy
breaches and misuse done by giant corporations that have not been penalized. Therefore,
data subjects have to be enlightened on privacy protection methodologies so that they
can choose which type of data is subjected to data collecting companies. Next, we will
elaborate more on the implementation of the privacy-by-policy concepts that have been
24
Chapter 2 Privacy-by-design concepts
initiated legally as an effort to protect user privacy.
Privacy-by-policy from a legal perspective: Privacy-by-policy is regulated by
legal entities in order for the privacy documents and privacy policies to be effective. This
thesis is based on the General Data Protection regulation (GDPR) and focuses mainly
on the EU regulations. We have grouped the into two categories : legislature based on
Notice principles and legislature based on Choice principles.
EU data protection regulation from the perspective of Notice principles: The EU
data protection laws stipulate that data controllers have to inform data subjects about
the data they collect and this is legally provided under article 14 of the General data
protection regulation (GDPR) [57]. Below is an excerpt of article 14 which explains the
legal measures to be taken before processing data.
1. Where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject, the controller
shall provide the data subject with the following information:
(a) the identity and the contact details of the controller and, where applicable, of
the controller’s representative;
(b) the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable;
(c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well
as the legal basis for the processing;
(d) the categories of personal data concerned;
(e) the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any;
(f) where applicable, that the controller intends to transfer personal data to a
recipient in a third country or international organization and the existence or
absence of an adequacy decision by the Commission, or in the case of transfers
referred to in Article 46 or 47, or the second sub paragraph of Article 49(1),
reference to the appropriate or suitable safeguards and the means to obtain a
copy of them or where they have been made available.
2. In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the controller shall
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provide the data subject with the following information necessary to ensure fair and
transparent processing in respect of the data subject:
(a) the period for which the personal data will be stored, or if that is not possible,
the criteria used to determine that period;
(b) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller or by a third party;
(c) the existence of the right to request from the controller access to and rectifica-
tion or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data
subject and to object to processing as well as the right to data portability;
(d) where processing is based on point (a) of Article 6(1) or point (a) of Article
9(2), the existence of the right to withdraw consent at any time, without
affecting the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal;
(e) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority;
(f) from which source the personal data originate, and if applicable, whether it
came from publicly accessible sources;
(g) the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in
Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about
the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences
of such processing for the data subject.
3. The controller shall provide the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2:
(a) within a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data, but at the latest
within one month, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the
personal data are processed;
(b) if the personal data are to be used for communication with the data subject,
at the latest at the time of the first communication to that data subject; or
(c) if a disclosure to another recipient is envisaged, at the latest when the personal
data are first disclosed.
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4. Where the controller intends to further process the personal data for a purpose other
than that for which the personal data were obtained, the controller shall provide
the data subject prior to that further processing with information on that other
purpose and with any relevant further information as referred to in paragraph 2.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not apply where and insofar as:
(a) the data subject already has the information;
(b) the provision of such information proves impossible or would involve a dis-
proportionate effort, in particular for processing for archiving purposes in the
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes,
subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in Article 89(1) or in
so far as the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is likely to
render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of
that processing. In such cases the controller shall take appropriate measures
to protect the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests,
including making the information publicly available;
(c) obtaining or disclosure is expressly laid down by Union or Member State law
to which the controller is subject and which provides appropriate measures to
protect the data subject’s legitimate interests; or
(d) where the personal data must remain confidential subject to an obligation
of professional secrecy regulated by Union or Member State law, including a
statutory obligation of secrecy.
EU data protection regulation from the perspective of Choice principles: Lawful data
processing must be done subsequent to data subjects consent. This means that data
recipients have to explicitly inform data subjects of the intentions of how they are to
process data. Consent is referenced in article 7 of the General Data Protection regulation
as follows;
1. Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall be able to demonstrate
that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data.
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2. If the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration which
also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner
which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily
accessible form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration
which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding.
3. The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time.
The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on
consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be
informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.
4. When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of
whether, interalia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service,
is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary
for the performance of that contract.
At the time of writing this thesis a year after the GDPR was enacted, large mobile
application corporations like Google and Facebook have not fully integrated its regulations.
Subsequently, CNIL, the data protection regulator in France have issued a €50 million
penalty to Google for not complying to the GDPR regulations [58]. With this limitation of
existing privacy protecting approaches in current mobile applications, we call for stringent
enforcement of GDPR regulations and other data privacy regulation laws in current and
future mobile applications.
Hybrid approach: In [27], guidelines for building privacy-friendly systems using two
approaches: privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy were presented. The method
for addressing privacy-by-architecture minimizes the collection of personal data and
emphasizes randomization, client-side data storage and processing. The privacy-by-policy
method, on the other hand, focuses on the implementation of notice-and-choice principles
for fair information practices. The authors further, point out that, according to current IT
architectures, there are three technical domains for building privacy-friendly technologies
and information systems: user sphere, recipient sphere and joint sphere. The user sphere
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encloses a user device, it should be fully controllable by the user who owns it and data
should not flow without the user being able to control it. The recipient sphere is a
company-centric sphere of data control that involves back-end infrastructure and data-
sharing networks. The joint sphere includes companies that host people’s data and provide
additional services.
Enhancing privacy across different domains can be analyzed via the following key
questions:
• How is individual privacy maintained when data are crossing many boundaries
(data in motion)1, that is, from the user-sphere domain to joint and recipient sphere
domains?
• How do we ensure individual privacy for data at rest 2 and avoid secondary and
tertiary(n-ary) further processing of data in the joint and recipient spheres?
• How do we ensure that the trade-off between application functionality(effectivity)
and privacy is minimized to improve customers’ confidence in emerging mobile
applications?
We take into account the approach presented in [27] to design privacy-preserving
systems using privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy which play a crucial role in
building mobile applications, especially in the early stages of development. In general, a
hybrid of the two concepts is required for building robust privacy aware mobile applications
[60].
Therefore, there is a need for a clear-cut method of implementing a hybrid of privacy-
by-architecture and privacy-by-policy techniques in mobile applications to ensure that
policies are put in control over their personal data. We refer to user-privacy in mobile
applications as the protection of information, such as location data, name, driving route
and user identity, which can be used by an adversary for illegal tracing and user-profiling.
In order to achieve this goal, we need to do the following:
1Data in Motion are data that are traversing the network, or temporarily residing in a computer
memory to be read, updated or forwarded to another data-processing service [59].
2Data at Rest refer to ’inactive data’ physically stored in databases, data warehouses, spreadsheets,
archives, tapes, offsite backups or on mobile devices [59].
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1. Specify requirements for implementing mobile application design processes using
privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy.
2. Identify clearly what the privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy principles
mean in the mobile application domain.
3. Specify the privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy best practices applicable in
mobile applications and make them accessible to policymakers and design engineers.
Next, we will elaborate on privacy challenges involved in designing mobile applications.
2.2 Privacy-by-design challenges
Data-management systems typically perform data transfers, data storage and data pro-
cessing. With this in mind it is important to understand how privacy breaches can occur
and how to counter them. Spiekermann and Cranor [27] analysed privacy requirements on
the basis of privacy sensitive processes, user perceptions and concerns. Privacy concerns
can be subdivided into three major spheres. First, users are concerned about data being
collected and processed in the user sphere or their personal systems without user awareness.
In particular, privacy concerns arise over unauthorized collection, unauthorized execution,
exposure and unwanted inflows and outflows of data. Second, after a transfer of data
from the user sphere, they are hosted by companies in the joint sphere. Here, users do
not have any control over their data and, therefore, they are concerned about their data
being exposed, unauthorized secondary use and improper access by external third parties.
Third, data storage in back-end infrastructure systems is a major concern as data are
stored without users’ consent and so users need to trust the recipients in the remote
sphere. Therefore, steps must be taken to ensure that internal and external unauthorized
uses of data, improper access to data by third parties, and errors in data are avoided.
Spiekerman and Cranors’ suggestion to design privacy-preserving systems using privacy-
by-architecture and privacy-by-policy has similarities with our research; however, prior
work has documented that privacy-by-design is a vague concept [61] which leaves many
open issues regarding the application of its methods and the translation of its principles
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to actual designs of system engineering. For example, each company or commercial party
can decide individually how privacy-by-design is implemented. Much as this approach is
innovative, it does come with certain disadvantages, e.g. users, such as policymakers, local
authorities etc, have to understand how each company implements privacy-by-design.
Furthermore, existing privacy approaches, such as privacy-by-design or PETs, are,
however, still challenging when directly transferred to mobile communication systems due
to the way in which these systems are built and implemented. The distributed nature of
mobile applications makes existing privacy approaches that are implemented for different
stakeholders or entities very difficult to assess because of random mobility and frequent
disconnection.
To enforce personal data privacy, in particular Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
across multiple parties, Pearson et al. propose sticky policies, which may also be considered
a privacy-by-design approach. Sticky policies (disclosure policies) can be used to allow
the selective disclosure of any aggregation or combination of confidential information
[15]. Protecting PII is vital, because it contains data that can be traced to a particular
individual. Such data are sensitive and may contain: passwords, email addresses, social
security numbers, personal identification numbers, medical data or financial data. The
authors state that much as substantial research has been conducted to provide mechanisms
for online privacy management, major issues remain, such as how to give more control to
end users and how to gather and manage end-users’ content. In this regard, an approach
based on sticky policies was determined. Sticky policies are conditions and constraints
attached to data that describe how data are to be used. Sticky policies help in controlling
how data are to be accessed and used, or how data are accompanied through an entire
distributed system [16]. The use of sticky policies is a good idea for protecting user data;
however, previous research has mainly focused on encryption techniques that can finally be
traced back to the user. Thus, sticky policies are not enough to effectively handle secondary
and tertiary(n-ary) scenarios because there still exist privacy risks related to the abuse of
information by parties with legitimate access to back-end servers and databases. There
also remains a need for an effective method of protecting user data during information flows
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across organizational boundaries and cross-domain boundaries in the system development
process. Cross-domain privacy is the process of protecting information transmitted
between different domains which have different levels of mutual trust. This refers to user
data that flows from a mobile device or application to other organizational boundaries and
entities in the mobile communication architecture. Mobile communication systems are
composed of largely independent subsystems with multiple domain boundaries, making it
hard for user privacy to be maintained across different domains. There still exists a trade-
off between privacy and application functionality(effectivity) when developing mobile
communication systems. Much as most of us are aware that functionality (effectivity)
and privacy are desirable, we understand that enjoying one will lead to giving up the
other. This trade-off has been part of our lives and our choices. However, corporations are
increasingly building user profiles without users’ knowledge and thus users are gradually
losing the option of choice. Similarly there is a trade-off between privacy and security.
As users reflect a heightened concern for security, the nothing-to-hide argument often
declared by users necessitates a higher demand for security than privacy. This means
users are willing to give out their personal information as long as they have nothing to
hide or, to put it differently, if users feel they only engage in legal activity, then they do
not have to worry about surveillance or data-mining. The nothing-to-hide argument has
been extensively discussed by Solove [62]. However, there is little research on the impact
of the nothing-to-hide phenomenon or the trade-off between functionality and privacy in
current mobile-application systems.
Our research will also target this problem area. In particular, we argue that user data
collection, user data processing and user data dissemination increase the vulnerability
to potential abuse of user information as users do not have a say in how their data are
processed. The key challenge in our research is the privacy of user data during data flows
across the entire mobile application architecture. The hyper-connectivity and constant
distribution of messages between mobile applications involves multiple privacy risks. For
example, the manipulation of data on a mobile device may cause problems for applications
running on other connected devices, resulting in privacy infringements. Also, mobile
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applications require the collection of massive amounts of data, e.g. past and present
location data. This data is aggregated and sent to back-end systems, such as data control
centers, for further processing. This type of data collection poses privacy challenges; for
instance, data crossing domain boundaries can be intercepted when being sent from a
mobile application to its destination. Similarly, data stored in back-end databases can be
manipulated. The large volumes of data collected make them more appealing to attackers.
Mobile applications involve multiple actors, meaning that secondary/tertiary leakage or
abuse of personal information is highly possible because the user has no control in terms
of how their data are used at secondary and tertiary levels. Therefore, there is an urgent
need to design privacy preserving mobile applications that provide cross-domain data
security and privacy. Thus, preventing unauthorized secondary/tertiary usage of data for
the successful deployment of mobile applications is key.
The aforementioned privacy vulnerabilities indicate that personal information in
mobile applications is not as secure or inaccessible as users may assume. There exist
implicit possibilities for user privacy breaches, such as tracking users’ movements and
the generation of user profiles through privacy and security leakages. In addition, it is
not only security leakages that pose privacy threats, the systems accessing users’ data
can also enable profiling, and this can be disastrous if these data are leaked to less
ethical organizations and adversaries. The following section provides privacy engineering
methodologies that are used to design some of the current privacy preserving applications.
2.3 Privacy design strategies
Hoepeman introduces eight privacy design strategies which are derived from Spiekermanns
and Cranors’ framework for privacy-friendly system design. We will now discuss the eight
strategies from a mobile application design perspective. in relation to designing mobile
applications.
• Minimise: The first strategy is to minimise and it states that: “The amount of per-
sonal information that is processed should be minimal.” This strategy is in alignment
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with our approach to designing mobile applications, especially where companies are
reported to continuously collect data and personal identifiable information without
consent from data subjects. We emphasize minimal data collection by modern apps,
especially so if users can be identified and monitored when using mobile apps.
• Hide: The hide strategy states that: “ Any personal information that is processed
should be hidden from plain view.” In our view, in most mobile applications data
are transferred to back-end servers without any form of anonymity or data-hiding
techniques. This has led to the possibility of personal data being compromised,
although initial authentication, e.g. by using passwords, has been done on the client
side. Also, data sets in databases are not anonymised. Therefore, this strategy
should be implemented to reduce privacy data breaches that occur in both back-end
servers and mobile application application databases.
• Separate: The separate strategy states that: “The processing of personal infor-
mation should be done in a distributed fashion whenever possible.” Privacy is best
implemented with decentralized systems which do not allow the generation of user
profiles. Distributed mobile applications should therefore be in a position to run on
different database systems so that the tracking of data subjects is avoided.
• Aggregate: Aggregation is an important strategy in the design of mobile ap-
plications. The aggregate strategy states that: “Personal information should be
processed at the highest level of aggregation and with the least possible detail such
that it is (still) useful ”. Once personal information is aggregated it makes it harder
for adversaries to identify and monitor their subjects. A good example of such
an implementation is the changes that STRAVA put in place after a heat-map
data dump revealed location information about its users. The map zoom level was
reduced so that maps were not able to reveal users’ precise locations without further
authentication. Therefore, aggregating data to protect user privacy plays a crucial
role in implementing privacy in mobile applications.
• Inform: This strategy is mentioned in most well-known privacy principles. It states
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that: “Data subjects should be adequately informed whenever personal information
is processed.” However, the industry has not been keen on informing data subjects
about the personal information that is collected. In most cases, regarding what is
seen in privacy policies, data subjects are required to pay a fee in order to get details
about their personal data collected by companies. Information about personal data
collected should therefore be accessible without paying any service fees so as to
improve trust and openness in mobile applications
• Control: The control strategy states that “ Data subjects should have agency over
the processing of their personal information.” Data subjects should be able to check
how their personal data are used. Regulation has to be imposed on the collecting
companies so that checks and measures are put in place to ensure that privacy
principles are adhered to.
• Enforce: The enforce strategy states that: “A privacy policy compatible with legal
requirements should be in place and be enforced.” This is in sync with what we
advocate in this research. Our focus is on how privacy policies are implemented.
In current mobile apps, privacy policies are not in sync with the data collected by
mobile-application companies. Therefore, regulations that require the enforcement
of privacy policies have to be enacted, not only in privacy policy statements but
also in how collected data are used and processed.
• Demonstrate: The demonstrate strategy states that: “Companies must be able to
demonstrate compliance with their privacy policy and any applicable legal require-
ments.” Compliance is a crucial step in privacy implementation, especially from a
legal perspective. Companies should be able to prove that their systems are privacy
compliant and adhere to privacy principles and guidelines. Companies may be
compliant through certification, which is one way in which users may determine
which companies they can trust to handle their personal data in a privacy-preserving
manner.
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2.4 Privacy design and legal aspects
The EU general data protection regulation (GDPR) [57] was effected on 25 May 2018.
It contains 99 articles and 173 recitals. GDPR’s major aim is to protect user data and
privacy in European Union member states and during cross-border data transfers to third
countries. After taking effect many companies have redesigned their privacy statements
to meet the privacy demands proposed by GDPR. In the following we highlight some of
the articles that are given major emphasis in this thesis.
• Article 16: Right to rectification:
“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue
delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her..”
This article refers to the ability of the data subject to rectify inaccurate data that
have been collected by data controllers without delay. This, however, has recently
been massively abused in mobile applications, as seen in the rising cases of "fake
news". The fake news phenomenon has proven very hard to rectify and critics say
that it has turned into a major security risk. Spreading false news for personal
gain has drastically increased, especially through social media platforms, and has,
unfortunately, proved very hard to correct. Therefore, the right to rectification plays
a major role in the design of modern mobile applications and should be integrated
into the application development process by default.
• Article 17: Right to erasure(right to be forgotten):
“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of
personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall
have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay.”
The right to erasure or to be forgotten plays an important role in the design of
mobile applications. This involves the deletion of data that are considered old and
outdated according to the duration for which they have been published. Examples
of such data may include convictions of data subjects, unwanted information about
individuals published through company URLs that could be used against them
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when buying say insurance, taking out a mortgage or searching for jobs. There have
been a couple of cases where data subjects have complained of their data online
being erased by data controllers, such as Google, as in the case of Google Spain
SL v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos. As a result, measures have been
implemented by data-collection firms, such as Facebook and Google, to remove
URLs in a bid to implement the right to erasure. In this thesis, we emphasize the
right to be forgotten or the the right to erasure, especially in mobile communication
applications where the data subject does not have full deletion control over their
data held by data-collecting companies. We observed that most mobile applications
to date had not put this into effect. Therefore, more attention should be paid to
implementing data-erasure policies and techniques in the initial stages of application
development.
• Article 20: Right to data portability:
“The data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or
her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used
and machine-readable format...”
Data portability involves data subjects requesting information about the data being
collected about them. This article plays an important role and ensures that data
subjects are well informed about the data they submit to various data-collection
companies. If needs be, they are able to delete them or request their deletion as
envisaged in article 17. In this thesis we observe that most mobile applications
still lack a mechanism to implement data-portability procedures. Some companies
have explicitly included clauses about how to request information about the data
collected from data subjects in their privacy policies. However, this always comes
with a fee payable to the company. This means that data subjects are reluctant to
request information about data being collected, especially if it requires paying a fee.
Therefore, better measures have to be put in place to ensure that data-collection
companies implement the right to data portability without charging data subjects.
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• Article 21: Right to Object:
“The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her
particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or
her...”
Data subjects have a right to stop data controllers processing their data. This means
that companies have to accept data subjects’ demands and stop processing without
any delay. However, data controllers do not have to delete data they have collected
in the process. So this means that although companies can stop the data processing
for, say, marketing purposes, they still retain the data. This is common in mobile
applications, especially when companies retain data for research purposes. These
data can easily be sold to third-party service providers who can in turn process
them further. While the data have to be processed in a more secure way, using
data minimisation principles and pseudonymisation techniques, many data breaches
still occur, which thus calls for immediate attention in this field of research. In
this research, we call for the deletion of all data collected once data subjects have
requested a halt to processing them.
• Article 22: Automated individual decision-making, including profiling:
“The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on
automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”
This article restricts data controllers from obtaining personal information for pro-
filing using automated processing. This means that companies are not allowed to
make decisions or collect any information that is used to classify users based on, for
example, personal facts, health data, interests, lifestyle or where they live automati-
cally, without any human intervention. Automated decision-making systems are
on the increase, especially in social media platforms and search engines which use
machine-learning and data-science algorithms to identify user preferences for use
in targeted advertising. Article 22 therefore aims to protect data subjects against
such automated decision-making processes. It requires data controllers to inform
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data subjects of any automated decision-making done while collecting data.
• Article 25: Data protection by design and by default:
“..The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures
for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific
purpose of the processing are processed.”
This article is the main focus of this thesis. We argue that controllers should
implement privacy-protection measures in the initial stages of development, and
especially that privacy should be implemented by default and not as a response
measure after privacy breaches have taken place. In this way data subjects are
protected from the beginning of the data-collection procedure.
• Article 32: Security of processing:
“...the controller and the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organ-
isational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including
inter alia as appropriate.”
Data controllers and companies that process personal data must put in place
technical security mechanisms that ensure that the security of user data is maintained.
This may be done using policies and data-protection processes that ensure that risks
are addressed and controls are put in place to protect users’ data. In our research
we mainly focus on data collected in mobile applications. Different apps should
include mechanisms that protect user data not only at the app level but also during
data transfer and in back end servers that store personal data. Risks should be
minimised by introducing security controls that mitigate attacks. This can be done
using pseudonyms or end-to-end security encryption, e.g. as implemented in mobile
applications such as WhatsApp. In this way, data-transfer processing is secured
against potential attackers especially for data in motion. Our research emphasizes
the implementation of security controls that regularly assess if security measures are
applied. To date, privacy and security techniques are not regularly used to enforce
security in mobile apps.
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• Article 34: Communication of a personal data breach to the data subject:
“When the personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and
freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall communicate the personal data
breach to the data subject without undue delay.”
This article refers to data collectors notifying data subjects of any data breaches
that occur. In the event of any data leak, companies have to inform individuals
about the leak and the risks involved. This can be communicated via email, as
in the case of Yahoo! data breaches where hackers managed to compromise user
accounts in 2013. The data leak exposed the email addresses, passwords, dates
of birth, security questions, answers to security questions and hashed passwords
of all 3 billion users. Such data breaches must be communicated to the users in
order for data subjects to be able to change their credentials so that hackers are
prevented from using them. As a result, Yahoo! took action and notified all users
who were affected to change their passwords and security questions. This was also
communicated on its website so that users could change their credentials. This
article has therefore been well implemented by giant data controllers, but little has
been done in the area of mobile applications to apply it. Our research therefore
maintains that mobile application companies should inform data subjects whenever
data breaches occur.
In the following, we elaborate on some of the key privacy frameworks, described in
literature, designed to enforce the aforementioned privacy principles.
2.5 Privacy-by-design frameworks
A number of privacy frameworks are described in the literature to aid developers implement
privacy principles in system development. Among the well-established privacy frameworks
in the literature is Ann Cavoukian’s privacy by design (PbD) framework developed in the
mid-nineties [63]. PbD has the ability to integrate privacy in all stages of development,
ranging from application systems and network infrastructures to the business application
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level. The general idea behind PbD is to integrate privacy by default, even when the user
has not asked for any such implementation or does not intend to use it.
1. The Privacy-by-design framework
The PbD framework is based on The fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP)
principles described as follows:
• Proactive not reactive: Privacy has to be implemented initially in the system
before any privacy breaches occur, and not after attacks have been identified.
Any privacy-invasive events have to be prevented before the system is in
operation, not after it has been attacked.
• Privacy as the default setting: Personal data in applications have to be pro-
tected by default without any need to change the settings or foreign action at
both the business level and the networking level.
• Privacy embedded into design: Privacy should be embedded in application
design and not be an add-on, it should reside in the software and functional
components of the application
• Full functionality (positive-sum, zero-sum) : Privacy and security are both
important when developing applications; therefore, both should be achieved
without compromising any design goals of the system.
• Maintain end-to-end security: Data should be secure in the whole development
cycle, security should be maintained when data are in use and after they have
been used and discarded.
• Visibility and transparency Stakeholders should be aware of any business
applications and technologies put in place to implement privacy. Privacy
objectives should be met and it should be verified if they meet the required
privacy principles.
• Have respect for user privacy and keep it user-centric : Data subjects should
be aware of how their data are processed by notifying them of any failures and
offering them better privacy-protected solutions.
41
Chapter 2 Privacy-by-design frameworks
2. OECD Privacy Framework
The OECD privacy framework’s main objective is to protect personal data and data
flows across the borders of OECD member states and to enact laws that govern
cross-border transfers of personal data. It comprises the following main principles:
Collection Limitation Principle: This principle aims to reduce the quantity of user-
specific data that are collected by institutions, organisations and companies. The
second part of this principle requires that users are aware of data being collected
about them or are at least informed about data collected so that they may accept
the conditions under which data are stored.
Data Quality Principle: At the heart of this principle is the notion that data
acquired should be correct and constantly revised to ensure that they are accurate,
especially for the aim fow which they are collected and intended.
Purpose Specification Principle: The main objective behind this principle is to state
the reason why user data are being acquired. This has to be done before users hand
over their personal data so that they can opt in or out in case they find that the
reason for which data are being collected is not acceptable. For example, We have
regularly seen many websites that are designed to collect personal addresses for sale,
but without users being aware of the purpose of data collection.
Use Limitation Principle: This principle works in conjunction with the purpose
specification principle and states that collected personal data should not be utilised
other than for the purpose for which they were collected. The second part of this
principle states that data should only be used only in cases where the data owner
consents or where the law permits.
Openness Principle: This principle implies that how data are processed should be
open, and principles and policies have to be put in place to monitor how data are
processed. The principle also states that the people who process personal data
should be known and accountable for the way data are processed and put means in
place to protect collected data.
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Security safeguards Principle: The security safeguard principle states that collected
data should be protected by security mechanisms from attacks by malicious intruders.
In addition, data should not be altered or misused by organizations that collect
them.
3. A Framework for Privacy-friendly System Design
Spiekermann and Cranor [27] produced guidelines for building privacy-friendly
systems using two major approaches: Privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy.
Privacy-by-architecture:
The method for addressing privacy-by-architecture minimizes the collection of
personal data and puts emphasis on randomization, client-side data storage and
processing. The method of privacy-by-policy, on the other hand, focuses on the
implementation of notice and choice principles for fair information practices.
We take into account the approach of designing privacy-preserving systems using
privacy-by-architecture where privacy-by-policy plays a crucial role, especially in the
early stages of development. Therefore, there is a need for a clear-cut method of
implementing a hybrid of privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy techniques
to ensure that policies are put in place and users have control over their personal
data. We refer to user privacy as the protection of personal identifiable information,
such as name, home address, location data, email address, driving route and vehicle
identity, which can be used by an adversary or third parties for illegal tracing
and user-profiling. Next, we elaborate on some of the challenges of integrating
privacy-by-design in mobile applications using the solutions mentioned above.
2.6 Privacy engineering methodologies
2.6.1 LINDDUN privacy threat modeling
A number of privacy methodologies have been proposed in the literature. LINDDUN
privacy-threat modelling is one of the key methodologies used during our research to aid
in generating privacy requirements. LINDDUN aims to identify privacy threats using
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data-flow diagrams (DFD) of the system being investigated. They comprise six key steps
derived from the STRIDE model [64].
• Define data-flow diagrams(DFD:)
This is the initial step of the LINDDUN framework, it involves defining data-flow
diagrams for the system under design. This process includes defining the system at
a high level and distinguishing the elements in the system and how data flow in
these elements, which are connected to each other.
• Map privacy threats to DFD elements:
The next step entails mapping the DFD to privacy threats which are derived
from privacy properties: linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation, detectability,
information disclosure, content unawareness, policy and consent noncompliance.
• Identify threat scenarios:
The third step of the LINDDUN framework is a core execution step, which involves
using threat-tree patterns which can be used to attack a system’s privacy. Again,
these are based on the privacy properties listed above and are meant to protect the
system from any privacy attacks.
• Prioritize threats:
In this step, the most significant privacy threats are considered; these may be based
on an assessment made by system and privacy engineers concerning how grave the
impact of these threats might be. Risk assessments aid in determining which threats
should be considered or not.
• Elicit Privacy requirements:
Based on the threats identified in the threat prioritisation step, privacy requirements
are generated using threat trees and misuse cases. Requirements are generated
by determining the causes of threats and how these threats can be mitigated by
making fine-grained changes.
• Select corresponding privacy-enhancing technologies(PETS):
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The final step in this process is to decide on privacy-enhancing technologies and
solutions to respond to threats. Which technologies are to be used in order to
prevent privacy attacks hinges on the system under development. Privacy-enhancing
solutions may further be divided into technical solutions which may be applied to
the system or legal structures generated by government bodies which could be used
to implement requirements.
2.6.2 Privacy enhancing technologies
Privacy enhancing technologies (PET) can be defined as a system of ICT measures
protecting informational privacy by eliminating or minimizing personal data thereby
preventing unnecessary or unwanted processing of personal data without the loss of the
functionality of the information system [65]. PETS involve the use of data anonymization
methods , data separation methods, authorization concepts that are determined by user
access controls. PETS enable user empowerment on how individual personal data can be
processed and most importantly allow for the principle of data minimization of personal
information.
This involves the use of encryption technologies e.g, pseudonyms, digital signatures,
blind signatures to protect user personal Identifiable information (PII). A number of
PETS have been proposed in the literature which include digital signature algorithms e.g
the Enhanced privacy ID (EPID), obfuscation methods and communication anonymizers.
According to [65]. PETS can be classified depending on the capabilities and functions
they offer. These include informed consent, data minimization , data tracking, anonymity
and control. These capabilities play a major role in choosing which PET best suits the
privacy challenge one is facing. We will now elaborate on these capabilities in relation to
privacy design in mobile application focused on in this thesis.
• Information Consent: This thesis focuses on informed consent in the form of proper
privacy policy design and implementation in mobile applications. Mobile application
designers should inform users of the data stored, its use and how its shared before
users consent to privacy policies given. Next, Data mimimization is key to the
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reduction of the data being proceesed by mobile applications. Applications should
process only the data required for system functionality and required services. Several
attempts have been developed in this domain which include search engines that only
collect infromation required for use to minimize user profiling e.g by storing web
searches, IP iddresses, search histoty. Such engines aid the user by protecting PII
and thus minimize data collection. These include Start page[66] , Duckduckgo[67],
Disconnect Search [68], and Oscobo[69].
2.7 Privacy metrics
Privacy metrics in the literature can be defined as measures that determine the level
of privacy in systems. Privacy metrics are used to determine which method of privacy
implementation is best to use when integrating privacy into software applications. There
has been a lot of research in the literature that aids in determining what level of privacy
can be attained using privacy-enhancing technologies [70] [71]. In the following we describe
some of the major privacy metrics that are reported in the literature. This thesis is not
based on these metrics but we mention them as background concepts related to this
thesis.
• k-anonymity. The k-anonymity privacy metric was introduced by Samaratti
and Sweeney in 1998. k-anonymity uses tuples of attributes to uniquely identify
individuals using quasi-identifiers [72]. The general idea behind it is to protect the
identity of individuals within an anonymity set. That is, it minimises the possibility
of re-identification of attributes in a data set by suppressing them or generalizing
them so that they cannot be leaked to other data sets. The k-anonymity concept is
commonly used to determine a data set’s level of privacy. It has been recently used
in combination with other cryptographic hashing techniques to determine the level
of privacy of given passwords [73].
• l-diversity. l-diversity is an improvement over k-anonymity and was introduced by
Machanavajjhala in 2007 [74]. He states that:
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“An equivalent class is said to have l-diversity if there are at least l well-presented
values for the sensitive attribute. A table is said to have l-diversity if every
equivalence class of the tables l-diversity.”
The l-diversity concept generates stronger levels of privacy compared to the k-
anonymity approach as it provides a greater distribution of attributes within a data
set Unlike the k-anonymity concept, the l-diversity concept improves anonymity in
that attributes are not disclosed. It employs a better pruning mechanism compared
to the k-anonymity approach through its l-diversity algorithm. However, critics of
this approach maintain that l-diversity contains a lot of redundant attributes. It is
also prone to privacy attacks, e.g skewness and similarity attacks [75].
• e-differential privacy. A brief definition of e-differential privacy from Machanava-
jjhala states that: “An algorithm satisfies e-differential privacy if its output on a
database of individuals is statistically indistinguishable (measured by parameter
e) from the output of the algorithm if any one individual had opted out of the
database.” e-differencial privacy aims to hide information about attributes in a
database by using random values embedded in the results of applied queries. This
approach improves the level of privacy such that query results are ambiguous and
hard to reconstruct because of the random attributes [76].
• Privacy metrics as presented by J. Bonneau and S. Preibusch. Bonneau
and Preibusch investigated online social networks to determine privacy practices
and the implementation of privacy policies [77]. To evaluate the data collected
based on 45 Online social networks, their research used imputed privacy metrics
based on the amount of data collected, the privacy controls used and the design
of the privacy policies. These metrics aimed at computing scores to determine
privacy implementation in online social networks. The scores employed for data
analysis are privacy scores and functionality scores. Privacy scores are computed
using a data collection score, a privacy control score and a privacy policy score.
Functionality scores are scores that represent features that are not required for
system functionality in an online social network site. These scores are the basis of
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the analysis of the data collected in our research and they play a significant role in
the privacy preservation methodology used in our research.
Privacy Mobile Application framework Although various frameworks concerning
privacy have been proposed in recent works e.g the above mentioned privacy frameworks;
Privacy-by-Design (PbD) framework, OECD Privacy framework and the LINDDUN
privacy framework, supporting frameworks for mobile applications are lacking. Extensive
research regarding frameworks in the Internet of Things (IOT) domains have further been
proposed in [78] and for detecting privacy violations in Android application code in [79],
however, frameworks of incorporating privacy properties such as anonymity, unlinkability,
unobservability, Pseudonymity, and confidentiality in the software development lifecycle of
current mobile applications are missing. Furthermore, the integration of privacy protection
and privacy policies through legislation bodies, to align with the fast development of
current mobile applications has been not effective enough to prevent privacy abuse.
Currently, there are no standards on how privacy is implemented in mobile apps making
way for tech giants to prioritize their commercial and financial needs while developing
applications. Although efforts have been made to integrate Privacy-by-Design in other
domains like IOT systems [80] and in the medical domain [81], little research exists in the
mobile app domain. Therefore the needs to be a standard method of protecting private
data in mobile applications.
2.8 Summary
This section has presented the background and work related to this thesis. We focus on
work presented in the literature that defines what privacy is and the role that privacy
plays in protecting information about individuals. Our explicit interest in protecting
user privacy has been discussed to give a clearer understanding to readers who do not
know that they have a right not to have their personal data misused by companies.
Companies should therefore, inform users about data being collected as envisaged by the
GDPR data protection guidelines; furthermore, they should put in place structures that
are secure to prevent any data breaches. For this research our intention is to illustrate
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the approaches and mechanisms that are used to protect user privacy. These include
the use of privacy-enhancing technologies , privacy-by-design which is a combination of
privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy principles and privacy-by-design frameworks.
Companies should also abide by the rules and regulations that are imposed by regulatory
bodies, such as the OECD and GDPR by implementing appropriate frameworks, e.g the
OECD privacy framework and the framework for privacy-friendly system design.
We present some of the challenges faced when using privacy-by-design principles and
privacy implementation in Telematics mobile applications by reporting on the survey of
current telematics mobile application. This section further gives a short overview of the
privacy metrics described in the literature.
The other limitations observed in the course of this study is that the concepts of
privacy-by-architecture and privacy-by-policy are all applied and implemented individually
in an attempt to improve user privacy. However, a hybrid approach is more effective
where system engineers work with lawyers and HCI engineers to develop systems that
are privacy friendly. Instead of, software engineers developing privacy-by-architecture
solutions, privacy-by-policy strategies being formulated by lawyers and HCI engineers
developing user interaction software there must be a way of all these solutions being
consolidated together to provide a streamlined way of designing privacy preserving mobile
applications. Personally Identifiable Information (PII) which includes sensitive information
e.g Social Security numbers, National Insurance Numbers, Mailing addresses, Financial
data, medical records and non sensitive information e.g zip codes, postal codes, race,
gender, date of birth and place of birth. We consider this information private as this can
easily be used to identify an individual.
In addition to this, geo-location information and data on the device e.g messages,
emails, identifiers, and logs need to be protected while using modern apps.
With these key gaps in mind, we propose a privacy standard mobile application
framework in an effort to improve privacy protection in current mobile applications. The






This chapter explains the research method adopted in this thesis. We present the research
methodology applied and the procedures we undertook to accomplish all the tasks in the
research. We differentiate the types of research methods used which include qualitative
research methods and quantitative research methods. Qualitative research involves
performing research using empirical methods that are not in the form of numbers e.g. by
using interviews and questionnaires. It assumes a dynamic and negotiated reality where
data is collected by performing interviews and through participant observations. On the
other hand, quantitative research assumes a fixed and measurable reality which is gained
by collecting data through measuring things. In quantitative research, data is analysed
using numerical comparisons and statistical inferences [82], [83]. This research involved
using both a qualitative and a quantitative approach. In the following section we present
details of the research design and its structure.
Research Methodology: A research methodology is the process of investigating
research topics and is further referred to as a theoretical underpinning of the research. It
is a way of defining the research activities involved, the procedures taken to accomplish
the research, determining the elements the research is based on, defining the scientifically
adopted models, designs and tools.[84]. Research methodologies are generally classified
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as quantitative and qualitative research. However, they can be further classified into
descriptive and analytical research methods. Descriptive research methods involve the
use of surveys and analytical research uses facts to analyse a problem in order to make a
critical evaluation of the material involved in the research. Other types of research such
as exploratory research on the other hand explore the research area and do not attempt
to attain a conclusive answer to the research questions involved [85], [83]. Thus, choosing
a research method should be taken with much care as there are many factors to take into
account especially in how the studies should be evaluated and presented to the general
audience.
3.2 Research background and research questions.
This section presents an overview of the research background detailing the problem domain
and the need for performing the research. It also elaborates on the importance of users
knowing the privacy measures integrated in the apps e.g in the form of privacy policies
and their rights to using applications that are not privacy invasive.
3.2.1 Mobile application selection and analysis
The use of mobile applications has steadily increased since the inception of the Android
Google Play Store and the App store. At the time of writing this thesis, Android Google
play store was reported to have 2.6 million apps in March 2018 and App store 2.0 million
apps. The overwhelming number of applications commonly known as apps, on the market
comes with a lot of challenges faced both on the developer side and the consumer side. As
we have reported in chapter 1, there have been reports of security and privacy breaches
which have constantly increased as the number of mobile applications increase. A study
made by the privacy body based in Washington DC, the Future of Privacy Forum in 2012
found that 48% of free mobile applications had in-app access to a privacy policy while
32% of paid applications did have one [86]. With these findings in mind, it is eminent
that at least half of the users’ of mobile applications do not know that privacy policies do
exist. For this reason most of the users do not know why privacy policies are required
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and what they are used for. In previous years, Google play store has however, enacted
privacy policy requirements for developers which demand that all apps should contain
a privacy policy that is easily accessible in the application by users. This was after the
California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) was enforced in 2012. CalOPPA
applies to any person who develops mobile applications that collects Personal Identifiable
Information (PII). Developers should include a privacy policy whenever they share or use
PII and clearly state how they are going to use the data collected.
In addition to these laws, the new GDPR requires that users are well informed of the
data collected about them and how the data is processed. Privacy policies among others
must include:
• The identity of the data collector (address, name of the company) has to be given.
• The type of data the mobile application collects.
• Why and how the data is to be processed.
• The identity of the third parties the data is shared with.
• Users should be able to request for the data collected about them.
• Users should be able to delete their data.
In an attempt to reach a more nuanced understanding of how current mobile appli-
cations are designed and how privacy policies are integrated in mobile applications we
examined if the applications have in-app privacy policies and if the privacy policies are
on the company websites. We further examined which permissions the application uses
The major key questions we investigate in the course of the methodology are as follows:
• What are the current trends of privacy preserving procedures integrated in mobile
applications in current App stores?
• Are the privacy policies included in both the companies websites and the mobile
applications?
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• Are the in-app privacy policies readable and easy to understand for users?
• Are users explicitly told of which data is being collected and for what purpose?
• Are the mobile application permissions in the app stores easily found and easy to
understand by users?
• Are mobile application permissions necessary for the functionality they are requested
for or not?
To answer the above questions we focused our investigation on the Google Play Store.
We considered Google Play Store because its apps can easily be accessed and are more in
number compared to those in App store. Google Play Store is a digital store where users
can search and install mobile applications. The applications are installed on Android
devices. Android is an Open source software framework which provides APIs based on
the Android Software Development Kit. Android is community based, which means
that developers are allowed to develop applications in the Java programming language
and publish them in the store. To investigate the current state-of-the-art in mobile
applications, we examine 50 most popular mobile applications. We focused on two major
domains, the eHealth domain and the Telematics domain. The data was collected between
December 2018 and June 2019. We used Google play store to determine the type of
permissions the apps use.
3.3 Research methods used in this study
3.3.1 Qualitative research methods - documentary analysis
The first qualitative research method used was that of a documentary analysis. Docu-
mentary analysis involves the study of written material in form of documents, reports,
peer reviewed publications like journals, research papers, newspapers and media online.
It focuses on what is reported in these documents. The analysis of the documents can be
done electronically using content analysis software, or text data mining tools, or manually
focusing on the words and phrases in the documents. The type of document analysis used
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in this research was done by undertaking a literature review which has been presented in
chapter 1. We investigated media reports both online and in newspapers to study the
problem domain. We searched in online data bases e.g IEEE, ACM, Springer, Elsevier
and used key words such as privacy in mobile apps, privacy protection in mobile apps,
data breaches in android apps to get an insight of the problem domain.
3.3.2 Exploratory research and analysis - of mobile apps
The next research method used was that of an exploratory study in eHealth and Telematics
apps. This study was investigative and did not involve any testing and evaluation rather
was conducted to determine the extent at which mobile apps do integrate privacy preserving
methods in the application. We looked at how the apps were developed, which features
they had to offer, checked the company websites if they did have privacy policies. We
further investigated the type of data that was collected both in the app and what was
stated on the company sites. In the following we present how the exploratory research of
the eHealth mobile applications was done.
3.3.2.1 Privacy requirements analysis in mobile apps
We subdivided eHealth apps into six categories; Fitness apps, Cardiology apps, Diabetes
apps, Weightloss apps, Depression apps and Physician apps. We searched for the apps in
Google Play store according to the above named categories. Our aim was to determine
the following type of data collected:
• Which permissions does the app have access to?
• Are the permissions requested required for app functionality?
• Does the app have a privacy policy in Google Play Store?
• Does the app have an in-app privacy policy?
• Does the app have a privacy policy on the companies website?
• Does the privacy policy contain the details of the data that it collects?
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• Does the privacy policy contain the contact of the developer?
• Does the app inform users of the medical data it collects?
• Are users informed of the data shared to third-party service providers?
The chosen apps were subdivided amongst the above mentioned categories. The apps
are a combination of health improving apps and health information apps. They are
used to enhance modern health care management for patients and health care providers.
We further examined, patient monitoring apps which gather patient information and
electronic health care records. The apps were of interest because they collect a lot of
health related personal information ranging from patients genetic conditions required
for weightloss, to hereditary conditions like diabetics, and mental health conditions like
depression. Such personal data is very sensitive and requires a high level of privacy
during app development and in operation. The investigated apps are open source and do
not require stringent medical observation from medical personnel, so no special medical
guidelines were required. We focus on eHealth fitness and Telematics mobile applications
because of their constant evolving nature. These two app domains collect a lot of sensitive
data without going through stringent controls that are required to protect user data. For
these reasons we found it necessary to investigate these domains in an effort to improve
user privacy in current mobile applications.
3.3.2.2 Data extraction in mobile applications:
The initial step of the data extraction was to download the apps from Google Play Store
on a Motorola XT1092 phone running Android version 8.0. We analyzed the information
given in the store about the app. This was done in two phases; (1)First, we examined the
permissions required while downloading the app and (2) the second phase was to examine
the privacy policies. We transcribed in detail which parameters were indicated in the
permissions and the privacy policies. All information that was requested by the companies
during sign-up and that was required in the privacy policies was recorded. Key parameters
especially PII details like; name, gender, email addresses, phone numbers to financial data
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such as credit card numbers, employer were all recorded for privacy policies on company
websites and within the apps. Table 4.15 shows the common permissions which were
recorded in the various apps we examined. Generally apps have different features as they
provide various services to customers, we recorded all the optional information that apps
required, for example Lose it! which is a weightlos app requires that is customers give up
a saliva sample to determine their DNA for weight loss purposes.
3.3.2.3 Permissions required in mobile applications
We manually recorded the permissions the apps required in the Google play store. The
permissions required after logging in the app were further examined and compared to those
in the store. We examined all permissions of the application as presented in the Google
Play Store and within the app. We transcribed all permissions as seen in Table 4.16 for
the Nike training app and privacy policies as shown in Table 4.17 for the Depression CBT
app and Table 4.18 for MySugr app, to determine the type of permissions and privacy
policies the application requires. The results were recorded for each app and observed that
some apps requested for permissions which were not used for application functionality.
We transcribed all the details regarding the permissions and attempted to answer the
following key questions;
• What are permissions used for?
• What type of permissions are used for the apps?
• What permissions are required for the app to function?
• What permissions are not required for the app to function well?
3.3.2.4 In-app privacy policies in mobile applications
The privacy policy given in the store was examined and screen shots were taken in an
effort to determine which data the app collects, is mentioned in the privacy policies.
All information about the collected data in the privacy policy was transcribed. After
downloading the apps, accounts were created for each app and the information requested
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in the app was recorded. This information included if the app requested for personal
information like the name, email, address or a login using social networks like Facebook, or
the app required payment information like credit card details. Furthermore, we recorded
if the app had a privacy policy during log on or not. This data enabled us to compare
both privacy policies in the app and that in the Google Play Store to determine any
inconsistencies of personal data collected by the apps. Next we examined the privacy
policies in the company websites to determine if they differed from those in the app and
the store.
3.3.3 Quantitative approach - Using Privacy scores
The next approach used was a quantitative approach where we applied privacy scores to
determine privacy integration by finding out which apps collected more private data in
comparison to others. The aim of this approach was to investigate if the data collected
in the apps was in sync with the functionality that the apps offer and if it was privacy
invasive. The scores were obtained by identifying key words of what type of data the
apps collect. These were transcribed to generate scores which included, a data collection
score, a functionality score and and a privacy policy score. The data collection score was
computed by identifying which type of data is collected, the functionality score computes
the type of functionality and features that the apps offer while the privacy policy score
computes the amount of privacy policy measures implemented in the app.
3.3.4 Qualitative analysis - Conceptual framework design
A conceptual framework is required to synthesise the literature and provide the answers to
the knowledge gap in the literature. We identified that there are limitations in the design
of privacy aware applications as companies did not fully integrate privacy in current
mobile applications. In an attempt to resolve the privacy limitations, we took a qualitative
approach and developed a privacy aware trade-off analysis framework (TRANK) aimed
for system designers, developers and privacy engineers to design mobile applications that
integrate privacy at the initial stages of development. The framework entails a privacy
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goals component, a privacy goals trade-off analysis component, a privacy requirements
component, a privacy and functionality trade-off analysis component and a privacy
requirements management component. These components are used to integrate a privacy
development life-cycle during application development.
We further used a prototyping methodology to create prototypes which were used to
evaluate TRANK and as a proof of concept for the framework. Two frameworks were
designed; a Telematics app prototype and an eHealth fitness app prototype.
Finally the prototypes were evaluated using interviews and questionnaires. In order
to assess how users perceived the applications we carried out two interviews based
on questionnaires. The first interview was a privacy based interview which aimed at
asking participants how they perceived the privacy features integrated in the apps. We
recruited participants who were active app users and asked their opinions on how the
privacy integrated in the apps should be enhanced and what their opinion on privacy
implementation in current apps was.
The second interview was a usability interview. This aimed at asking participants if
the apps were convenient to use in terms of usability and what they would like to improve.
3.4 Summary
This section has presented the methodology used in this thesis. We present two major
research methodologies namely the qualitative and quantitative research methodologies
that we use in the course of this research. We specify how the research processes in each
methodology were carried out beginning with a qualitative approach using a documentary
analysis which involved using a literature review to define the problem scope. In addition,
an exploratory research method was undertaken to investigate the challenges of privacy
preservation in mobile applications. A quantitative research methodology was employed
to analyse the collected data in the investigated mobile apps using privacy scores. Further
qualitative methods employed include; (1) the design of a conceptual privacy aware
framework which serves as a tool for privacy engineers and designers to develop privacy
aware applications (2) a prototyping methodology used to design the prototypes which
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serve as a proof of concept of the research undertaken in this thesis and lastly surveys
were carried out to evaluate the prototypes. The surveys included a privacy related user




4.1 Empirical study 1 - Exploratory Empirical study
This thesis presents three empirical studies which investigate the gaps related to designing
privacy aware mobile applications. The first contribution of this thesis is the exploration
of modern telematics mobile apps which involves an investigation in the type of data the
apps collect and the privacy methodologies integrated in the telematics applications. We
further carried out a study in modern eHealth apps to similarly determine what type of
data is collected and how the apps integrate privacy preserving methods. In an effort
to protect user privacy especially in the eHealth domain, where sensitive medical data
is gathered and processed to provide health related services e.g Diabetics management,
mental health management and weight loss management among other services, it is
important that medical data is processed in a proper manner. In this section we present
the approach used in performing this study and our key findings of the study.
Privacy in evolving mobile applications
There has been a surge in the deployment of telematics mobile applications in recent
years. One of the promising revenue streams in the telematic ecosystem is the use of
diagnostic data to provide insurance-relevant information. The use of telematic insurance
requires the collection of vast amounts of vehicular data. Some of these data are clearly
indicated on the websites of insurance companies. However, most insurance companies do
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not inform users about the data being collected and the purpose of doing so. We report on
the results of an exploratory study on the top 5 telematic insurance or black-box insurance
companies in the UK. We analyse the data collected by telematic insurance companies,
compare the privacy policies given on companies’ websites, model privacy requirements and
offer insights into privacy-requirements engineering in telematics insurance applications.
4.2 Privacy in Telematics mobile applications exploratory
study
There has been an increase in telematics mobile applications deployed in modern vehicles
in recent years. Telematics mobile applications are also referred to as V2X Telem-
atics applications. V2X applications are applications that are used to communicate
between Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) or Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) systems. Exam-
ples of V2X applications include emergency call systems, vehicle theft-recovery systems,
fleet-management systems and remote vehicle diagnostics. Among the emerging V2X
technologies is the use of telematic data to advise insurance premiums to users. This is
referred to as telematic insurance or commonly known as black-box insurance. Insurance
companies are offering black-box insurance policies in addition to traditional premium
policies. Black-box policies are aimed at ‘young drivers’ between 17 and 25 years of age.
Users are required to install a ‘black box’ which is a telematics device that constantly
records and monitors vehicular data on how, when and where the user drives.
With the help of this telematic information, insurance companies are able to accumulate
a vast amount of personal data. However, the privacy impact of collecting telematic data
and the role of privacy requirements engineering in designing telematic insurance software
have remained unstudied to date.
A number of major questions remain unanswered and act as the basis of this study:
• Are users aware of the privacy concerns related to the adoption of systems provided?
• Are users explicitly informed about the data being collected so that they are able
to opt-in or opt-out of applications?
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• Do the privacy policies on companies’ websites include information about the data
being collected, how they are collected and what they are used for?
We performed an exploratory study on telematic insurance providers in the UK in order
to find possible answers to these questions and to determine how privacy-requirements
engineering in telematic insurance systems can be modelled and implemented. This
section presents the initial results of our findings and highlights the gaps and challenges
encountered when engineering Telematics mobile applications privacy requirements. The
novel contributions of this study are threefold:
1. We present insights into the information collected in telematic (black-box) insurance.
2. We highlight the privacy risks involved in using telematic insurance and compare
the data collected by the system to those included in privacy policies. Our analysis
highlights some potential mismatches between privacy policies and the data collected
(reflecting similar gaps identified by previous studies of privacy in online social
networks [87]).
3. We apply an existing privacy requirements modelling framework, LINDDUN [33],
to derive privacy requirements for telematics insurance and discuss the potential
challenges in realising these requirements in practice.
Privacy implementation in Telematics applications
Privacy plays a key role in the design and implementation of vehicular communication
networks (VCNs). To this effect, several V2X research projects have introduced privacy
requirements. One of the key VCN projects that focuses on privacy in V2X networks is
the European Union Project: Preparing Secure Vehicle-to-X- Communication Systems
(PRESERVE). The PRESERVE project aims to protect users’ privacy by introducing
an integrated V2X Security Architecture (VSA) that incorporates pseudonyms as a
mechanism to improve privacy [88]. Similarly, the PRivacy Enabled Capability In Co-
Operative Systems and Safety Applications (PRECIOSA) project aims to integrate privacy-
preserving mechanisms in VCNs and to formulate regulations and privacy guidelines for
62
Chapter 4 Privacy in Telematics mobile applications exploratory study
protecting data and location privacy in vehicular cooperative systems [89]. These works
serve as guidelines for modelling telematic privacy requirements in our study.
In the following we present prior research in two major categories, that based on
anonymisation and data obfuscation and that which focuses on location privacy.
4.2.1 Anonymising and data obfuscation
Data anonymisation and obfuscation in VCNs is mainly done by using pseudonyms.
Pseudonyms are a set of short-term identifiers that ensure the privacy of users by hiding
the real identities of senders. The adoption of pseudonyms has been extensively studied.
For example, Chaum et al. introduce the use of digital pseudonyms as a means of
providing privacy by hiding the identity of a user transferring information from one
source to its destination [90]. To enable the unlinkability of vehicles, the use of changing
pseudonyms at a given time and period has been proposed and pseudonym schemes have
been extensively compared and analysed to determine the best strategies [91]. However,
the use of pseudonyms has been challenged by Wiedersheim et al., as there remains the
possibility of linking vehicles to their users, depending on location information and the
level of granularity [92].
4.2.2 Location privacy
Location information remains a major concern in the implementation of telematics
mobile applications and has been extensively studied, in detail, to demonstrate privacy
breaches that occur using vehicle-profiling. Ma et al. highlight privacy concerns in the
continuous accumulation of location-driving data which may be used to determine a user’s
neighbourhood over a long period of time [93]. Hoh et al. show how location privacy in
traffic-monitoring systems that use GPS equipment can reveal the position and location
to the service provider’s traffic-monitoring servers. In [94], the authors propose the use of
multiple pseudonyms as a means of protecting location privacy and maintain that some
actors may not be willing to change pseudonyms.
Research in both of these categories plays a key role in enhancing privacy protection
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in telematics mobile applications systems and emphasises the importance of protecting
personal data. While the above works emphasise privacy protection in the V2X domain
in general, this thesis focuses in particular on protecting privacy in mobile applications,
especially the concern for explicitly raising privacy awareness and the protection of
personal information collected by telematic insurance providers.
4.2.3 Data acquisition
We analysed the top 5 telematic (black-box) insurance companies in the UK in order to
determine the types of personal, telematic data or driving data aggregated and how they
are used. The information collected was found on company home pages at both main
URLs and privacy-policy URLs. Data acquisition was performed by taking snapshots of
the data collected by the black-boxes as stated on company sites. Collected data were
taken at face value from the websites. The process of data collection was performed
between November 2016 and April 2017. Initially, we recorded the information presented
on companies’ sites about the data collected by their telematic devices (black boxes).
We then recorded the information presented at companies’ privacy-policy URLs. The
final step was to contrast the information presented about data collection at company
URLs with that presented at privacy policy URLs to identify potential mismatches. The
following steps outline our data-acquisition process:
• Step 1: (a) Search for the top 5 telematic insurance-provider sites. (b) Check if
each site has a page explaining how black-box insurance works. (c) Elicit results by
marking sections advising the data collected by telematic devices. (d) Check if sites
contain information collected in case of an accident, take screenshots and compare
sites. (e) Note down the results in a comparison table.
• Step 2: (a) Check if telematic insurance provider sites have a privacy-policy site.
(b) Repeat substeps (b), (c) and (d) in Step 1 above. (c) Check if the privacy-policy
site has information about third-party service providers. (d) Check if the site
has information about where data are stored and processed by third-party service
providers (EU, Non EU). (e) Check if sites include information about what happens
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Figure 4.1: Example of information use in black-box insurance
to data after users have opted out of policies. (f) Note down the results in a
comparison table.
4.2.4 Search Results
This section presents the results of our study. Figure 4.1 provides an example of information
collection in black-box insurance given on one of the company sites [95]. Next, we outline
the findings from our study in detail. Our results are based on three major observations:
1. Data collected by telematic devices on a daily basis.
2. Data collected and further processed by third-party service providers.
3. Data collected even when a user has opted out of telematic insurance services.
A. Data collected daily by the telematic device.
Most traditional insurance providers offer discounts on premiums based on no
claims. In contrast, with telematic insurance, telematic data are used to determine
a driver’s premium. Generally, there are two major types of data collected by
telematic insurers: personal data, i.e. information filled in on quotation forms, e.g.
name, gender, address and age, which is used to file for claims. The other type
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Sheet5
Page 1
Data Collected by Telematic devices given on websites
Think Marmalade SmartMiles Insurethebox DrivePlus
Data Collected
Time driven X X X
Duration of driving X X
Speed X X X X
Acceleration X X X X
Brake X X X X
Breaks taken X X
Cornering X X
Number of miles X X
Number of journeys X
Roads you drive on X X
Motorway miles X
Vehicle location X X X
Accidents
Time and place X
Force of impact X
Direction of travel X
Speed before impact X
Speed after impact X
Privacy policies
Data in privacy policy X partial
Use in privacy policy X partial
How Data is used X X X partial
How Data is shared X X partial
Figure 4.2: Data collection provided on the companies’ web sites.
of information collected is telematic data (data collected via black boxes). The
black box contains four major components that help in acquiring telematic data:
(1) a GPS satellite receiver which aids in locating the vehicle, wherever it is; (2) an
accelerometer which detects whether sharp cornering or a collision has occurred; (3)
a SIM card which sends collected data to back-end databases; and (4) customised
insurance software which analyses and sends collected information to insurance
back-end servers.
Figure 4.2 gives a brief report of the details we found about the data collected by
telematic insurance providers, which are used to calculate monthly premiums. A
letter X in the table denotes the type of data reported as being collected.
There are three key types of driving information collected by telematic devices:
acceleration, speed and cornering. The location of a vehicle is tracked via a GPS
module which is used to find the vehicle in case of theft. A motion sensor is installed
to detect if a vehicle has had an impact in case of an accident or heavy braking.
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The speed at which a vehicle is driving is tracked to determine whether its user is
driving within legal speed limits. The duration for which a driver has been driving
is recorded to determine if the driver has been driving for long hours. Telematic
insurance provider further record if one takes breaks while driving long distances or
when one is driving on a motorway (highway). The number of miles (and motorway
miles) driven, the roads that are driven on, if one is driving at night or during the
day are all recorded and some of this information is provided to an online portal for
users to get an estimation of the monthly insurance premium used for billing and
payment purposes beforehand.
For each of the insurance providers in our study, we collected telematic data directly
from the information provided on their webpages [95] [96] [97] [98] [99]. Most of
this information is not given directly on a website but has to be searched for at
external URLs indicated, for example as "How does black-box insurance work?",
"What is telematics?", "What is black-box insurance?". We observed that some
of the telematic insurance providers explicitly explained what telematic insurance
is and gave the type of telematic data that the device collects and how they are
used [95] [98]. However, for some sites, a comparison of the data given on the
webpage differed from that given in the privacy policy. In detail, we found that some
companies only gave a general list of data collected, with statements such as "Our
black box only measures four aspects of your driving - the ABC’s", meaning that
they collect data about acceleration, brakes, cornering and speed with no further
explanation of what exactly the data are used for [96].
B. Data collected and processed by third-party service providers.
Telematic data are initially collected via a vehicle’s OBD-II port. This aggregated
information is then transmitted to the insurance company over a wireless phone
network. To enable proper processing of collected telematic data, insurers employ
third-party service providers to deliver services, e.g. calculating premiums or de-
tecting fraud. Third-party service providers play a big role in the development and
implementation of telematic insurance, as collected telematic data and personal in-
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formation are constantly shared between insurers and among other service providers.
Examples of such service providers are: credit-reference agencies which aid in check-
ing users’ identity and credit status, fraud-prevention agencies, third-party libraries,
driving-licence authorities, research agencies that analyse insurance products, online
databases, regulators and law-enforcement agencies. Although telematic data and
personal information are obtained or transferred to third-party service providers,
most telematic insurers do not include this in their privacy policies. The few sites
that included the type of information they share with other service providers were
not precise, using phrases such as: "we will only share your driving information with
our trusted business partners". The sharing of personal information is not included
in privacy policies, instead rather general information is provided, e.g. "we will
release personal information to other insurers, or agents providing services to us on
your behalf" [95]. In addition to this, some telematic insurance providers mention
that "the data we collect from you may be stored outside the European Economic
Area (EEA)" [97] [98]. This not only means that personal data are transferred
to other service providers outside Europe but also indicates that the insurance
companies are not ready to mention the countries to which the information is
transferred. Finally, some sites mentioned that sensitive information, e.g. health,
race, religion and previous criminal convictions, is used when determining user
policies. This clearly indicates that users have to be explicitly informed about such
information before they opt for using telematic insurance applications.
C. Data collected after users have opted-out of telematic insurance services.
According to our findings, most telematic insurance companies did not give infor-
mation about how telematic data are used when a user opts out of a policy. Opting
in and out of a policy means that the user is free to choose and buy (opt in to) the
policy or cancel (opt out of) the policy. Some telematic insurance companies state
that "we will stop recording your information if you sell your car or if your policy
is cancelled" [98]. However, we found it contradictory when the same insurance
companies claim that they will use information to "carry out research and analysis
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about our products and services" even when a policy is cancelled. Therefore, it is
not clear what telematic data are used for after users sell their cars or cancel their
policies.
4.2.5 Deriving Telematics mobile applications privacy requirements
From the search results obtained in section 4.3.4, we observed that privacy implementations
by current telematic insurance providers are inconsistent and unsatisfactory. One of
the major research gaps in their design is the lack of adequate privacy requirements in
engineering models specific to telematic systems which have to be employed in the initial
stages for stringent privacy-aware application development. Although the V2X community
has raised concerns that question privacy non-compliance in the majority of telematic
insurance systems on the market today, little has been done to model privacy requirements
aimed at telematic insurance. It has not yet been established how telematic insurance
should be adopted while offering functional system requirements without compromising
privacy at the same time. We, therefore, apply one of the general approaches for
modelling privacy requirements, LINDDUN [33], to derive privacy requirements for
telematic insurance and analyse the challenges in realising these.
The first step in the LINDDUN methodology is to create a data flow diagram (DFD).
This is done by generating a graphical representation of the system to be modelled in
terms of how data are transferred between its components. A DFD contains 4 major
elements: (1) external elements that use the system (e.g. users, external applications and
services); (2) processes that are run on the system which include run programs, procedures
and system functionality processes; (3) data flows which represent data transfer from one
component in the system to another; (4) databases or data stores which store collected
vehicular transactional or logical data.
Creation of a Data flow diagram
The abstract data-flow diagram in Figure 5.7 describes how data are exchanged in
telematic insurance applications, e.g. when information is requested by a driver to show
the current status of their driving behaviour or insurance premium online. A telematic
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Figure 4.3: Telematics insurance data flow diagram
application is composed of four main processing components: (1) an insurance web portal,
which drivers use to enquire about their premium status; (2) a vehicle black box, used
to collect telematic data; (3) back-end servers, used to process collected data and (4)
databases, used to store telematic data. These components have to be protected against
malicious intruders that could compromise user privacy in the system.
Mapping of DFD to potential privacy threats
The next step is to map the DFD to potential threats that may arise when using a
telematic insurance system. The mapping involves identifying threats that may affect
each component of the system. This involves distinguishing the type of threats that are
applicable in data transfers from users to the web portal, telematic devices to servers, and
servers to back-end databases. From our analysis, each DFD component is susceptible to
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Table 4.1: Mapping of Data flow diagram to potential threats
Mapping of DFD to privacy threats
Privacy threat target L I N D D U N
Telematic Data Store Telematic insurance DB • • • • • •
Telematic Data Flow Driver - portal flow • • • • • •
Portal - driver flow • • • • • •
Portal - vehicle flow • • • • • •
Vehicle - portal flow • • • • • •
Vehicle - server flow • • • • • •
Server - vehicle flow • • • • • •
Server - database flow • • • • • •
Database - server flow • • • • • •
Telematic processes Telematic insurance portal • • • • • •
Manage vehicle black box • • • • • •
Manage servers • • • • • •
Entity Driver • • •
Table 4.2: Telematic threats modeling
Description T1 Direct vehicle identification which may be linked to users.
Attack process Adversaries who gain access to the system may identify users and their vehicles.
Result Access to the system to identify which vehicles belong to a particular driver, exposing their identity.
Description T2 Vehicle and driver location identification.
Attack process Vehicles are located using GPS receivers and geo-location data.
Result Location identification of drivers and vehicles.
Description T3 Information-sharing of private data to third-party providers.
Attack process Telematic insurance providers sharing or selling data to third-party service providers.
Result Information disclosure and misuse by third-party service providers.
5. Information disclosure (D).
6. Content unawareness (U).
7. Consent or policy non-compliance (N).
Table 4.1 shows the mapping of a data-flow diagram to potential privacy threats. A
black circle symbol • denotes possible breaches of a privacy category.
Generating telematic insurance privacy threats
After mapping the DFD to potential threats, we derived potential privacy threats in
relation to DFD elements. Table 4.2 illustrates threats that may arise when using telematic
insurance systems. It describes privacy breaches that may be used to compromise the
system. The list includes a description of the attack, the type of attacker, the attack
process that may be used and finally the result of the aforementioned attack. Threats are
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Table 4.3: Deriving privacy requirements from threats
From threats to privacy requirements
Telematic insurance threats Privacy requirements
Linkability of users to telematic insurance DB Unlinkability of users to database
Linkability of users to data flows Unlinkability of users to data flows
Linkability of users to telematic processes Unlinkability of users to system processes
Linkability of external entities, e.g a driver, Unlinkability of external entities connecting to systems
Identifiability of users to telematic insurance DB Pseudonymity or anonymity of users in DB
Identifiability of users to data flows Pseudonymity or anonymity of users in data streams
Identifiability of users to telematic processes Pseudonymity or anonymity of users in systems processes
Non-repudiation of users sending data streams Acknowlegement of users using system processes
Non-repudiation of users using system processes Acknowlegement of users using system processes
Detectability of users connecting to DB Unobservability of users connecting to DB
Detectability of users sending data streams Unobservability of users sending data streams
Detectability of users using system processes Unobservability of users using systems processes
Information disclosure of users connecting to DB Confidentiality of users connecting to DB
Information disclosure of users sending data streams Confidentiality of users sending data streams
Information disclosure of users using system processes Confidentiality of users using system processes
Unawareness of users about content given in systems User awareness of content given to systems
Non-compliance of systems with policies and regulations Compliance with policies and regulations in systems
denoted by the letter “T” and are numbered in series T1 - Tn depending on the system to
be modelled and the number of threats derived. Please note that the list is not exhaustive,
rather, only a representative fragment is presented in this thesis.
Generating privacy requirements from threats
After distinguishing potential threats, privacy requirements are then derived on the
basis of threats as illustrated in Table 4.3. Here, we followed the LINDDUN threat
categories. Please note that these requirements are not exhaustive, rather they should be
seen as examples of privacy requirements for telematic insurance applications based on
the methodology described in [33] and are subject to revision in case the system changes
or a different type of system altogether has to be modelled.
The major privacy-requirement engineering implication of this study is that there are
major potential privacy threats, and hence requirements. Therefore, we need systematic
ways of capturing these requirements and designing them into privacy-compliant telematic
insurance systems. We discuss some insights into this next in our analysis.
4.2.6 Privacy challenges in Telematics mobile applications
From our analysis we found LINDDUN is a well-structured framework to model privacy
requirements. Table 4.4 gives a general overview of the advantages and drawbacks of
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Table 4.4: Advantages and drawbacks of LINDDUN privacy-requirements modelling
Advantages
- Provides a detailed structure to model privacy requirements.
- Entails a privacy-by-design approach.
- Models risks by deriving privacy-enhancing technologies from elicited privacy threats.
Disadvantages
- LINDDUN privacy-requirements modelling may be at too high a level to model large systems,
and depends highly on the depth of the DFD.
- The final product might not meet user requirements due to ambiguities in privacy terminology.
modelling telematic insurance using the LINDDUN framework.
A key challenge in realising privacy requirements derived using LINDDUN is that
not all information in a telematics insurance application can be entirely unlinkable.
Although total unlinkability and undetactability may be desired, applications have to
depend on certain information, e.g. personal information, location information or driving
behaviour, for proper functionality. Therefore, complete anonymisation of personal
credentials and driving data is very difficult, if not impossible. Thus, there should be a
means of enabling such services while at the same time taking into consideration users’
privacy demands and preferences.
Our results reveal that users are not explicitly informed about the information collected
by telematic devices (black boxes) in either privacy policies or on companies’ websites.
Telematic insurance providers must employ better means of informing users about the
information they collect, how they collect it and what it is used for.
In order to fulfil this goal, employing privacy engineering, especially in the initial
stages of development, can play a big role in the development of privacy-aware telematic
applications. This involves designing stringent privacy policies that comply with privacy
regulations used to control the access to and distribution of personal data in the proposed
system, in combination with the system in operational use.
The design of such systems is complex. Further, the complexity of managing privacy
requirements in telematics is due to the fact that telematic applications are composed of
dynamic sensor applications with constantly changing data. This means that designing
privacy requirements involves dynamic data, e.g. acceleration, braking or speed data
generated by electronic control units (ECU). This immense volume of data cannot be
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stored in vehicles, it has to be sent to third-party services for further processing, making
it very challenging to design efficient and expandable privacy policies. Another key
challenge faced is the use of pseudonyms in telematic applications. Despite substantial
previous research in this area [91], there is still a need for improved pseudonym schemes
for telematic insurance applications to ensure that both system functionality and privacy
requirements are met.
Furthermore, most telematic insurance service providers in the UK market today offer
privacy-invasive applications which gather all the telematic data used for the calculation
of insurance premiums. Insurance providers should therefore invest in designing system
models that do not compromise privacy by, for example, only partially collecting telematic
data, such as odometer and mileage readings, used to calculate premiums. In this way,
data collection is reduced while simultaneously maintaining system functionality.
Consequently, the solution to these challenges is we believe as follows: First, telematic
insurance service providers must ensure that the information on company sites indicates
the types of data collected by the telematic devices. In addition, the data collected by
insurance providers should be anonymised but at the same time allow proper functionality
of the system. Second, third-party service providers and the applications they provide
should be clearly indicated to users before they choose to opt in to insurance policies.
Third, telematic insurance providers must ensure that policy statements given on company
sites are complete and transparent to users.
Lastly, we note that there may needs to be systematic approaches for keeping policies
and functionality in sync, as proposed by, for example,[100] and [101].
Above all, there is a need for revised privacy regulations and policy enforcement in
telematic insurance development and deployment. Most importantly, users should be
clearly informed about the data collected and how they are used. In this way, they will be
able to opt in or opt out of insurance premiums due to unfulfilled privacy requirements
or evident privacy concerns when they wish to do so.
Conclusions
We observe that there has been a tremendous increase in the deployment of mobile
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applications in recent years. Telematics, or black-box, insurance mobile applications is
one of the most promoted applications because drivers (especially young drivers aged
between 17 and 25 years) would like to reduce the cost of vehicle insurance. Unlike
existing insurance policies where drivers pay per year (PPY), telematic insurance is
charged according to a pay-per-mile (PPM) or pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) model. Much
as this development is promising for young drivers, though it does come with various
privacy concerns. Telematics insurance is implemented by collecting driving data using a
telematic device (black box) connected to the vehicle’s on-board diagnostics II (OBD-II)
port, which constantly tracks the movement and driving behaviour of its users. This
study aims to enlighten users about related privacy concerns to ensure that user privacy
is protected. Via an exploratory study of the top 5 telematic insurance providers in the
UK, we demonstrate the privacy protection gaps encountered in the data-acquisition and
privacy policies of mobile applications and in particular, telematic application services.
We derive privacy requirements for telematic insurance applications using the LINDDUN
methodology and highlight its challenges as regards realising total unlinkability and
unobservability in this particular domain.
The following section presents an exploratory study of eHealth mobile applications to
further investigate the privacy protection measures that have been integrated in eHealth
mobile applications and how data collection is handled in current eHealth apps. We
elaborate on the studies undertaken using eHealth android based mobile apps.
4.3 Privacy in eHealth mobile applications exploratory study
eHealth mobile applications also known as mHealth or telehealth apps have been on the
increase in recent years. eHealth apps aid in managing patient health to improve and ease
self management of health related information and the general quality of life for patients.
Examples of eHealth apps include Physician apps, Mental health apps, Cardilogy apps,
Diabetes apps, clinical trial apps e.t.c. Among the evolving eHealth technologies is the
use of fitness data to improve patient health. It is believed that physical inactivity is one
of the main causes of diseases such as cancer, diabetes, hypertension, obesity and vascular
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diseases in adults. Subsequently, medical bodies like the NHS and health professionals
have warned that physical inactivity can be deadly as smoking as was published in the
Lancet [102]. Examples of eHealth fitness apps are Sworkit, Noom, Strava e.t.c. With
the help of these apps, users are able to monitor their body activities and improve their
fitness.
However, the privacy impact of collecting fitness data and the role of privacy re-
quirements engineering in designing eHealth application software faces a lot of privacy
challenges as was depicted in the Strava Data Heat Maps incident [14]. In this case,
privacy concerns were raised as users who ignored the off-by-default privacy settings
exposed off their location details. Through this, the fitness tracker exposed exercise routes
of military personnel and their exact location. This led to major concerns in the way
eHealth apps in general integrate privacy in mobile application development.
A number of major questions remain unanswered and act as the basis of this study:
• Are users aware of the privacy concerns related to the adoption of the eHealth apps
used?
• Are users explicitly informed about the private eHealth data being collected so that
they are able to opt-in or opt-out of applications?
• Do the privacy policies on companies’ websites include information about the data
being collected, how they are collected and what they are used for?
• What measures have been put in place to protect eHealth data especially medical
data, genetical data and location based data so that it does not leak to the public?
We performed an exploratory study on eHealth fitness apps in order to find possible
answers to these questions and to determine how privacy-requirements engineering can
be modelled and implemented. This section presents the initial results of our findings
and highlights the gaps and challenges encountered when dealing with sensitive medical
data. The novel contributions of this study are threefold:
1. We present insights into the information collected in eHealth fitness applications.
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2. We highlight the privacy risks involved in using eHealth fitness applications and
compare the data collected by the apps to those included in privacy policies. Our
analysis highlights some potential mismatches between privacy policies and the data
collected (reflecting similar gaps identified by previous studies of privacy in online
social networks [87]).
3. We apply an existing privacy requirements modelling framework, LINDDUN [33],
to derive privacy requirements for eHealth mobile applications and discuss the
potential challenges in realising these requirements in practice.
Privacy implementation in eHealth fitness applications
Privacy implementation in eHealth mobile applications is very crucial as they collect
a lot of sensitive personal information like, medical records, location data, genealogical
data e.t.c. Several researchers have reported on privacy [103], [104], [105] in eHealth apps
however to the best of our knowledge no work has been done to integrate privacy-by-design
using a privacy trade-off analysis at default. In the following we present some of the
solutions employed in protecting user privacy in medical applications.
4.3.1 Anonymising and data obfuscation in eHealth applications
Anonymizing medical data has tremendously advanced in the areas of Electronic Health
care records (EHR). Previous research has focused on anonymizing EHR records mainly
to enable medical research based on patients data without exposing patients details.
Using cryptographic techniques to anonymize data has been proposed in [106] based
on hierarchical identity-based cryptography. Other mechanisms like l-diversity and k-
anonymity [107] have been proposed to integrate privacy in electronic medical records.
However, these come with limitations such as high computational overhead [108]. We
have further seen a lot of eHealth related breaches reported as existent anonymization
methods are not sufficient enough in protecting patient data. Therefore, this calls for
more research in the way eHealth mobile applications have to be designed to meet future
privacy demands.
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4.3.2 Location privacy in eHealth applications
Location information in eHealth mobile applications is applied e.g in portable devices such
personalised wearables used to monitor patients and other eHealth monitoring systems like
fitness applications. Several studies have been taken in the eHealth domain to investigate
the impact of location based applications. These are used in providing health remote
services e.g diabetes management [109] which include web based services and smart phone
based eHealth systems that connect the physician and the patient. Location based devices
are further used to monitor patient data and offer personalized feedback to patients .
Other studies proposed location based solutions to monitor mental health disease [110]
which involved determining a patients location in order to investigate the relationship
between location, depression and anxiety. In recent years, eHealth in fitness applications
has been on the surge with more than 300,000 apps in app stores with numbers increasing.
Fitness apps are the major players in using location information to monitor users. Much
as location information has proved useful in providing information about users location
that is crucial in the development and implementation of the above named applications,
its use comes with a lot of privacy concerns as depicted in [111]. Therefore, there is a
need for designing privacy preserving eHealth location based applications that ensure
that privacy protection of medical data especially when using location information is
ensured. In the following we present on the data acquisition performed and the results of
our study.
4.3.3 Data acquisition in eHealth mobile applications
We analysed the top 5 top eHealth fitness apps to determine the types of personal, location
and medical data that is aggregated and how its used. We gathered information from
eHealth fitness app websites and recorded URLs for both websites and privacy policies.
Data acquisition was performed by taking snapshots of the data collected by the apps
and in the privacy policies. Collected data was taken at face value from the websites. The
process of data collection was performed between May 2017 and July 2018. Initially, we
recorded the information presented on companies’ sites about the data collected by the
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apps. We then recorded the information presented on the companies’ privacy-policy URLs.
The final step was to contrast the information presented about data collection at company
URLs with that presented at privacy policy URLs to identify potential mismatches. The
following steps outline our data-acquisition process:
• Step 1: (a) Search for the eHealth fitness apps. (b) Check if each site has a
page explaining how the fitness app works. (c) Elicit results by marking sections
advising the data collected by the fitness apps. (d) Check if sites contain information
collected in case medical data is leaked, take screenshots and compare sites. (e)
Note down the results in a comparison table.
• Step 2: (a) Check if fitness app provider sites have a privacy-policy site. (b) Repeat
substeps (b), (c) and (d) in Step 1 above. (c) Check if the privacy-policy site has
information about third-party service providers and if any information is shared
to other companies. (d) Check if the site has information about where data are
stored and processed by third-party service providers (EU, Non EU). (e) Check if
sites include information about what happens to data after users have opted out of
policies. (f) Check if the sites inform users of the medical data that is collected. (g)
Check if users are informed before data is transferred and how they are informed.
(h) Note down the results in a comparison table.
4.3.4 Search Results for eHealth applications
This section presents the results of our study. Figure 4.4 provides an example of information
collection in a fitness app given on one of the company sites. Figure 4.5 gives a brief
report of the details we found about the data collected by eHealth fitness applications in
various user groups. We outline the findings from our study in detail. Our results are
based on three major observations:
1. Data collected by eHealth fitness applications based on a daily basis.
2. Data collected and further processed by third-party service providers.
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Figure 4.4: Data collected in fitness
apps.
Figure 4.5: Data shared in fitness
groups.
3. Data collected even when a user has opted out of the fitness app services.
4. How medical data is protected and stored after being transferred to companies.
A. Data collected daily by eHealth fitness apps.
Data collection in fitness apps is increasing as fitness apps are on the rise in both
Android and Iphone Operating systems due to the high level of demand. Current
fitness apps are used to monitor users for their daily activities to improve physical
inactivity. They monitor activities like, the heart rate, the route taken, the paces
taken during physical activity. Fitness apps can be used to monitor diet by offering
nutritional plans and dietary advise to users. We subdivided the type of data
collected by fitness apps into 4 major categories. Personal data, Physical activity
data, Nutritional data and Location data. Table 4.5 indicates some of the data
collected and the activities performed. We note that fitness apps differ in the type of
features they provide to their customers, therefore data collection varies according
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Table 4.6: Sensors used in fitness trackers
Sensors Measures
Accelerometers Acceleration
gyroscope Orientation of an object in space
Barometric altimeters Object elevation and altitude tracking
Compass Cardinal direction
ECG sensors Heart rate
Bioimpedance sensors Pulse
Ambient light sensors Light
to the features provided.
B. Data collected and processed by third-party service providers for eHealth
fitness applications.
Fitness tracking data is collected by individual app companies. This involves using
sensors in the various tracking devices like smart watches and fitness trackers. The
information is then processed by sensors. Table 4.6 shows some of the sensors used
in fitness apps with the corresponding sensor data they collect. This data is then
shared to third-party service providers to analyze the collected data and provide
accurate services to the users. Several fitness apps have been reported to send user
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data to social media platforms e.g Facebook [112]. This data is shared mainly for
advertising and target advertising. This way companies can use it to advertise their
products to the customers they presume will buy the products. Data shared ranges
from daily fitness routines to more sensitive data like calendars and menstrual cycles.
However, users are not informed of the companies which this data is shared to. The
statements about data sharing are vague, and it is not clear which type of data is
shared, if it is PII, sensor data, or motion data. The following excerpt 4.7 shows
the information given about data sharing to third-parties found on Fitbits privacy
policy.
We transfer information to our corporate affiliates,
service providers, and other partners who process it for us,
based on our instructions, and in compliance with this policy and
any other appropriate confidentiality and security measures.
These partners provide us with services globally,
including for customer support, information technology,
payments, sales, marketing, data analysis, research, and surveys.
Table 4.7: Fitbit privacy policy
This clearly shows that eHealth mobile app companies continue to share user data
and the user is not aware of which impact it may have if this data is sold to insurance
companies. Insurance companies may charge higher prices to customers that may
have preexisting conditions or are physically inactive [113]. Therefore companies
must stop sharing PII and sensitive medical data to third-party service providers
for purposes of advertising to reduce privacy invasion.
4.3.5 Deriving eHealth mobile applications privacy requirements
The case study used in this study is that of a heart beat rate sensor as shown in Figure 4.6.
We apply the LINDDUN methodology to generate privacy requirements, similar to the
methodology of deriving telematics mobile applications privacy requirements described
above.
Creation of a Data flow diagram
We initially created a Data Flow Diagram which shows the data flow between different
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Figure 4.6: EHealth Heartrate monitor data flow diagram.
components of the applications as seen in Figure 5.6. The data flow diagram of heart
rate monitor is composed of 5 major components (1) Heart beat sensors that measure a
patients heartbeat (2) Patients (3) Physicians (4) Back end servers used to process the
collected data (5) Databases used to store data. The components have to be protected
such that eHealth data is not compromised.
Mapping of Heart beat monitor DFD to potential privacy threats
The data flow diagram is mapped to potential threats which may be used to attack
the application. Each component is monitored to determine which threats may occur
during the general data flow from each component to the other. According to LINDDUN,
all components are prone to privacy threats and need to be analysed for potential privacy
leakages based on the following privacy categories; Linkability (L), Identifiability (I),
Non-repudiation(N), Detectability (D), Information disclosure (D), Content unwareness
(U), and Consent or policy non-compliance (N). The mapping of the data flow diagram
can be seen in Table 4.9.
Generate heart beat monitor privacy threats
Potential privacy threats to the eHealth heartbeat monitor were derived in relation to
the generated data flow diagram. Table 4.8 illustrates some of the possible threats that
may occur in an eHealth heart beat monitor application. This includes the attack, the
attack process and the result of the attack. Corresponding threats are generated which
further need to be modeled in order to find privacy solutions that best suit the threat.
Generate privacy requirements from threats
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Table 4.8: eHealth heart beat monitor threats modeling
Description T1 Patient identification which may be linked to their illnesses.
Attack process Attackers who may intercept the system and heart beat device may identify patients
Result Compromised systems and access to patients sensitive medical data.
Description T2 Manipulation of the heart beat monitor and sensors.
Attack process Devices are tampered with to produce incorrect values.
Result Wrong measurements leading to false diagnosis.
Description T3 Information-sharing of private data to third-party providers.
Attack process Ehealth service providers sharing or selling data to third-party service providers.
Result Information disclosure and misuse by third-party service providers.
Table 4.9: Mapping of Heart beat Data flow diagram to potential threats
Mapping of Heart beat DFD to privacy threats
Privacy threat target L I N D D U N
Heart beat Data Store Heart beat DB • • • • • •
Heart beat Data Flow Heart Monitor - patient flow • • • • • •
Patient - Server flow • • • • • •
Server - Database flow • • • • • •
Database -Physician flow • • • • • •
Physician - Server flow • • • • • •
Server - Patient flow • • • • • •
Heart beat processes Heart beat sensors • • • • • •
Manage heart beat sensors • • • • • •
Manage servers • • • • • •
Entity Patient • • •
Physician • • •
The next step after deriving privacy threats is to generate the anticipated privacy
requirements. The privacy requirements are based on privacy categories; Linkability (L),
Identifiability (I), Non-repudiation(N), Detectability (D), Information disclosure (D),
Content unwareness (U), and Consent or policy non-compliance (N) as proposed by the
LINDDUN methodology. Table 4.10 illustrates how privacy requirements are derived
from threats based on the privacy categories. In the following we elaborate on some of
the privacy challenges faced in eHealth mobile applications.
4.3.6 Privacy challenges in eHealth mobile applications
The key challenge in eHealth mobile applications concerns the privacy protection of
patient data which is susceptible to attacks from external attackers and from third party
service providers with whom companies share data. Medical data is very prone to attacks
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Table 4.10: Deriving privacy requirements from threats
From threats to privacy requirements
eHealth Heart beat monitor threats Privacy requirements
Linkability of patients to Heart beat monitor DB Unlinkability of patients to database
Linkability of patients to data flows Unlinkability of patients to data flows
Linkability of patients to Heart beat monitor processes Unlinkability of patients to system processes
Linkability of external entities Unlinkability of external entities connecting to systems
Identifiability of patients to Heart beat monitor DB Pseudonymity or anonymity of patients in DB
Identifiability of patients to data flows Pseudonymity or anonymity of patients in data streams
Identifiability of patients to Heart beat monitor processes Pseudonymity or anonymity of patients in systems processes
Non-repudiation of patients sending data streams Acknowledgement of patients using system processes
Non-repudiation of patients using system processes Acknowledgement of patients using system processes
Detectability of patients connecting to DB Unobservability of patients connecting to DB
Detectability of patients sending data streams Unobservability of patients sending data streams
Detectability of patients using system processes Unobservability of patients using systems processes
Information disclosure of patients connecting to DB Confidentiality of patients connecting to DB
Information disclosure of patients sending data streams Confidentiality of patients sending data streams
Information disclosure of patients using system processes Confidentiality of patients using system processes
Unawareness of patients about content given in systems User awareness of content given to systems
Non-compliance of systems with policies and regulations Compliance with policies and regulations in systems
as it includes a lot of financial data that is embedded in the data stolen. There is a
high potential of information in health data records as a lot of players are interested in
accessing it ranging from medical insurance companies, employers and criminals that
are interested to sell the data. Therefore, preserving privacy is very crucial and should
be maintained through out the development and integration of the product life cycle.
This is quite hard to sustain as their are very many players in the eHealth development
Eco-system, so protecting privacy at all levels of system development with all the key
stake holders involved has proven to be very challenging. As a result, the number of
privacy breaches affecting eHealth applications has increased mostly at health care service
providers such as hospitals and physician offices. Below we highlight some of the privacy
challenges met when designing eHealth mobile communication systems.
Lack of privacy regulation and policy enforcement:
The eHealth mobile sector has not been well regulated. With various medical bodies
involved, system regulation with each body varies [114] with no privacy guidelines and
so application designers have been faced with a myriad of regulations to implement.
In addition, the rampant development of the industry makes existent policies e.g Fair
Information Practices(FIPPs) inadequate for emerging technologies. This has led to tech
giants and application designers having to build applications that lack privacy protection
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measures. This however, is gradually improving with efforts from tech giants e.g. Google
who insist that application designers who place their applications in their app stores must
ensure that they have a privacy policy for all apps in the market store.
Lack of privacy preserving mobile connection systems
eHealth mobile applications use wireless connectivity to provide remote access to
patients and to connect to medical devices remotely. Wireless connectivity e.g. WiFi and
Bluetooth is used to connect to terminals and body eHealth sensors which communicate
with smart phones and remote servers used to store data. The wireless communication
setup comes with a lot of privacy challenges and is prone to privacy and security attacks.
4.4 Empirical study 2 - Research Empirical study
This section presents the works performed in our second empirical study which involved an
extensive research investigation of both eHealth and Telematics mobile applications. This
study attempts to understand how mobile applications are designed and to which extent
privacy protection methodologies are implemented. It investigates the implementation of
privacy between the company website and the policy relating to the app. We investigate
the the policies on the website versus the policies in the apps stores and those in the apps.
After carrying out exploratory study 1, we found that more research had to be done in
order to determine the extent at which mobile applications collect data and integrate
privacy preserving mechanisms. The study involves a detailed analysis of data collection
and privacy policies employed in current eHealth and Telematics applications.
4.5 TRANK based design for eHealth applications
4.5.1 eHealth case study
Within the eHealth case study, we investigate the integration of privacy in modern mobile
eHealth apps. Mobile eHealth apps or digital eHealth apps are currently on the increase.
They have a great potential in improving health care for patients in remote areas who
cannot have a face-to-face visit with a physician. Mobile phones are used to provide online
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medical platforms using eHealth apps, to assist in health monitoring and assessment of
patients. This type of monitoring promises cheaper implementation costs and deployment
especially as the number of doctors to patient ratio has reduced in recent years. However,
the increase of eHealth applications comes with privacy concerns. The use of smartphones
as a means of attending to patients remotely puts patients at the risk of their data being
intercepted or landing in the wrong hands. In this case study, we investigate the highest
revenue generating eHealth apps that are on the market and analyze privacy invasive
capabilities in mentioned apps. We describe a taxonomy of eHealth apps which we use as
a criteria in testing the apps. We further use a privacy score [77] to determine the privacy
level used in the tested apps.
4.5.2 Data collection in eHealth mobile applications
In order to determine the type of data collected by current eHealth apps we analysed 30
eHealth apps. The apps we examined are shown in Table 4.11 which was retrieved at the
time of this study and are subject to have changed. We initially used Google Play Store








Data Collection in eHealth apps:
Data collection in mobile eHealth apps was based on the functionality of the app. By
comparison, of all eHealth apps we examined, fitness apps collect the most data. Fitness
apps are in addition, the most used in all the above listed categories. It was observed that
87
Chapter 4 TRANK based design for eHealth applications
Table 4.11: eHealth apps
Apps Category
Name Active Users Downloads Type Ranking Data Score
Nike Training 252,919 10,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.6 53
Freeletics 133,224 10,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.5 22
Sworkit 109,944 5,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.6 23
Garmin Connect 245,109 10,000,000 Health and Fitness 3.9 40
Fitbit 364,990 10,000,000 Health and Fitness 3.9 41
Instant Heart rate 296,610 10,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.3 47
Pulse Point 8,148 100,000 Medical 4.5 14
Daily Cardio Workout 14,981 1,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.4 20
Nokia Health Mate 29,441 1,000,000 Health and Fitness 3.6 39
Cardiograph 200,564 10,000,000 Health and Fitness 3.8 30
Diabetes PA 1,218 50,000 Health and Fitness 4.2 38
Dexcom 38 10,000 Medical 3.5 16
Diabetes Tracker 945 100,000 Health and Fitness 3.9 19
MySugr 21,839 1,000 Medical 4.6 32
Glooko Diasend 122 10,000 Health and Fitness 2.8 30
Ideal weight 112,479 5,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.2 3
Lose it 70,373 10,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.4 34
Weight watchers 279,961 5,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.2 37
Noom coach 169,789 10,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.3 29
Calorie counter MyFitnessPal 1,900,605 50,000,000 Health and Fitness 4.6 29
Depression CBT 1400 100,000 Medical 4.2 17
7 cups of tea 14,139 500,000 Health and Fitness 4.2 23
Operation reach out 24 1,000 Health and Fitness 4.0 8
Mood Scanner 969 100,000 Entertainment 3.3 11
Fight Depression naturally 314 50,000 Health and Fitness 4.6 13
Medscape 51,272 5,000,000 Medical 4.4 15
PEPID 323 100,000 Medical 3.9 11
Uptodate 5,946 500,000 Medical 4.4 12
Aminion Doximity 1,094 50,000 Medical 4.3 17
ReadbyQxMD 1,770 100,000 Medical 4.6 8
Table 4.12: Number of apps downloaded in a category
Category Total No of Apps >50K Downloads Percentage
Health & Fitness 80756 4004 5%
Medical 36222 1336 4%
Dating 3971 476 12%
Photography 60372 8197 14%
Role Playing 7806 2715 35%
Business 162373 3031 2%
Education 216771 12337 6%
Simulation 25615 9056 35%
Weather 9315 1337 14%
Maps & Navigation 32594 2597 8%
Music & Audio 157440 7986 5%
Social 50878 3502 7%
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users who download apps, however, do not use the majority of the apps they acquire from
app stores. Although the number of apps downloaded and the volume of apps increases as
the number of smartphone users increase, it is estimated that less than 20% of the people
who download the apps use them regularly. There are many categories of pps in Google
Play Store [115], however, we derived our own categories in an attempt to differentiate
them from the others and be specific in our reporting. Table 4.12 shows some of the
categories in Google Play Store and the number of apps with more than 50,000 downloads.
As you can observe, from the table the volume of apps in Google Play Store is not in
correlation with the percentage of the apps that are frequently downloaded by users. We
notice that even though educational apps have a large volume of apps in Google Play
Store the percentage that is downloaded repeatedly is very low. Whereas the Simulation
and Role playing apps are downloaded constantly although they are few in numbers in
the store. Thus, users perception of using a pps is determinant on the functionality of the
app rather than the numbers accessible in the store. It is nonetheless, important to note
that data collection in the downloaded apps continues even when the app is not frequently
used, and sometimes when the phone is off. Whenever users accept the permissions to the
apps normally on the app downloads permission view, data collection is done to enable
proper app functionality. Users are then bound to the app permissions and only with the
help of the privacy policies can one choose to use the app or not. But at this stage of
the app download (thats if the app has an in-app privacy policy), users can only consent
to the privacy policy when most of the permissions used for e.g., device hardware data,
location data, payment type data are already collected. Privacy policies tend to be long
as a result, users often do not read them. Most of the privacy policies are vague and
cannot be reliably understood by non-tech users. In addition, many phone screens are
small and often not well lighted to enable proper readability. It follows that the majority
of users do not read in-app privacy policies but constantly press the "Accept" button
in order for them to continue using the app as desired. We observed that some Apps
continue on accessing user information even when they are deleted from the phone. Also,
phones periodically receive location based messages, information messages even when the
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apps are not in use without users knowledge. Therefore, users should be informed of these
activities even during app downloads to enable them opt-in or out of these services. These
scenarios call for app developers to re-evaluate the way apps are developed especially
by creating user awareness of which data is being collected about them. Better privacy
enhancing methodologies are therefore required in an effort to achieve this goal.
4.5.3 Data extraction in eHealth mobile applications
Data extraction: The initial step of the data extraction was to download the apps from
Google Play Store. We then analyzed the information given in the store about the app.
Next, the privacy policy given in the store was examined and screen shots were taken
in an effort to determine which data is mentioned that the app collects. Information
about the data collected in the privacy policy was transcribed. After downloading the
apps, accounts were created for each app and the information requested in the app was
recorded. This information included;
• If the app required personal information like the name, email, address.
• A login using social networks like Facebook.
• If the app required payment information like credit card details.
• If the app had a privacy policy during log on or not.
This data enabled us to compare both privacy policies in the app and that in the store
to determine any inconsistencies of personal data collected by the apps. Next we examined
the privacy policies in the company websites to determine if they differed from those in the
app and the store. Extracts of the data collected can be shown in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14.
Permission Use:
In addition to the collected data in both the apps and privacy policies, we recorded the
permissions the apps required in the Google play store. The permissions which were
required after logging in the app were further examined and compared to those in the
store.
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We log web browser information(e.g. browser types,...
page view tallies,time spent on each page,
geographic location information, page browsing
information,subject browsing information and
operating system information...we may collect
hardware information related to the device used by the member.
Table 4.13: Snippet from 7 cups Privacy policy Browser information
...we collect personal information ...known as Personal
Data and includes your name or alias or contact phone number.
We also collect meta-data about the overall site, like frequency
of page views...we collect information about your computer like
your IP address and browser information.
Table 4.14: Snippet from 7 cups Privacy policy
4.5.4 Permissions in eHealth applications
In an attempt to understand the permissions in mobile applications, we need to understand
what type of permissions exist and their purpose. Most users cant distinguish permissions
that are required for app functionality from permissions that are used to monitor user
movement and their activities.
What are permissions used for? Permission requests are used to protect sensitive
data on the gadgets. Users can choose which permissions the app has access to. However
some permissions are mandatory for the basic functionality of an app. Take for example,
a telematics insurance app requires the position information (geo-location using GPS
sensors on the phone) for the app to know a drivers’ exact location in order to measure
the distance traveled and calculate the premium based on these details. Similarly, to
download apps a connection to the Internet is unavoidable, so the majority of apps require
the "full network access" permission.
Myriad of app permissions required: The plethora of app permissions in the app store
is overwhelming for a non-tech user. Much as most of the permissions are listed in Google
Play Store, its really hard to comprehend what these apps mean for any lay person. The
actual number of permissions an app requires does not depict which information is going
to be used and collected from the phone and why its needed. Various app permissions
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Table 4.15: Example of Permissions extracted
Permissions
read your own contact card heart rate monitors
add or remove accounts read Calendar events plus confidential information
read sensitive log data receive data from internet
find accounts on the device view network connections
read your own contact card pair with Bluetooth devices
read your contacts access Bluetooth settings
modify your contacts control Near-Field Communication
read phone status and identity read Google service configuration
access USB storage file system toggle sync on and off
directly call phone numbers download files without notification
read call log read sync statistics and settings
write call log full network access
access USB storage file system control flashlight
read the contents of your USB storage control media playback and metadata access
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage smart card services permissions label
read the contents of your USB storage send sticky broadcast
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage change network connectivity
read phone status and identity connect and disconnect form WiFi
approximate location (network-based) change your audio settings
precise location (GPS and network-based) run at startup
access extra location provider commands draw over other apps
receive text messages(sms) control vibration
read your text messages(SMS or MMS) prevent device from sleeping
receive text messages(mms) modify system settings
send sms messages Google play licence check
read Calendar events plus confidential information reorder running apps
take pictures and videos prevent device from sleeping
record audio close other apps
install shortcuts uninstall shortcuts
manage document storage create accounts and set passwords
view WiFi connections use accounts on the device
require a lot of PII and a collection require only information about hardware components.
Some of the permissions recorded were given as follows:
1. Identity: find accounts on the device, read your own contact card, add or remove
accounts.
2. Phone: read phone status and identity, access USB storage file system, directly call
hone numbers.
3. Location data: approximate location (network based), precise location (GPS and
network based) and access extra location provider commands.
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find accounts on the device download files without notification
add or remove accounts read sync statistics
Contacts receive data from Internet
find accounts on the device view network connections
read your contacts create accounts and set passwords
Location full network access
approximate location (network-based) control Near Field Communication
precise location (GPS and network-based) read sync settings
Phone run at startup
read phone status and identity use accounts on the device
Photos / Media / Files control vibration
read the contents of your USB storage prevent device from sleeping
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage toggle sync on and off
Storage
read the contents of your USB storage
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
Camera
take pictures and videos
Wi-Fi connection information
view Wi-Fi connections
Device ID & call information
read phone status and identity




read phone status and identity receive data from Internet
Photos / Media / Files view network connections
read the contents of your USB storage full network access
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage prevent device from sleeping
Storage
read the contents of your USB storage
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
Device ID & call information
read phone status and identity
We recorded these permissions for each app and observed that some apps requested for
permissions which were not used for application functionality. There is a tendency of
collecting more data than is required for system functionality but rather gather more
information for advertising and system analytics. Nike Training for example, required
more permissions than Depression CBT as shown in Table 4.16 and Table 4.17. Mysugr
required few permissions as compared to Nike Training as depicted in Table 4.18 although
it provides a lot of features. Therefore, permissions requested varied from app to app
based on not only the services given but also on how much advertising and systems
analytics is done for a particular app and company.
In an attempt to investigate what type of data is collected in the apps, we studied the
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find accounts on the device receive data from Internet
Contacts view network connections
find accounts on the device pair with Bluetooth devices
Location access Bluetooth settings
approximate location (network-based) full network access
precise location (GPS and network-based) run at startup
Photos / Media / Files control vibration
read the contents of your USB storage prevent device from sleeping
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
Storage
read the contents of your USB storage
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
Camera
take pictures and videos
Other
Figure 4.7: Fitbit privacy policy - sharing data with third parties.
privacy policies to find out what is included in the policies. We further recorded details
of the privacy policy of how data is shared to third parties for the Fitbit app as seen in
Figure 4.7 which states that “First and foremost we don’t sell any data that could identify
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Figure 4.8: Fitbit privacy policy - of how data is shared with friends and location details.
you. We only share data about you when it is necessary to provide our services, when the
data is de-identified and aggregated, or when you direct us to share it.” This statement is
not clear on what and when data is shared. We observed that most privacy policies were
vague and hard to understand by a normal user. Details of the type of data shared and
how its protected are not given. This trend was observed in most of the privacy policies
we analysed.
In Figure 4.8 information about how data is shared with friends using the same app is
given as follows:“To help you stay motivated on your fitness journey, Fitbit lets you add
friends who are already Fitbit users or invite friends who have not yet joined. You can
add friends in several ways such as by providing their email addresses, by accessing social
networking accounts such as Facebook or from the contact list on your phone.” These
statements involve data sharing to both friends in the contact list and in Online Social
Networks without user consent. eHealth apps have further advanced to use genetic data
to offer services based on DNA as is with the Lose It App which used genetic data to
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Figure 4.9: EmbodyDNA Kit Figure 4.10: DNA Report
determine if customers can lose weight depending on the genetic DNA results.
Figure 4.9 included details of how the genetic traits may determine weight loss as
follows; “Learn your unique genetic traits and how they could affect your weight loss,
nutrition, fitness, and food sensitives” and Figure 4.10 states that; “In 6-8 weeks your report
will be available in the Lose it! app. Your report will reveal your genetic predisposition
toward each trait and highlight which of your logged foods and drinks apply.” These details
are processed without user consent and the fact that genetic data is saved in the app
makes it vulnerable to attackers who may steal customers genetic data and compromise
user privacy.
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Figure 4.11: How Telematics insurance works
4.6 TRANK based design for Telematics applications
4.6.1 Telematics insurance case study
In our second case study we focus on the emerging new technologies in Vehicle-to-
Everything (V2X). The V2X case study we used is that of a telematics insurance applica-
tion. Figure 4.11 illustrates how telematics insurance works. In a telematics insurance
application users subscribe to the application and in return are charged less fees if they
drive less frequently and carefully. The main objective of telematics insurance is to
provide cheaper costs of car insurance to young drivers between the ages of 17 to 25 years.
Compared to conventional insurance policies that are billed based on the Pay-Per-Year
(PPY) model, telematics insurance is billed according to the number of miles driven;
Pay-Per-Mile (PPM). It is further billed depending on what time you drive and how you
drive; Pay-AS-You-Drive (PAYD). This payment model makes it cheaper and attractive
for young drivers who would like to reduce initial insurance costs. However, telematics
insurance has faced a lot of criticism regarding its 24 hour surveillance and tracking of its
users. This has been seen as privacy invasive as users are not aware of how the data is
used especially if its sold to third parties.
4.6.2 Data collection in telematics mobile applications
We analysed 10 telematics apps and recorded the type of data they collect. We used
Goople Play Store to download the apps checking the type of permissions the apps requires
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Table 4.19: Telematics Insurance apps
Apps Category
Name Active Users Downloads Type Ranking Data Score
Aviva drive 8,687 100,000 Finance 4.0 31
Tomtom curfer 153 10,000 Auto and Vehicles 3.0 26
Marmalade 7 1000 Finance 2.6 26
Smart Miles 366 10,000 Maps and Navigation 3.9 4
Admiral Insurance 28 5000 Business 4.3 12
RAC Telematics 71 10,000 Business 2.1 20
Smart Wheels 584 50,000 Auto and Vehicles 1.4 5
Drive Smart Insurance 1,091 100,000 Maps and Navigation 3,9 28
SEAT Telematics 26 500 Lifestyle 1.0 15
Volkswagen Telematics 66 1000 Lifestyle 1.0 22
on installing it. We further analyzed details of the privacy policies presented on company
websites and in-app privacy policies. Telematics insurance technology in most of the apps
analyzed is similar in comparison to the different types of the eHealth apps we analyzed,
which offer diverse features to customers. Therefore, the technical type of data collected
was much the same. However, the amount of data required by the apps varied immensely.
4.6.3 Data extraction in telematics mobile applications
The first step of the data extraction was to download the apps from Google Play Store.
Figure 4.19 shows details of the apps we analyzed from Google Play store. We recorded
the information given in the store about the app. Next, the privacy policy given in the
store was examined and screen shots were taken in an effort to determine which data
is mentioned that the app collects. Information about the data collected in the privacy
policy was transcribed.
After downloading the apps as shown in Table 4.19, accounts were created for each
app and the information requested in the app was recorded. The data collected included;
• Whether the app collected PII information i.e, name, email address, telephone
numbers
• Data shared to Online Social Networks
• Whether the app collected financial information e.g employer, debit card details
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• Whether the app had no discrepancies in the privacy policies during sign up ad the
privacy policies given on the company websites.
Similar to the data collection in eHealth apps, we used Google Play Store to determine
the permissions the telematic apps have access to. We compared the privacy policies
presented in Google Play Store to the privacy policies presented on the company websites.
We installed the telematics apps investigated on a Motorola XT1092 phone running
Android version 8.0. Our dataset consisted of the most popular telematics apps. We
collected data from 10 telematics insurance companies namely, Aviva Drive [116], Tomtom
Curfer [117], Marmalade [96], Hastings Direct - Smart Miles [118], Flo driving insights
[119], Smart Wheels [120], Insure the box [98], Drive smart Insurance [99], Seat Telematics
[121] and Volkswagen telematics [122]. We observed that most of the apps required users
to sign in for insurance policies. We therefore, used the privacy policies presented in
the company sites for our analysis. We transcribed the information given in the privacy
policies to determine which data is collected by the apps. Our aim was to determine the
following type of data collected;
• Which permissions does the app have access to?
• Are the permissions requested required for app functionality?
• Does the app have a privacy policy in Google Play Store?
• Does the app have an in-app privacy policy?
• Does the app have a privacy policy on the companies website?
• Does the privacy policy contain the details of the data that it collects?
• Does the privacy policy contain the contact of the developer?
We analysed the information given in the store about the apps both in the companies
websites and the apps. This was done in two phases; (1) First, we examined the permissions
required while downloading the app and (2) the second phase was to examine the privacy
policies.
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Figure 4.12: Data collection in Drive smart telematics insurance.
As illustrated in Figure 4.12 we have extracted data given in websites that informs
users of what the companies collect. We found that Drive smart explicitly informs users
of which data they collect. This includes the length of the trips taken to determine if the
driver travels long distances on the highway. This information can be used to predict if
the driver is prone to making accidents, thus increasing the price they have to pay for the
insurance. Drive smart further collects data about driving at night between 11:00 pm and
5:00 pm. This information is also necessary to determine if the driver may cause accidents
at night. Drive smart further collects data about customers driving in congested areas,
it collects data about how often they brake, or speed up and finally how familiar they
are, with the roads they drive on. This is important as drivers tend to make mistakes
in new environments because they are not used to the roads and thus increasing the
probability of causing accidents. We transcribed this data to enable us determine if
there were no discrepancies between the privacy policies given on the websites and in-app
privacy policies.
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Figure 4.13: DriveSmart permissions Figure 4.14: User rights.
4.6.4 Permissions in Telematics applications
We manually recorded the permissions the apps required in the Google play store. The
permissions required after logging in the app were further examined and compared to
those in the store. Figure 4.13 shows the in-app permissions for the Drive smart telematics
application and Figure 4.14 shows the rights to personal data.
On installing the application we made screenshots of the application similar to what we
did for eHealth applications. We examined all permissions of the application as presented
in the Google Play Store and within the app. The permissions are as follows;
1. Storage
• modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
• read the contents of your USB storage
2. Location
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Table 4.20: Marmalade Telematics insurance Permissions
Marmalade
Permissions Permissions
Device and app history Other
read sensitive log data receive data from Internet
pair with blue tooth devices
Contacts access blue tooth settings
find accounts on the device full network access
read your contacts manage document storage
Location
approximate location (network-based)
precise location (GPS and network-based)
Phone
read phone status and identity
Photos / Media / Files
read the contents of your USB storage
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
Storage
read the contents of your USB storage
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
Camera
take pictures and videos
Wi-Fi connection information
view Wi-Fi connections
Device ID & call information
read phone status and identity
• precise location (GPS and network-based)
• approximate location (network-based)
3. Wi-Fi connection information
• view Wi-Fi connections
4. Phone
• read phone status and identity
• directly call phone numbers
5. Photos/Media/Files
• modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
• read the contents of your USB storage
6. Device ID and call information
• read phone status and identity
7. Other
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• download files without notification
• receive data from Internet
• view network connections
• pair with Bluetooth devices
• full network access
• access Bluetooth settings
• control vibration
• prevent device from sleeping
• run at startup
We transcribed all telematics permissions as seen in Table 4.20 for the Marmalade
telematics insurance app. We opted to record all the permissions as given in the websites
and compared them with those in the apps to determine any asymmetries. For each
app we checked for any differences between the permissions in the Google Play Store
websites and those reported in the apps. Permissions play a major role in determining
which data the app has access to. For example, we observe that although most of the
permissions requested are used for functionality such as the permission request access
to Wi-Fi connections is used to access the internet, and access to the camera is used
to enable taking photos, some of the permissions used are entirely for marketing and
advertising. A Global Privacy Enforcement(GPEN) survey [123], reported that most of
the permissions requested are not required. This means that app designers explicitly ask
for more data that is not mandatory for app functionality. This results into immense
amounts of data being collected without user influence and empowerment. Although
some apps include details of having access to the data collected within the app, this
comes at a fee as depicted in Figure 4.14 and so customers are hesitant to ask for their
data. According to the GPEN survey [123] 32% of apps had access to location data and
the number is increasing. This means that customers are constantly being monitored
wherever they go making it very lucrative for data analysis used for determining user
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Figure 4.15: How the app is used. Figure 4.16: How the app works.
trends. In the telematics insurance domain location information is required to determine
the cost of the insurance policy based on the customers driving.
In-app privacy policies in Telematics applications
According to the new applicable laws e.g GDPR, apps are required to have a privacy
policy within the app that explicitly informs users of how user data especially PII is
handled. Google Play Store demands that all apps have a link to the privacy policy
within the store. We observed that the majority of the apps had a privacy policy on the
company sites as well as on Google Play store but lacked one within the app. Apps are
required to give information about the data they collect and about what the app does
as illustrated in Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16. However, the majority of the apps did not
have this information within the app but had a privacy policy or a link to the privacy
policy in the app. We observed that generally companies provide in app privacy policies
however, these policies are too long for some of the devices used. This means that users
do nor fully read the policies they are provided.
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For instance, Figure 4.17 is part of a long privacy policy with phrases that are hard to
comprehend for layman users. Similar to the privacy policies on Google play, it illustrates
how the data collected is used which states as follows:
“We may use your data to review and analyse market trends and to track sales data,
including but not limited to data provided as part of your quotation, information on how
you use our website, pages you have viewed and which websites you used previously to
visit ours. We may also pass this data to third parties for analytical purposes. Where
you have come to our website by clicking on a price comparison service button or another
service button on another site, we will supply information about the quotations you have
obtained and any policies you obtain to that site....”
This statement justifies that most mobile apps share information to third party service
providers for analytics and marketing. Although the legal basis for data collection enacted
by the GDPR regulations and the EU law demands that mobile app developers include
for which specific purposes the data collected is for, we observed that most of the apps
did not present this information.
Not only is data shared to third parties within the UK but also in other countries
outside the UK as illustrated in the privacy policy shown in Figure 4.18 which states that:
“ All personal information you provide will be held in the strictest confidence and only
used for the purpose of providing our service, subject to certain exclusions as described
within this Privacy Policy and the Terms and Conditions. From time to time there may
be a requirement to process your personal data in other countries out side the European
Economic Area (EEA) where data protection safeguards differ from those of the UK.
Where this is necessary we will ensure that your data is kept securely and only processed
in accordance with the Data Protection Act. Some of our service providers may also
process your data in other countries and we require all your data is kept securely at all
time and the same UK standards are met.” This statement clearly shows that users have
no control over their data when companies have shared it outside the EEA. Cross-boarder
data transfers are regulated by the GDPR in article 45[124] and 46 [125]. Article 45
section 1 states that: “A transfer of personal data to a third country or an international
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Figure 4.17: In app privacy policy
showing how data is
used.
Figure 4.18: In app privacy policy
data sharing to third-
parties
organization may take place where the Commission has decided that the third country, a
territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or the international
organization in question ensures an adequate level of protection. Such a transfer shall
not require any specific authorization.” This clearly states that transferred data has to
be protected. This information however was lacking in most of the privacy policies we
analyzed.
4.7 Privacy metrics used for Data Analysis
To compute the data transcribed in the studies above we had to choose a privacy metric
that best suits the type of data collected from privacy policies, the functionality features
provided by the apps and the amount of data collected.
The privacy metrics used in this work are based on the analysis in [77]. The analysis
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relies on the amount of data collected, the privacy guidelines used in the privacy policies
and the privacy controls employed by the apps. These metrics are means to quantify
the usefulness of our design for the TRANK framework. The privacy score (PS) is a
measure of how much privacy is implemented in a particular app. This value is obtained
by computing the average of the privacy control score (PCS), the privacy policy score
(PPS) and the data collection score (DCS) as follows:
PS =




PCS1  - min(PCS1)
max(PCS1) - min(PCS1) (4.2)
PPS2 =
PPS1  - min(PPS1)
max(PPS1) - min(PPS1) (4.3)
DCS2 = 1 - DCS1  - min(DCS1)
max(DCS1) - min(DCS1) (4.4)
The three subscores are further defined as follows;
Privacy Control Subscore: is derived from the features integrated in the app and
the company site to ensure that their privacy is protected. An example of such features
include the use of encryption measures e.g Transport Layer Security (TLS) or how the
privacy configuration is set in the app. This entity was given a value of 1 point.
Data Collection Subscore: is calculated using the number of data items that are
collected in the app. The data items are further computed from the details given in the
privacy policies. This is to ensure that the data items that are mentioned in the privacy
policies and not clearly seen during app download or when the app is running are not
missed out. This entity was given a scale of 1 for each data entity and varied from 1 to 3
based on the entity it represented. For example, we allocated a value of 1 to data entities




The Privacy Policy Subscore is computed based on if the app or the company website
has implemented a privacy policy and the details included in the app. The details were
allocated a value of 1 e.g. based on if the privacy policy existed in the app, within the
app and within the company site. Other factors were put in consideration e.g. if terms
and conditions existed, if personal information can be deleted.
The derived values were further normalised to give each score equal weight for our
analysis. Data collection scores (DCS) are reversed as a higher data collection score leads
to a decrease in data privacy.
Initially, Google play store was used to list the permissions that apps are able to
access. A subsequent step was to award points to the permissions that we deemed privacy
intrusive based on the app functionalities. For instance, the point range from -0.5 to 3
was used to share data with third parties and to connect to social platforms respectively.
Next, PCS values were analysed which involved among others checking for data security
features like the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) during login. PPS values were
determined based on privacy policies which were rated using accessibility, use of privacy
policies during sign on and availability of contact details. Our data set consisted of 30
eHealth apps. Each app was downloaded from Google play store onto a Motorola XT1092
phone running Android version 8.0. Then privacy policies in Google play store as well
as the company sites were analysed. Further, the functionality the app provided and
the privacy controls that were implemented in the app were analysed. The results were
digitally recorded and transcribed in three categories, one containing the results for the
PPS, PCS and DCS.
4.8 Summary
This section provides the contributions of this thesis in which we analyse privacy preserving
methodologies employed in current eHealth and Telematics applications. We initially
analyse the eHealth domain. In the mobile application selection and analysis section, we
categorized eHealth apps in six independent categories, namely; Fitness apps, Cardiology
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apps, Diabetes apps, Weightloss apps, Depression apps and Physician apps. We focused on
these apps as they are the leading apps in use with high revenues and due to their highly
evolving nature. In particular, we focused on 30 eHealth apps and 10 telematics apps,
in which we examined the permissions reported on the company websites, permissions
in Google Play and in-app permissions. We used this approach to investigate if there
are any asymmetries and inconsistencies in the permissions provided to customers. We
investigated which permissions are used and what they are used for within the app
and in Google Play Store and if the app permissions requested for, are required for
app functionality. Next, we analysed privacy requirements analysis in eHealth apps
with a focus on data extraction in eHealth applications, in particular the permissions
required in eHealth apps and in-app privacy policies used. Finally, we investigated the
telematics insurance domain starting with the privacy requirements analysis, followed by
data extraction, permissions and in-app privacy policies. In general, this section gives a
comprehensive investigative study of privacy-by-design methods used in current mobile
applications. In the following chapter, we introduce TRANK a privacy trade-off analysis
framework which aims at addressing the gaps discussed in chapter 1, 2 and 3 by enhancing




framework for designing future
mobile applications
5.1 TRANK framework overview
This chapter presents a privacy Trade-off Analysis Framework (TRANK). TRANK is a
design framework for designing privacy aware mobile applications. Designing of privacy-
aware mobile applications is crucial in order to protect user Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) and to reduce data leakages. In practice, mobile apps collect a lot of
data required for proper system functionality ranging from personal data e.g. name and
address to billing information e.g credit card details. Privacy data protection reduces the
damages caused when such systems are compromised. Today data leakages in mobile
applications like social networking services (e.g. Facebook) and web service providers
(e.g. Yahoo) are reported frequently and the cost of the damage is increasing. As such,
the results in chapter 1 show that existing mobile applications are prone to massive data
leakages due to the large amounts of data they collect and their inability to protect this
data and, therefore, require novel privacy protecting methodologies.
Privacy awareness has become a major concern in recent years as companies continue
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to collect data without users consent. We have seen a continuous monitoring of users
through third-party companies which are outsourced as discussed in chapter 1. In recent
years, privacy concerns have increased about the use of personal data by data controllers
and processing companies. User’s demographic location is used to profile users as depicted
by the Cambridge Analytica data scandal [20]. In addition, we have seen a massive
growth of mobile applications which collect large amounts of personal data. This massive
growth raises privacy concerns both from users and legislators especially on how personal
data is used. The EU General Data protection regulation (GDPR) has mandated that all
companies must inform users of what type of data is collected. Much as companies have
attempted to address privacy directives by using privacy policies, despite these efforts
they continue to collect data without informing users.
These challenges call for a consistent methodology to design privacy-preserving mobile
applications. Mobile apps have increasingly been deployed by companies to aid in,
among others, the management of business efficiency, ease in accessing information,
simplifying communication and the provision of user-friendly applications. However,
there is a significant gap in having common practices for designing and implementing
privacy-preserving methods. TRANK, therefore, aids mobile application developers and
privacy engineers in designing privacy-aware applications from the initial stages of system
development most importantly putting into consideration the trade-offs between privacy,
system functionality and performance. We propose TRANK, to improve the development
of privacy-aware apps and report on our empirical findings derived from our study of
current mobile applications in the previous section. Our analysis conducted on real
eHealth and V2X telematics case studies reveals that more than 50% of current apps
accumulate a lot of data that is not required for app functionality without the users’
knowledge. Our proposed framework TRANK thus is a contribution towards privacy
preservation in current mobile applications.
Privacy integration in mobile apps: In practice, mobile apps have to consolidate
privacy requirements by providing privacy policies and open privacy practices. However,
a major privacy concern that arises is whether current apps depict what is in the privacy
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policies they provide to their users? In an effort to close this gap, we examined the data
the apps collect at the app level and that mentioned in the privacy policies and company
websites. The data examined involved for example personal identification data e.g. name,
email, address, date of birth; billing information e.g. billing address, credit card numbers;
location based data e.g GPS location data to determine any asymmetries involved. The
major aim of determining these differences is to reduce the massive data apps collect
without users consent that is not necessarily required for app functionality.
This chapter aims at fulfilling this call by proposing a privacy aware trade-off analysis
framework which aims at leveraging app functionality and privacy aware requirements, to
aid application designers in developing more privacy aware mobile applications without
minimizing app functionality.
The major contributions of this work are three fold:
1. An empirical study of 30 eHealth apps and 10 telematics apps to determine data
collection inconsistencies of mobile applications at the app level compared to the
data mentioned in the companies privacy policies.
2. A privacy trade-off analysis framework(TRANK) which evaluates, identifies and
minimises data collection inconsistencies of data collected at the app level to that
mentioned in the privacy policies and company websites.
3. A statistical evaluation of the privacy aware analysis framework (TRANK) which
indicates a significant reduction of data collection in examined apps thus improving
data privacy.
Given the aforementioned limitations in chapter 1 and 2, there is a significant gap in
the the way apps are designed and how users data is stored and managed. The above
incidences highlight the need for the design of less privacy invasive apps while considering
the impact of privacy trade-offs. Proposing TRANK, therefore, serves as a stepping stone
in addressing these challenges.
Privacy trade-offs in application development: Previous research has been
done to tackle trade-offs in relation to security, utility, functionality and performance.
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Privacy trade-offs play a great role in designing mobile applications because for some
applications to function as they are required, e.g in navigation apps, location data must
be used. This means that in such instances privacy has to be sacrificed. Next we present
previous works on trade-offs we reviewed as a basis of our research.
Liu et al [126] introduced a model to determine the trade-off between functionality
and user privacy preferences. This model was aimed at performing personalized App
recommendation using three levels of privacy information. While this focuses on per-
sonalized app recommendations based on the trade-off between app functionality and
user privacy preferences, the focus of our framework is on reducing data collection in
mobile applications while putting into consideration the trade-off between privacy and
app functionality.
Patil et al [127] conducted a survey to determine the perception of security and
privacy during surveillance on the Metro in Europe. This study aimed at finding the
trade-off between privacy and security in surveillance-oriented security technologies and
to determine if they were privacy intriguing. This approach however defers from our
research in that we aim at improving privacy preservation through limiting data collection
in mobile applications. We focus on the trade-off between app functionality and privacy
preserving mechanisms that are used in app development and design.
Xi et al [128] introduced a class of privacy definitions called Blowfish which entails
policies used to determine the trade-off between privacy and utility. In their classification,
they use kmeans clustering and cumulative histograms to tune utility in relation to privacy
specifications. Policies are used to distinguish information in the data base that is to
be protected against attackers thus enhancing utility. While this approach is similar to
ours in the sense of considering privacy trade-offs in application development it differs
to ours in terms of objectives. Our work focuses on privacy trade-offs in terms of app
functionality in mobile applications and not privacy trade-offs in relation to utility in
databases.
Enck et al [129] introduced a tracking system for monitoring privacy on smart phones
named Taintroid. Tantroid was used to study 30 third party applications from the Android
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Market place. Their study included an analysis of the Android execution environment
to determine which third party applications misused users’ private information. This
work closely relates to ours in the sense that it was performed using Android applications
to determine which third parties misuse data collected. However, it defers to ours in
objective that a solution in terms of how the data collection is minimised and integrated
with privacy management is not given.
In this work, we address challenges of privacy trade-offs by investigating privacy
policies, privacy control measures and data collection to get an insight in the privacy
implementations employed in current apps. The main purpose of our study is to provide
a framework for designing privacy aware apps using the eHealth and V2X telematics
domains as case studies.
Why do we need a Trade-off framework?
There has been a multitude of mobile applications developed and uploaded on to
the Android market known as Google Play store. However, these mobile applications
come with privacy related challenges. Android applications may reveal private data
to both third-party applications or app developers through permissions. Android apps
use permissions to implement security and privacy. Much as the permissions are well
structured in restricting the apps not to access user’s data, some apps leak personal data
to third-party service providers [21]. Furthermore, users are not aware of how this data
is used by app designers and third party applications. Users have to authorize third
party service providers before their personal data has to be shared as envisaged by the
EU 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Such privacy preserving
measures have been enacted by the EU legislative bodies. However, users personal
private data has continuously been shared and bought outside the devices by collecting
companies and third party service providers [22]. The element of trade-offs arises when
users have to choose between trading their privacy for better functionality or giving up
app functionality in order to attain privacy. Therefore, there is a need for a solution that
takes into consideration the trade-off between privacy, functionality and performance.
For these reasons we found it necessary to develop the privacy aware trade-off analysis
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framework.
Domain selection: We analyze the eHealth and the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)
telematics domains, to determine if the data collected by mobile applications at the app
level is consistent to that mentioned in the privacy policies. Further investigations to
find out if the data collected is required for app functionality were performed. We put
emphasis on these two domains because of the highly sensitive personal data they collect
and the privacy regulations they must use for app development. Next, we highlight on
eHealth and V2X privacy concerns reported with respect to privacy violations in current
mobile apps on the market.
eHealth: The emergence of eHealth apps or mobile health apps has created new
revenue generating opportunities for medical companies in fields like diabetic management,
patients analysis and disease management to enable patients monitor their health status
continuously. These apps are a big relief to customers and offer very good services towards
health care management. However, The major concern though is that many of these
apps do not go through stringent traditional quality controls and scrutiny from medical
organizations, although they do collect a lot of private and personal sensitive data. Users
are not explicitly told of the data and the implications of this data being collected. A
good example of such massive data collection has been observed in fitness apps and weight
loss apps. We therefore explored, this domain using TRANK in an effort to determine
how privacy preservation can be improved.
V2X applications:
In V2X applications, the major privacy concern is vehicle tracking through identifying
location information. This requires anonymity and unidentifiability of vehicles in the
network through pseudonym use to avoid inferring personal information from drivers [130].
Cyber attacks on connected vehicles and autonomous vehicles are of major concern as
well, especially, if hackers in the vehicular network are able to compromise drivers privacy
[131]. The V2X applications domain used in this research, however, is that of telematics
insurance. Telematics insurance applications are on demand as they provide cheaper
alternative insurance policies compared to the traditional car insurance policies. Privacy
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Figure 5.1: Telematics components
concerns have been raised as users are of the opinion that telematics insurance companies
are constantly tracking and monitoring them. Additionally, drivers have concerns about
their data being sold to third-party service providers without their consent [132]. Modern
vehicular applications are composed of in built sensors which are capable of tracking
our locations, social behavior and monitoring of our day to day activities. The collected
data is often used to infer our personal and social movements thereby generating a lot
of privacy concerns. An overview of the V2X application components and how they are
interconnected is illustrated in Figure 5.1. In the following, we present the Privacy Aware
trade-off Analysis framework (TRANK) to aid in solving the aforementioned privacy
invasion challenges. TRANK further aims to enhance privacy preservation methodologies
in current mobile applications.
5.1.1 TRANK Framework
In this section, we present TRANK, a modeling framework for designing privacy-aware
applications. TRANK is motivated by the existence of a large diversity of privacy
requirements when designing apps originating from different domains. The major challenge
is how to design a framework which suits different domains. The framework should provide
a meaningful solution to designing privacy-aware applications putting into consideration
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the trade-offs between privacy and functionality.
Step 1: The initial step of the framework defines privacy, functional and performance
goals of the planned system.
The major objective of our framework is to determine which goals are most important
and how best they can interplay with the other goals under consideration. We emphasize
Privacy-by-Design (PbD) principles [133] with a strong consideration of privacy goals
especially during the initial stages of the app development life cycle as shown in the
process flow in Figure 5.2.
Manage Privacy Requirements
Develop Privacy and functional goals
Perform privacy and functonality goals
trade-off analysis
Develop Privacy Requirements







Figure 5.2: TRANK framework process flow.
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Figure 5.3: TRANK framework.
The TRANK architecture as illustrated in Figure 5.3, uses the privacy-by-architecture
and privacy-by-policy design concepts to integrate privacy in mobile applications as
introduced in chapter 2 of this thesis.
Step 2: Furthermore, TRANK proposes to assess and determine a functionality,
performance and privacy goal trade-off analysis which aims at improving privacy mod-
eling. The objective of this approach is to determine whether or not functionality and
performance goals can be achieved even when a high level of privacy is implemented.
Establishing such properties is paramount in order to determine if solutions developed
enhance privacy and at the same time acceptable. The analysis identifies relationships
between requirements using a requirements trade-off matrix and determines which re-
quirements are in conflict with others. It further determines how requirements influence
each other, for example by limiting access to private information in the system.
Step 3: In the third step, we propose developing privacy requirements based on
privacy modeling approaches such as the LINDDUN privacy threat modeling methodology.
LINDDUN has been applied by several projects e.g the BioMedBridges, RERUM, and
TClouds as a privacy analysis technique. It has also been supported as a privacy risk
management technique by the PRIPARE project [134]. More details of eliciting privacy
requirements with the LINDDUN framework can be found in [33] [135] [136].
The LINDDUN privacy threat modeling methodology provides a systematic approach
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in identifying privacy threats that may be used to compromise mobile applications. We
demonstrated this approach using an empirical study to design privacy requirements in
Telematics mobile applications in chapter 2. Applying LINDDUN systematically identifies
privacy flaws in mobile applications and aids in fixing them before the application is
developed.
Step 4: The fourth step involves reviewing and redesigning conflicting goals and
requirements using a privacy requirements trade-off matrix. This step is the most
challenging step as goals and requirements have to be refined in order for complex goals
to produce alternative requirements. The major objective of this phase is to achieve a
balance between the intrusiveness of privacy requirements to functional requirements and
performance goals.
Step 5: Finally, privacy requirements are managed by a requirements management
tool e.g. IBM Rational Doors [137] or Irise [138] to ensure that they are properly managed
in the software development life cycle. Due to the constant changes that are involved
in mobile applications, there is a high volatility of conflicts in the requirements that
often need to be resolved. High volatility in software requirements demands for a quick
and stable requirements management approach. Requirements management is referred
to as; “an iterative set of activities that help ensure that elicitation, documentation,
refinement, and changes of requirements is adequately dealt with during a lifecycle,
with a view toward satisfying the overall mission or need in a quality manner and to the
customers’ satisfaction.” [139]. Figure 5.4 illustrates how we utilized the IBM management
requirements tool [137] to design and manage requirements for the telematics insurance
mobile application in the course of this research. As architectures are based on the
requirements that define a mobile application, changes in the requirements subsequently
demand for critical architecture changes and this can result into delays or failures of mobile
application software [140]. Therefore, proper requirements management is mandatory to
handle requirements volatility in mobile applications.
The next section elaborates on the privacy modeling of eHealth applications and
Telematics application using TRANK.
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Figure 5.4: Privacy requirements management
5.2 TRANK based design for eHealth applications
5.2.1 Privacy modelling with TRANK for eHealth applications
As mentioned previously from our analysis, we observe that, in practice, modern applica-
tions are not keen on integrating multiple requirements demands simultaneously. Thus,
sacrificing some of the crucial requirements like privacy requirements in turn for functional
and performance requirements. This section employs TRANK and its constituent steps
to model privacy using a running example of the eHealth application and a Telematics
application.
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of TRANK, we modelled and generated privacy
goals to address privacy intrusiveness in the eHealth application as presented in the
TRANK framework. LINDDUN concepts were employed to design privacy requirements
as proposed in [135]. One way to minimise privacy invasiveness is to reduce the amount
of data that is collected. For example, [141] showed that the use of large volumes of data
could lead to the manipulation of Personal Identifiable Information(PII). Thus, a privacy
trade-off analysis was employed to reduce the amount of data collected. The privacy
trade-off analysis is used to generate a design solution that best suits the applications
privacy goals and requirements. It also, evaluates alternatives that can be used to produce
better privacy-aware solutions.
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There are various actors who play a big role in the mobile heart rate application which
have to be identified. These include; the patient, the physician, system engineers, the
heart beat measuring device, policy makers and shareholders among others.
These key actors play a major role in the design of a privacy aware mobile application.
The interplay of the actors has to be designed in such a way that no privacy threats arise
when medical data is transferred from the patient to the physician. This example shows
that in order to design and maintain privacy a design methodology that integrates privacy
for all actors has to be put in place. We therefore, saw the need to design a privacy
framework that can be used in eHealth applications to ensure privacy is preserved and
maintained at all stages of system development.
Key Actors:
• Patient: Uses the heart beat device to monitor his/her heart rate.
• Physician: Monitors the patients health and prescribes medicines as required.
• System engineers: rectify any problems that may occur when the telematics
system is running.
• Heart beat measuring device: collect heart rate data for analysis by the physician.
• System designers: develop the heart beat monitor system from requirements
specification to go live phase.
• Policy makers: design policies used by the heart beat monitor and other medical
applications.
• Regulators: design rules and regulations that are used to govern eHealth devices
and system applications.
• System managers: ensure that the heart beat monitor applications are profitable
in accordance to shareholders interests.
• Shareholders: Generate capital for the heart beat monitor applications.
121
Chapter 5 TRANK based design for Telematics applications
5.3 TRANK based design for Telematics applications
5.3.1 Privacy modelling with TRANK for telematics applications
Similar to the eHealth case study, first, privacy goals were designed to determine the
privacy objectives required in designing telematics applications in an attempt to integrate
multiple requirements demands from various stake holders and other parties involved. We
further applied the LINDDUN methodology to model and integrate privacy requirements
in the telematics mobile applications.
As telematics applications do collect massive amounts of both personal and location
data, we performed a privacy trade-off analysis to determine which privacy requirements
are required before designing the privacy aware telematics application. An example of
the telematics privacy aware trade off analysis can be seen in Table 5.2.
We further identified the following key actors that are required in modelling the
privacy requirements as they play a significant role because they all have different views
and interests in how the application has to perform both practically and financially.
Key Actors: There are various actors who play a big role in the telematics insurance
application. These include among others, shareholders who generate capital to finance
application development and end users. Actors have different interests and more often
their interests conflict with privacy goals and requirements. We identified the following
key actors;
• Vehicle: used by drivers as a means of transport to desired destinations.
• Vehicle driver: drives the vehicle and needs insurance in case of an accident.
• System engineers: rectify any problems that may occur when the telematics
system is running.
• Telematics devices(blackbox): collect telematics data in the vehicle which is
used for billing.
• Mobile appliances: used to connect to the system portal which monitors billing
and driving style information.
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Table 5.1: Modeling privacy goals.
Privacy requirements
Privacy goal Unlinkability Anonymity Pseudonymity Undetectability Unobservability Confidentiality
Instance of satisfaction goal satisfaction goal satisfaction goal satisfaction goal satisfaction goal satisfaction goal




















• System designers: develop the telematics system from requirements specification
to go live phase.
• Policy makers: design policies used by the telematics applications.
• Regulators: design rules and regulations that are used to govern the telematics
system applications.
• System managers: ensure that the telematics applications are profitable in accor-
dance to shareholders interests.
• Shareholders: Generate capital for the telematics insurance applications.
5.4 Privacy goals trade-off analysis
Privacy goals are derived with the main task of the insurance company to provide
maximum privacy for its customers. The privacy properties used to derive privacy
goals are unlinkability, anonymity, pseudonymity, undetectability, unobservability and
confidentiality. We employ The KAOS [30] formal definition of goals to model privacy
goals as shown in Table 5.1.
In order to achieve the most efficient goals, a privacy goals trade-off analysis is
conducted. The privacy trade-off analysis is an approach of evaluating the trade-off
between privacy, system functionality and performance. The first step in the trade-off
analysis is to generate functional, performance and privacy goals. We define functional
goals as goals which describe the features and services that the application has to deliver.
Performance goals as goals that describe the operational activity and how end users
easily perceive the application. This is followed by determining the attack scenarios and
weak points of the system to establish the weaknesses of the system. After establishing
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Figure 5.6: EHealth Heart rate monitor data flow diagram.
the weaknesses, solutions to these weak points are generated and countermeasures and
solutions are generated. This step is followed by making a decision on finding out if the
privacy and functionality goals are met. If the functional and privacy goals are fulfilled
the design phase is considered complete. If they are not met, alternatives to the proposed
goals are generated and a second approach to the first design is proposed.
Goals are then redesigned to meet the new design and the procedure is repeated
until an acceptable solution is achieved that balances the privacy goals, functional and
performance goals as illustrated in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.7: Telematics insurance data flow diagram
5.5 Privacy requirements design for mobile applications
The next step involves generating privacy requirements that are required for implementing
privacy in the telematics insurance application.
Privacy requirements are derived based on the LINDDUN privacy threat model as
in [135]. This task involves specifying privacy threats based on privacy properties as
mentioned earlier, which include: unlinkability, anonymity, pseudonymity, undetectability,
unobservability and condidentiality. The initial step of the LINDDUN methodology is to
define data flow diagrams as illustrated in Figure 5.6 for the eHealth heart beat monitor
application and Figure 5.7 for the Telematics application.
We use the LINDDUN methodology to determine threats using threat trees. Threat
trees aid in showing attack methods and design weak points that could be used by an
adversary. Figure 5.8 shows how a threat tree is designed. We refer the reader to the
LINDDUN website for the current threat trees. After generating the threat trees we
derive the privacy requirements and measures that can be used to mitigate the derived
threats and find potential solutions to the threats [135] [136].
Privacy requirements trade-off matrix:
In this step a matrix is generated to determine the effect of privacy requirements
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Figure 5.8: Example of a Threat tree












































































Performance - - -
Usability -
Reliability + + +
Scalability
Interoperability - - -
to other functional requirements. Table 5.2 presents a template of how the matrix is
generated. The various requirements may contribute negatively (-) or positively (+) to
other requirement parameters. Choosing alternative privacy solutions must be done to
determine how system functionality has to be maintained without compromising privacy.
We present a running example of generating the privacy functionality matrix for
telematics as shown in Table 5.3 and for the eHealth application in Table 5.4. The matrix
comprises of two main axes. The applications components are represented on the y-axis
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Drivers 5 8 7 6 2 1 4 3 9 10
Web portal 8 6 10 7 5 1 4 2 3 1
Vehicle telematics device 5 7 9 10 6 4 3 1 8 2
Back end servers 5 4 6 3 8 1 2 7 9 10
Database 6 7 10 9 5 1 4 3 2 8
Address - - - - - - - - - -
Email 2 3 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Phone - - - - - - - - - -
and the privacy components are represented on the x- axis. In the telematics example,
the key components are the drivers, web portal, the vehicle telematics device (also known
as the blackbox), back end servers and the data base. In addition to this we include the
main means of communication that are used to communicate to the users i.e email, phone
and lastly the address used in the companies documents. Privacy preservation of these
components plays an important role in telematics insurance and therefore, should be
modeled accordingly using the privacy functionality matrix. The privacy properties are
rated according to the application component. For example, the Drivers and Performance
are allocated a value of 1 and are rated as the major property to take into consideration
when designing the application while Interoperability is allocated a grade of 10 and
considered as the least property to be considered.
In addition, an analysis of the telematics system components is done based on the
privacy components to determine how they are affected in the matrix as shown in Table 5.3.
Similarly, Table 5.4 presents how the privacy functionality matrix for eHealth applications
are generated using the heartbeat monitor application based on the data flow diagram
presented in 5.6.
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Heartrate 5 6 7 4 8 1 3 2 9 10
Medical condition 4 3 5 2 6 1 7 8 9 10
Year of Diagnosis 3 2 4 1 7 5 6 8 9 10
Medication taken 5 4 6 3 8 1 2 7 9 10
Mood - - - - - - - - - -
Address - - - - - - - - - -
Email 2 3 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Phone - - - - - - - - - -
5.5.1 Privacy requirements management for mobile applications
In this thesis we employed, IBM rational doors which is one of the key requirements engi-
neering tools used in the industry. We chose it for our privacy modeling and management
process because its well structured and highly used for the management of requirements
in the industry. IBM DOORS next generation (DNG) uses Artifacts as the initial object
when starting a project. Artifacts can be any object created in the project for example, a
requirement, a heading, a diagram or an image.
5.6 TRANK Framework Design Evaluation
5.6.1 Ehealth results analysis
We initially investigated the relationship between functionality, privacy policy and data
collection in eHealth apps. In the following, we present our results analysis of the examined
apps based on our observation of functionality followed by results on privacy policy and an
analysis on data collection. The aim of this analysis was to determine how the interplay
of these features determines the design and development of current apps.
Functionality: Our analysis was based on the five categories mentioned earlier; fitness,
cardiology, diabetes, weight loss, depression and physician apps. As the functionality of
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these apps varies for each app and category, we found that fitness apps had the most
functionality features, followed by cardiology apps. In particular, Fitbit and Nike training
had more than 50% functionality features compared to the other surveyed fitness apps.
Among the noticeable features were Fitbits’ ability to track down all calories a user burned.
These can be used to challenge family and friends according to their sport activities.
Diet routines are also recorded. Meals eaten and the number of calories taken in a day,
the number of steps taken and a record of personal performance details are all collected.
Fitbit also has a sleep well feature used for sleep tracking. Its used to track the different
stages of sleep and also comes with a sleep schedule reminder. In contrast, diabetes and
physician apps had the least functionality scores. These apps were found to be precise
without a lot of functionality. For instance, Medscape an app used to aid physicians on
for example, determining medications and dosages has limited additional functionality
features.
Privacy policy: Most of the apps downloaded from the Google Play Store have a
privacy policy on the Google Play website. This has been mainly enforced by the California
Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) [142]. CalOPPA states that all applications
that collect user personal information have to include a privacy policy. The privacy
policy should state how applications gather user data and how its shared. One of the
main objectives of this study was to find out if the privacy policies presented on the
Google Play site are in sync with the privacy policies in the app and on the companies
site. Our findings, however, found that only 26% of the surveyed apps had a privacy
policy link presented during signup when this study was taken. For example, Depression
CBT Selfhelp Guide, 7 cups anxiety, Instant heart rate, Loseit!, all had no privacy policy
links in the app during sign up. In addition, 23% of all apps did not have a privacy
policy on the companies website. Sites like Instant heart rate, Ideal weight had no readily
accessible privacy policy on the company website. 43% of the apps surveyed reported
the national laws to be followed, while 48% included the possibility of deleting personal
information from their systems. 90% shared data with third parties and 87% reported
that they collected data from external sources. Several apps used third party services
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such as facebook for logging into the apps or uploaded the data to facebook. For example,
Mysugr encourages users to upload their sugar levels data to facebook along with the
mysugr app and their photos [143].
Data Collection: Data collection scores were investigated based on the permissions
used, the data collection statements mentioned in the data privacy policies and data
collected within the apps. Permissions continue to be the major data collection funnels
in current mobile applications. The detailed meaning of what the permissions mean is
beyond the scope of this study. However, we will highlight on the different app permissions
that are maily used in the surveyed apps. Our analysis found that 94% of apps required
full network access. 87% of the apps had access to the read contents of the USB storage
and modify or delete storage of your USB storage. 80% required the receive data from
internet and view network connections permissions. 47% required access to location. We
found that among the least used permissions are manage document storage and uninstall
shortcuts which were 3% for all surveyed apps. To expand our analysis we analysed
personal data collection key words that were mentioned in the privacy policy. 63% of the
surveyed apps stated that they collect the email address. 57% recorded the users name
while 56% the IP address. 3% of the surveyed apps collected the Tax ID number and
employer identification number. Physician apps included explicitly personal information
about the data collected in their privacy policies. Some of the data mentioned are for
example, medical condition (13%), mood (7%), heartrate (7%) and insurance provider
(3%). In summary, Nike training club reported the most data collection score followed by
Instant heart rate and Fitbit apps respectively. Relationship between data collection and
privacy policy: Our analysis was extended to investigate the relationship between privacy
policies and data collection. We hypothesize that the data collection scores are equal to
the privacy policy scores. In other words, the data collection performed in the apps has
to be in sync with the information stated in the privacy policies.
However, the overall findings indicated inconsistencies in how data is collected and
how the privacy policies are defined. Most privacy policies do not mention which data is
collected and what its used for. Some privacy policies were missing both on the company
130
Chapter 5 TRANK Framework Design Evaluation
(a) Privacy Policies vs Data collection in eHealth apps
(b)
Figure 5.9: Data collection score in eHealth apps
websites and in the app. Most of the apps had a link to the privacy policies in Google Play
Store but some policies varied from those in the company websites. Also, more data was
collected in the apps than what was reported in the privacy policies. The data collection
scores therefore, are not in sync with the information given in the privacy policies.
We observed that fitness apps collect more data at the app level than typical medical
apps such as Diabetes apps as shown in Figure 5.9 (a) and Ideal weight and Operation
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reach out apps reported the least data collection scores as shown in Figure 5.9 (b).
Much as the functionality of most of the apps need permissions for them to correctly
work, for example a fitness app needs location information in order to determine a users
mobility, users should be aware that their location information is being monitored. They
should be able to have a right to opt-in and opt-out of an apps feature. Little has been
done in most of the apps to allow this activity. Occasionally, there is an on and off button
to choose from without explicitly explaining to the user the consequences of turning off
the permissions. This is done while downloading the app which was introduced with
the Android 6 version. However, more information is required on what the permissions
are able to do. For example, location information permissions may lead to continuous
tracking and profiling even when an app is not in use.
Therefore, there is a need to inform users about the actual data that is being collected.
Our findings thus are a stepping stone in finding solutions to these gaps.
5.6.2 Telematics results analysis
Next, telematics apps were investigated, namely, the relationship between privacy policies,
privacy control, functionality, and data collection as illustrated in Figure 5.10 (a). We
further analysed the relationship between data collection and privacy policies as shown in
Figure 5.10 (b).
The functionality score in telematics apps was almost the same in all surveyed apps.
However, our analysis found that although almost all telematics insurance companies have
the same functionalities, the data collection scores differ. Companies continuously collect
data even when its not required for better functionality and performance. We observed
that Insurance box and Aviva Drive had the highest data collection scores. Furthermore,
the privacy policy scores varied from telematics app to app. Of the surveyed apps only
20% had a privacy policy link presented during signup although all apps collected data
from external sources. For example, Aviva drive, Marmalade, Sm>rt wheels, Insurance
box did not have a privacy policy link during signup. 40% specified the national laws
which were used in their privacy policies. In addition, only 30% reported on the ability
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(a) PCS, PPS, DCS, FS in V2X telematics apps
(b) PCS vs DCS for V2X telematics apps
Figure 5.10: Relationship between PCS, PPS, DCS and FS in V2X telematics apps
of users to delete their personal information. These observations indicate that privacy
policies in V2X telematic apps still need improvement compared to ehealth apps. Much
as the privacy policies did exist, especially on the Google Play Store website, most of the
companies did not include them in the company websites.
Telematics applications highly rely on data collected in the vehicle to compute insurance
policies. A number of sensors in the vehicle e.g. GPS sensors, G-force sensors are used to
measure a drivers speed, brakes and acceleration. Insurance companies determine how
well a user drives based on such sensor data. Therefore, V2X telematics insurance involves
a lot of data collection. However, users are not explicitly told of how this data is collected
and how its used and processed. Based on the GPS sensor monitoring functionality, it
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follows that the most used permission in V2X telematics apps is approximate and precise
location. Our analysis found that only 20% of the surveyed telematic insurance companies
included this information in their privacy policies.
In general, there has been a steady improvement in apps on how permissions are
accessed. However, from our analysis more emphasis has to be done on informing users
what exactly the app permission means and the functionality it performs.
5.6.3 Evaluation of the TRANK framework
To evaluate the TRANK framework we employed it to two use cases the eHealth and V2X
telematic applications. Our assessment characterizes the improvement of privacy analysis
results produced by TRANK as well as the completeness associated with executing the
framework. We focused on how TRANK affects data collection and functionality.
5.6.4 Impact of TRANK on Data collection
To properly assess the accuracy of TRANK on the data collection score we analysed the
values of data collection scores before and after using the TRANK framework as presented
in Table 5.5 and 5.6.
We hypothesized that the data collection scores before using TRANK are less than or
equal to the data collection scores after using TRANK.
H0: Data collection score before using TRANK are less than or equal to the data
collection scores after using TRANK.
H1: Data collection score before using TRANK are greater than the data collection
scores after using TRANK.
H0 : \mu DCSb  - \mu DCSa \leq 0
H1 : \mu DCSb  - \mu DCSa > 0
(5.1)
We ran a paired samples t-test with 95% confidence interval on eHealth applications
for data collection scores after employing TRANK (Number of apps = 30, Mean = 15.00,
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Pair 1 DCS Before 24.23 30 12.75 2.327
DCS After 9.233 30 4.89 0.89







Mean Lower Upper t df
Sig.
(2-tailed)
Pair 1 Data collection score beforeData collection score after 15.00 10.33 1.89 11.14 18.86 7.59 29 0.00
Standard Deviation = 10.32) conditions t(29) = 7.95 p-value = 0.00 as shown in table
5.7 and Table 5.8. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative
hypothesis.
By employing a privacy goals trade off analysis, only the goals that are required for
the application to perform effectively were used to determine the data collection score.
We came to the conclusion that the scores were reduced thus improving the privacy score.
This was clearly depicted especially in the case of fitness apps which collect a lot of data
that is not required for an effective app performance. A good example of this phenomenon
was although Fitbit and Nike training apps have almost similar functional goals; that is
to provide a healthier active life to their users, Nike training collected more data.
Using the TRANK framework to design such apps reduces the amount of data collected
thus improving privacy preservation in the application.
Furthermore, we observed that using TRANK significantly reduces the amount of
data collection. As a result only the most required goals are used to determine which
permissions are to be accepted.
On the whole, the purpose of the app was not correlated to the amount of data
collection performed by the application. That is, although some apps had the same
functionality, their data collection scores varied.
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5.6.5 Impact of TRANK on Functionality
We found significant differences when utilizing TRANK on both telematics apps and
eHealth apps as the inbuilt functionality of each app differs. For example, although
telematics apps have almost similar functionalities the impact of using the TRANK
framework differs according to each app based on the companies business model. This is
mainly because some companies use vehicle diagnostics hardware which uses the On-Board
diagnostics II port, while others use devices such as smart phones or Bluetooth solutions
to collect and analyze telematics data. Thus, the data collection differs with each app
and therefore using the TRANK framework results into different results. We found that
employing TRANK on vehicle diagnostics hardware telematic solutions and bluetooth
solutions resulted into lower functionality scores compared to smartphone solutions.
Using TRANK significantly improves privacy in both eHealth and V2X telematics apps.
TRANK employs a privacy goal trade-off analysis that checks for privacy implementation
at the initial stages of system development. Existing privacy modelling approaches for
example, the OASIS Privacy management Reference Model and Methodology [144] do
not take into account the trade-off between functionality and privacy. TRANK, however,
examines the requirements each application requires for both functional, performance as
well as privacy preservation which is a crucial step in privacy enhancement in not only
eHealth and telematics applications but in all future mobile applications to be developed.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we propose the TRANK framework to design privacy aware mobile
applications. This work is motivated by the existing privacy breaches that evolve as a
result of massive data collection in current mobile applications. In order to provide a
more robust privacy aware design of mobile applications, we proposed the generation of
privacy goals at the initial stages of development followed by the elicitation of privacy
requirements. To ensure that data collection is minimized a privacy goal matrix and a
privacy trade-off analysis is proposed. This enhances privacy preservation by reducing the
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amount of data collected and ensuring that only data required for system functionality
is stored. This section further integrates the TRANK framework based design in two
case studies, the eHealth and Telematics applications case studies. First, we explore the
implementation of TRANK in the eHealth domain using a data set comprising of 30
eHealth mobile applications. Data collection and extraction in these apps was investigated
to determine existing privacy challenges. Next, telematics insurance mobile applications
were analyzed and data collection and extraction were investigated to determine the
state-of-art of privacy enhancement in these domains. A privacy matrix was introduced





This chapter demonstrates the applicability of TRANK in order to develop mobile
applications using the eHealth and Telematics insurance applications. We focus on these
two domains because of their evasive nature and because they constantly collect sensitive
data which requires a high level of privacy protection.
Our framework aims at assisting mobile application developers in designing privacy-
aware applications while considering the trade-offs that occur between system functionality
and performance. Our framework implementation TRANK, therefore, provides the
following:
1. Aids in generating a privacy trade-off analysis for the application under development.
2. Integrates user privacy settings in accordance with the application used and privacy
features chosen.
3. Aids in defining user-specific privacy features according to the activities taken.
In the following sections, we describe the general overview of the TRANK frame-




Mobile applications are used for a range of online services across private and commercial
domains. These domains need to be secured and resilient to face challenges of privacy
leakages, privacy misconfigurations, cyber security attacks and system failures. Current
mobile applications have, however, faced a lot of criticism about unauthorized and
unintentional transfer of sensitive data due to misconfigured back ends, data sharing and
transfer to third-party service providers. In particular, the range of beneficial opportunities
and functional properties offered by mobile applications such as communication through
OSNs, easy accessibility, better functionality, business enhancement, introduce a number
of vulnerabilities. An indirect drawback lies within mobile applications dependency on
the Internet where privacy protection has been extensively studied but still faces setbacks.
The approach taken in this work relies on the TRANK framework to design privacy
aware mobile applications. TRANK is a privacy aware trade-off analysis framework
introduced in the previous chapter that is used to integrate privacy in mobile applications.
The underlying assumption is that future mobile applications will be subjected to novel
cyber security attacks, privacy breaches and anomalies for which existing solutions will
be insufficient and ineffective. Therefore, the goal of this work is to develop privacy
protection techniques that are particularly targeted for mobile application development
and design.
The infrastructure is based on the native mobile application design as illustrated in
Figure 6.1 [145].
We consider the elements that make up a mobile application, which are; the Presenta-
tion layer, the Business layer and the Data layer. The Presentation layer contains the User
Interface(UI) components and the User Interface(UI) process components. The UI process
components are a combination of views ad controllers used to perform the Presentation
logic. The Presentation logic contains routines and instructions responsible for executing
the Graphical User Interface. The Business layer is composed of the Application Facade,
Business Work flows, Business Components and Business Entities. The Application
Facade contains a combination of business operations and provides a single-message based
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Figure 6.1: Mobile Application Architecture.
operation which can be accessed through different communication technologies. Business
components on the other hand provide users with business services based on business
rules. Business entities are used to transfer data between different components e.g. data
from storage databases, database views, database tables. Business work flows are used to
coordinate business processes in multiple steps. The Data access layer is composed of
the Data Access component, the data utilities component and data service tools. This
layer is used to access logic components, manipulate and transform data using helper
methods and utilities. It also contains service agents that manage communication to
services provided by the business component. The multi-layered architecture connects
to external data sources or a remote infrastructure using synchronization connected to
local device databases. Multiple database types e.g. Oracle, Microsoft SQLServer and
DB2 are synced with applications using Sync services. In addition to these components,
common or cross-cutting functionality such as security, communications and configuration
management is used for logging and instrumentation.
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Figure 6.2: TRANK Mobile Application Architecture Design.
6.2 Gaps in developing privacy preserving mobile applica-
tions
The native mobile application architecture would ideally be free from cyber attacks,
vulnerabilities and data breaches. However, we see an increase of privacy and security
threats in current mobile applications. There remains a need for an efficient method
that can integrate privacy in mobile applications at the initial stages of application
development. Few researchers have addressed the problem of privacy challenges in mobile
applications, in particular, the gradual increase of privacy-invading mobile apps.
Although the existing mobile architecture entails a common security component,
unfortunately its functionality does not always guarantee effective security and privacy
protection. An alternative approach to ensure privacy protection is necessary. There
exists a gap in the design of the existing architecture because of the absence of a privacy
protection component as seen in Figure 6.1.
This thesis closes this gap by proposing the integration of a privacy protection
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Figure 6.3: TRANK Mobile Application Architecture.
component called the TRANK Privacy Component as shown in Figure 6.2. Comparing
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 shows that a privacy preservation component is crucial in an attempt
to safeguard privacy in mobile applications.
In order to increase preservation of the mobile application infrastructure, we have
defined a resilience architecture as illustrated in Figure 6.3. This work discusses privacy
preservation using a novelty privacy detection and preservation approach that employs a
privacy monitoring framework. The architecture extends the native mobile architecture by
integrating a privacy aware trade-off analysis framework named TRANK to ensure privacy
protection. TRANK introduces three major components within this architecture that
deal with privacy preservation at the Presentation and Business layer. The components in
TRANK present a foundation in which different privacy protection techniques allow the
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identification of privacy threats and enable data protection. More specifically, we evaluate
our approach using a privacy enhancing methodology as emulated within a prototype
implementation. The major privacy preserving methodologies used are a privacy threat
modeling technique, a privacy and functionality trade-off analysis technique and a data
minimization technique. We have selected these particular privacy preservation and en-
hancing techniques as they have been identified to effectively enhance privacy preservation
and reduce data collection based on the studies we performed. Our contributions in
designing the TRANK prototype are as follows:
1. We introduce a privacy preservation architecture that is evidenced through an
implementation of a privacy aware trade-off analysis framework across a multi-
layered architecture.
2. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to explicitly address the aspect
of trade-offs in privacy design by introducing a privacy and functionality trade-off
matrix that plays a major role in designing mobile applications.
3. We provide a prototype implementation which employs "Privacy Modes" that enable
end-users to have control over private data transferred to mobile applications.
6.3 TRANK based Mobile application architecture
The architecture introduced in this section is based on the native mobile application
architecture comprising of a Presentation layer, a Business layer, a Data Access layer, a
remote infrastructure data access layer and a common or cross-cutting component. In
contrast to the native mobile application layer, we introduce a TRANK based privacy
aware sub-component in the common or cross-cutting component. We emphasize on the
integration of privacy in the future mobile application architecture. As indicated in the
native mobile architecture a component that handles privacy development is evidently
missing. Cross-cutting functionality such as configuration management, communication
across multiple boundary layers and security features e.g. those against cross-site scripting
are included in the architecture but no privacy functionality is inclusive. The main issue
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raised in this work is the integration of a privacy preservation component that addresses
the aspect of early privacy abuse prevention, privacy abuse detection and minimal PII data
collection. Therefore, apart from providing a privacy trade-off analysis framework, our
work further aims at enriching the native mobile application architecture with a privacy
management sub-component. Hence in this work we are inspired by the works of [27],
where privacy-by-architecture is emphasized. We employ privacy-by-architecture explicitly
for the prevention of privacy attacks in future mobile applications, in particular those
resulting from architectural loopholes and excessive data collection. One further reason
to integrate privacy in mobile application architectures is to design mobile applications
where privacy is by default but not responsive as in the case of current mobile applications.
As a result it is possible to prevent future privacy attacks where users do not have to
cater for any privacy preserving measures but the application handles them in advance
without end-user interaction.
TRANK Based Privacy Component : The TRANK Based Privacy Component
(TBPC) is a multi-layered component that comprises of 5 major sub-components as
illustrated in Figure 6.4 namely; the Privacy Threat component, the Privacy Trade-off
component, the Privacy Mode component, the Privacy Permissions Integration component
and the Privacy Policies Management component. It also embodies two cross-cutting
sub-components namely; the Goals component and the Privacy requirements management
component.
In particular, TBPC is comprises of inner privacy control sub-components responsible
for Defending the mobile application against privacy threats, Determining privacy trade-
offs, Minimizing privacy breaches using a Privacy Mode component, Integrating Privacy
permissions and Management of Privacy policies in mobile applications. And outer
cross-cutting sub-components that refine the whole system by constant Diagnosis of
weaknesses in privacy goal management and privacy requirements management. Whilst
the inner privacy control component aims at privacy preservation of the mobile application,
the outer sub-component aims at ensuring that the privacy goals that are generated
at the initial stages of mobile application development are retained and the privacy
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Figure 6.4: TRANK Based Privacy Component.
requirements are managed efficiently. Based on the features gathered from each individual
sub-component, the TRANK Based mobile application implementation architecture is
designed to enforce techniques that are capable of building privacy enhancing solutions in
future mobile applications. In our implementation, privacy features are introduced in the
mobile application architecture and are combined to form a privacy feature composite.
Under normal operation the privacy features are run simultaneously to ensure that the
TRANK based privacy module is run smoothly and efficiently. The following sections are
dedicated to describing the design and steps involved in the prototype implementation in
order to integrate the TRANK based mobile architecture in a running mobile application.
Data Flow:
The TRANK based mobile application used in this work is based on a native mobile
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Figure 6.5: Trank Data Flow.
application which consists of a Presentation Layer with User Interface components,
a Business Layer with business entities and business components, and a Data Layer
comprising of Data Access Components and data utilities consisting of various devices.
These range from smart phones to other portable device types like tablets running on
different hardware systems and software requirements as illustrated in Figure 6.5. The
resolution of the screens to be used, CPU characteristics, Memory usage, the size of the
screen and its resolution have to be considered when designing mobile applications. In
addition, in order to improve the UI design we emphasized on a UI where users can
interact intuitively and easily. Navigating through the application both at the front-end
and the back-end is crucial especially between the Presentation layer and the Data Access
layer. In our implementation, the introduction of the TBPC which contains the privacy
features has to be executed in a manner that end-users can easily navigate through the
privacy modes. In this case the data from the TBPC e.g the Privacy policies generated
from the Privacy Policy Management component are transfered to the UI from the Data
Access Layer asynchronously.
The eHealth API can be found on github under the following link:
https://github.com/schmusa/eHealth
eHealth User Integration: Figure 6.6 illustrates an example of the data flow in
an eHealth mobile application. Consider a sensor detecting a patients heart rate, using
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Figure 6.6: EHealth User integration.
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Figure 6.7: Telematics components
for example a wearable gadget or a sensor integrated in the mobile device. The patients
data is transferred to the the Internet using Https protocol to the back-end servers and
stored into a SQLite database. If a Physician controls a patients heart rate readings, the
request is sent via the Internet to the back-end servers and a result is generated back to
the Physician for proper diagnosis. Patients medical data requires a high level of security
and privacy. In our implementation we introduce the TBPC which ensures that privacy
preservation of the data transfered from the patient to the Physician is maintained.
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Figure 6.9: Integration of TRANK in the Prototype Architecture and Implementation
6.4 TRANK Based Mobile application demo
This section describes a mobile demo-application which focuses on improved privacy
integration compared to currently available applications. The prototype was built based
on the TRANK conceptual framework process. Initially, privacy requirements were
generated taking into consideration the privacy goals and privacy and functionality trade-
offs as shown in Figure 6.8. As a result a to privacy awareness engine is developed. The
privacy awareness engine is then integrated in the TRANK based architecture. The
TRANK based architecure is then used to develop the eHealth and Telematics prototype
as illustrated in Figure 6.9.
We focus on the Privacy Mode Component which plays a key factor in implementing
privacy in mobile applications. Its key features are so-called "Privacy Modes" which give
the user control over how their personal data is used by the respective mobile application.
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TRANK based Privacy modes: The TRANK framework application implementa-
tion is based on Privacy Modes. The Privacy Modes within the Privacy Mode Component
(PMC) are; Maximum Data Mode, Minimum Data Mode, Users Specific Mode and the
Data Obfuscation Mode. The Privacy Mode Component (PMC) in each mobile appli-
cation performs privacy misuse detection based on the features gathered from the other
components in the TRANK Based Privacy Component (TBPC). The PMC is in charge of
coordinating and disseminating information between other components within the TBPC
based on the output of the privacy abuse prevention and remediation functionality they
execute. These are then used to pinpoint privacy flaws and execute privacy preserving
mechanisms.
Current mobile applications allow users to choose which permissions they prefer to
use. The permissions enable apps to access phones features e.g. location, storage, media
e.t.c. Much as users can decide on which permissions to choose, the possibility of an
application not functioning as desired is very high. For example, if a user decides to
deselect location permissions, location based applications will not perform as expected.
We therefore, propose privacy modes to enable users choose permissions without losing
functionality. The PMC comprises of the following modes;
Maximum Data Mode: The Maximum Data Mode (MDM) is in charge of the
overall data control provided by the user. It enables users to submit all the data asked
for as in current applications. Herein, the application can access all the data including
optional data which is not mandatory for the application to perform as expected.
Minimum Data Mode: The Minimum Data Mode (MDM) allows the user to have
access to preferences mandatory for the application to perform. This means that the user
can select the basic preferences without selecting other permissions that are innesential
for the application .
User Specific Mode: The User Specific Mode (USM)allows users to choose which
permissions preferences to have access to. Here users can grant apps permissions to access
data, hardware functionality and features depending on what they prefer.
Obfuscation Mode: The obfuscation mode can also be referred to as the Data
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Anonymizer Mode. This enables users to select preferences that are obfuscated or
anonymised. This way if a user, for example, wants to use a location based app but does
not want to show his or her exact location, anonymised location data can be selected to
protect user identity and privacy.The framework is designed as a multi-tier architecture
based on Privacy Modes and the above named components. The upper layers of the
framework interact with the lower layers using fine grained function calls.
The application is based on a standard Android application written in the Java
programming language. For easier implementation, some additional libraries have been
used. Namely, several Google support libraries as well as an open source graph plotting
library 1 developed by GitHub user jjoe64. Android apps are comprised of four major
components; An Activity which is the User Interface visible to end-users, a Service which
generates executable code in the back-end servers, a Broadcast Receiver which receives
and broadcasts application events and a Content Provider which manages access to data
resources in structured databases e.g. SQlite or unstructured data like flat files.
In our implementation, the mobile application collects eHealth data in this case, fitness
data in form of "Sessions" and stores them locally on the user’s device. It is viewed
and managed via the app. Sessions which currently include the user’s pulse and meta
data such as timestamps and location whereby the latter is used to display workouts in a
Google map.
6.4.1 TRANK based main component
The overview activity is the main component and entry point of the application. It
provides the user with the most relevant information at a glance as shown in Figure 6.10.
From here, it is also possible to quickly navigate to the privacy settings. The first available
tab gives the user an overview of his current privacy settings e.g. his last recorded fitness
sessions or data. From the recorded sessions the user can easily navigate back to the
privacy settings. We integrate a Timeline as shown in figure 6.11 which lists all sessions
stored on the device, these are further accessed via a floating action button.
1http://www.android-graph view.org/
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Figure 6.10: eHealth Overview. Figure 6.11: eHealth Timeline.
6.4.2 TRANK based Privacy Settings
The Data Access Layer is accessed through a Data Activity used to present information
about a fitness session in detail as shown in Figure 6.12. It consists of an action bar at the
top containing the session title, a delete button, a map, and multiple other categories for
each recorded property. For simplicity and demonstration purposes, this is implemented
as a user’s heart rate.
Privacy settings design plays a crucial role in this work, this is where the Privacy Mode
Component which is the core functionality of the application prototype is implemented.
The privacy settings activity is the main point to select a privacy mode and customize
its respective settings. Figure 6.13 shows a screenshot of the privacy settings. The
currently available modes are "Maximum Data", "User Defined", "Minimum Data" and
"Obfuscation" or "Data Anonymizer". The user has the option to edit additional settings
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Figure 6.12: eHealth demo Data Ac-
tivity.
Figure 6.13: eHealth demo Privacy
Settings.
Figure 6.14: TRANK Privacy Data Flow.
via the "User Defined" Privacy Mode.
The main storage module of the application is an SQLite database containing all
recorded session data together with the underlying Java classes representing the ses-
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sion data, it makes up the core package of the app. The second component is the
privacy package containing all privacy mode related classes. As figure 6.14 shows,
the main OverviewActivity acts like a bridge between those elements and uses the
SessionDatabase to obtain a list of all sessions available. The SessionAdapter class is
then used to list them in different allocations and launch DataActivity instances when
tapped. Similarly, a PrivacyPreferenceActivity instance is launched if the user wishes
to change his privacy preferences. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first kind of
implementation that considers the trade-off between privacy and system functionality. The
ability to change through difference privacy modes without having to loose functionality
indicates that TRANK can be used to model other applications that may require a high
level of privacy protection by changing the privacy modes without collecting immense
amounts of personal data from customers.
6.4.3 TRANK Based Database
In a real use case, the SessionDatabase would obtain its data from some kind of device
sensors. However, due to this being a demo, the database is populated from JSON files
containing mockup data. The API contains basic IO methods to list, add and remove
sessions from the record. In the following, we present the application component design
which contains a detailed description of objects used to implement the framework. It
defines, packages, classes and methods used in the coding process.
Packages: The packages used to implement the eHealth prototype include the Data
package, the UI (User Interface) package and the Privacy package. The healthdemo.data
package is the core of the application and contains classes to access the underlying SQLite
database and the actual data models. It also contains a number of related UI-widgets. The
second package is the healthdemo.privacy package which contains all privacy related
classes. Its core element is the PrivacyMode enum describing all available PrivacyModes.
It also contains a number of related UI-widgets. The healthdemo.ui is a User Interface
package which contains all Activities and Fragments making up the actual UI. Classes
in this package use both the data and privacy packages. Within these packages we
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implemented functionalities which include the DataActivity. This displays detailed
information about a Session. The MainActivity provides the main interface of the app
where the user can select different sets of data and access his current PrivacyMode
settings. It consists of multiple fragments for compatibility with other applications.
Measurements are done using a Measurement class. This is a data class representing
a single fitness measurement consisting of different attributes such as a timestamp,
location and vital functions. We implemented 5 most recent sets of driving data which
are found in the OverviewFragment It provides an overview of the user’s PrivacyMode
settings. The privacy modes enable users to select permissions according to their
preferences. These are implemented using the PrivacyMode class. PrivacyModeAdapter:
The PrivacyModeAdapter takes Privacy Modes and displays them in an attached ListView
or a Spinner. Adapters are used to populate ListViews with data. ListViews on the other
hand are used to show a vertical list of scrollable items while Spinner objects are used to
select one value from a set of items in a drop down menu.
PrivacyModeChooserFragment: The PrivacyModeChooserFragment lets the user choose
his preferred PrivacyMode. Fragments are reusable parts of a User Interface which are
embedded in activities. They are dependent on activities and cannot run on their own.
The PrivacyMode class is an enumerated class which defines all available privacy modes
as shown in the code snippet in Listing 1.
156
Chapter 6 TRANK Based Mobile application demo
Listing 1: PrivacyMode
public enum PrivacyMode {
UNKNOWN (-1, R. string . privacy_mode_unknown_title ,
OBFUSCATION (100 , R. string . privacy_mode_obfuscation_title ,
R. drawable . ic_privacy_mode_obfuscation );
public static PrivacyMode [] userModes () {
List < PrivacyMode > modes = new ArrayList < >();
for ( PrivacyMode m : values ()) {




return modes . toArray (new PrivacyMode [ modes . size ()]);
}
public static PrivacyMode fromID ( int id) {
for ( PrivacyMode mode : PrivacyMode . values ()) {







PrivacyModeChooserFragment.ModeChangedListener: The ModeChangedListener in-
terface is used to notify an attached Activity about PrivacyMode changes. Custom
Listeners are used to implement asynchronous event handling. They are also referred to
as the Observer design pattern in which an object(subject) possesses observers which
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inform the object automatically whenever the state of the object changes through method
calls. Listeners can be used for example, to attach a click event to a button, I/O events
and view events used in screens.
PrivacyModeCustomizationFragment: The PrivacyModeCustomization Fragment pro-
vides a SettingsFragment used to customize the "User Defined" privacy mode. The User
Defined mode is a Privacy Mode used to select user defined data preferences to be used
by the application.
PrivacyModeView: This View is used to display the PrivacyMode of the user. All available
Privacy modes are listed in the PrivacyMode enum and can either be set programmatically
via setMode(PrivacyMode) or in the XML file using the ’score’ attribute. In case no mode
was set the View displays a placeholder without any information.
PrivacyPreferenceActivity: The PrivacyPreference Activity contains both the Pri-
vacyModeChooserFragment and PrivacyModeCustomizationFragment which together
make up the privacy settings. An Activity is used to launch an app. It invokes call back
methods that are used in specific stages of the app life cycle.
Session: This a data class representing a fitness session consisting of the SessionDescription
attributes and a list of measurements.
SessionAssetReader: This class parses the mockup session assets (JSON) in ’/assets/ses-
sions/’ and converts them into Session objects. It uses the JsonReader class provided by
the Android SDK.
SessionDatabase: This class manages the SQlite database containing all recorded fitness
Sessions. It includes methods to add, remove or list Sessions. By default it is populated
with mockup data provided by the SessionAssetReader class. SessionDescription: This
is a data class providing basic information about a Session such as it’s ID and SessionType.
SessionDescriptionAdapter: This class is a subclass of BaseAdapter and functions as a
List- or Spinner-Adapter for session data in form of SessionDescriptions. For each cache
entry a view representing the basic session info will be generated.
SessionType: The SessionType is an enumeration class that defines all available types of
fitness sessions.
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SplashActivity: This Activity shows a splash screen on each start of the application. A
splash screen is an introductory or welcome screen which consists of a logo, an image and
the current version of the software. This offers the first experience of the application to
the user.
TelematicsGraphView: This View is a more powerful GraphView featuring an additional
title, headline as well as maximum and minimum value statistics.
TimelineFragment: The Timeline Fragment provides a list of all Session entries in a
reverse (newest-to-oldest) order.
This chapter presents the evaluation of the prototype presented in chapter 6. The
prototype is implemented as a TRANK based eHealth application and a TRANK based
Telematics application. The evaluation was performed based on a Usability and user
experience survey. Results of the survey were analyzed based on average results, a System
Usability Scale scoring, and a Man-Whitney U test, after applying the TRANK framework
integrated in the tested apps.
6.5 Privacy Evaluation Survey
To evaluate the privacy implementation in the apps, a survey was conducted with 25
adults recruited from Lancaster University. The aim of the survey was to determine how
users perceive the privacy preserving features integrated in the eHealth Mobile application
and the Telematics application after applying the privacy aware framework TRANK.
The survey is a questionnaire based survey which was conducted based on the developed
prototypes.
6.5.1 Materials and Methods
The questionnaire consists of three major parts; (1) general information about a partici-
pants gender, age and educational background, (2) information about the use of mobile
apps and downloads and (3) information about the rating and privacy concerns regarding
the privacy modes and features integrated in the app. Initially, the questionnaires were
sent to participants through emails and their feedback transcribed accordingly. The
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Prefer not to say 1
Use of Android apps
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Yes 21
No 4
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Did not care 4




Participants concerned about private information collected
Very concerned 15
Concerned 6
May be concerned 4




questionnaires were sent to approximately 70 participants with a link to the questionnaire
using Google forms. The research has been approved by the Lancaster University Ethics
committee. Prior to starting the study an information sheet and a consent form was sent
to the participants. The information sheet is used to inform users about the study and its
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contents. The consent form is used by participants to approve taking part in the study.
Copies of the information sheet and the consent form can be found in the Appendix of
the thesis.
6.5.2 Data analysis and metrics
We transcribed the data manually and extracted details using Microsoft excel. We
analysed the data using IBM SPSS statistics software using descriptive statistics for the 10
questions in the questionnaire. A summary of the participant demographics is presented
in Table 6.1.
Results
Participant response to the emails was fair at a response rate of 62%. Some responses
though were not considered in the analysis as they did not meet the standards required.
The results from the general part of the questionnaire based on gender, age, and educational
background were as follows; Most of the respondents were male (68%, n = 17) compared
to females (32%, n=8). Participants were mainly between 21 to 25 years of age (44%,
n = 11) and the least number of participants was above 45 years (12%, n= 3). The
highest level of education was that of a doctorate (16%, n=4) and the majority were
undergraduates (52%, n=3).
In the second part of the survey, we emphasized on how participants perceived
the privacy preserving features integrated in the apps. More that half percent of the
participants downloaded Android apps (84%, n = 19) while 16% (n = 6) used other
mobile operating systems. Of the 25 respondents, 21 participants (84%) liked the privacy
features integrated in the app while 76% participants (n = 19) were concerned about
the data collected in the apps, 8% (n = 2) respondents did not mind about data being
collected in the apps and 16% (n = 4) did not care about data being collected. The apps
were rated Good by most of the participants (72%, n=18) which was based on the privacy
settings implemented in the apps. The majority of the participants were concerned about
private information (PII) e.g. national identification numbers, credit card numbers to be
collected by the app (60%, n=15). Finally, the majority of the participants did not find
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any problems using the integrated privacy features (68%, n=17).
Discussion
In general, the key findings depicted that the participants liked the privacy features
modes integrated in the apps, especially the possibility of choosing through different
privacy modes when using the app. Users are able to choose from a low privacy mode to
a higher privacy one without affecting functionality. This feature enables users to take
full control of the type of data to be transferred to the app without constantly switching
through a lot of privacy settings as it is in current modern apps. Instead a user can choose
a privacy mode that contains the privacy settings they would like to use at default.
Limitations of the study
The major limitation of the study is that currently the apps are implemented in the
Android mobile operating system only. The applications should be programmed in other
mobile operating systems to determine the differences and how the features would be
perceived by users.
Furthermore, the participant pool of 25 participants needs to be increased to get a
broader interpretation of the features built in the app. This way more opinions about the
apps can be gained and more ideas can be used to improve the apps.
6.6 Usability Evaluation Survey
We conducted a survey to investigate and evaluate the usability of the demo apps over a
three week period. Determining the usability of the apps is a fundamental requirement
in system development to assess user experience and the ease of use of a product after
development. Usability is “ the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context
of use.” [146]
There are five distinct usability components that are used to determine the quality of a
product or system [147]. Among these we focused on three components in the app survey.
These are learnability, re-usability and system potential. Learnability plays a major role in
determining the cost a user requires to achieve a competent level of performance on a task
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when using the app. We further focused on re-usability which is the performance level
a user requires to perform a task when there is a continuous period of non-use. System
potential determines the performance a user can obtain from the app.
Many researchers have used usability testing to investigate and identify the ease of
using a product or system. “Usability testing refers to evaluating a product or service
by testing it with a group of representative users” [148]. This approach is extremely
valuable for identifying if the product is understood, easy to learn and easy to operate
under a supervised period of time. In particular, a System Usability Scale (SUS) has been
developed to evaluate industrial systems, and has been used to evaluate the prototypes
in this study. A System Usability Scale is a ten-item Lickert scale which gives a general
view of subjective assessments of usability [1].
Participants were recruited using the Security Lancaster mailing group and using
friends. They were sent emails which included a participant information sheet with details
of the study and a consent form requesting for their permission to take part in the study.
The participant information sheet and the consent form can be found in the appendix of
this thesis. After participants filled in the consent form and accepted to take part in the
study, they were requested to rate the usability of the apps by submitting in an online
Google form questionnaire.
Participants: Respondents were mainly from the academic domain at Security
Lancaster, Lancaster university (N =50) and from Hamburg University (N =10). The
population was provided by recruiting through emails which were mainly sent to full time
researchers. This was done to provide a diverse participant base from the security and
privacy backgrounds and to get a more technical base of current students who often use
apps. Participants were given links to the apps and were requested to download them
and study the privacy features integrated in the apps. They were asked to fill in the
questionnaires based on the usability of the app.
Survey design: The survey presented participants with questions based on the
System Usability Scale (SUS) used to measure the usability of interactive systems. An
example of the original SUS questions is presented in table 6.2, rated from 1 to 5.
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Table 6.2: System Usability Scale Statements [1]
Strongly Strongly
Agree Disagree
I think that I would like to use this system frequently 1 - 5
I found this system unnecessarily complex ... ...
I thought this system was easy to use ... ...
I think that I would need the support of a technical person to use this system ... ...
I found the various functions in this system were well integrated ... ...
I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system ...
I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly ...
I found this system awkward to use ...
I felt very confident using this system 1 - 5
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system
Table 6.3: Modified SUS questions used in the survey
Average SD
I think that I would like to use this app frequently 4.6 0.78
I thought that there was too much inconsistency in this app 1.4 0.52
I thought the app was easy to use 4.7 0.82
I found the system very cumbersome to use. 2.6 1.73
I thought there was a lot of consistency in using this app.+ 3.8 0.78
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this app 1.8 0.56
I found the various functions of the app were well integrated 4.2 0.75
I think that I would need assistance to be able to use this app 2.8 0.91
I would imagine that most people would learn to use this systme very quickly 3.3 0.42
I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this app 2.4 1.35
The complete questionnaire consisted of questions based on a 5-point Likert scale
which asked participants about the apps in the following order: (a) how frequent would
they use the apps (b) the ease of using the apps (c) how consistent they found the privacy
features integrated in the apps (d) the ease of technology used in apps. The questions
were modified to match the original SUS questions as shown in table 6.3. A total of 75
emails were sent out to the Security Lancaster mailing list anticipating a response rate of
50%. The response rate was very low at 20% which led us to recruit new participants
through other universities (Dresden University of Technology and Hamburg University).
After checking for invalidity and inconsistencies, a sub sample of 50 participants was
selected in the preliminary analysis. The process of recruiting participants was approved
by the Lancaster University Faculty of Science and Technology ethics committee.
Measures:
The SUS Likert form consists of 10 questions in which the respondents rate the
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Table 6.4: Sample Results obtained
ID Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 Question 8 Question 9 Question 10
001 Agree Neutral Agree Disagree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Disagree
002 Neutral Agree Agree Disagree Agree Neutral Neutral Agree Neutral Disagree
003 Disagree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Neutral Disagree Agree Neutral Disagree
004 Strongly Agree Agree Agree Neutral Agree Neutral Disagree Agree Disagree Disagree
005 Agree Agree Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Agree Disagree
006 Strongly Agree Agree Strongly Agree Disagree Agree Agree Strongly Disagree Neutral Disagree Disagree
007 Agree Agree Strongly Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Disagree Disagree
008 Neutral Neutral Neutral Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree Strongly Disagree
.....
050 Neutral Agree Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Neutral Neutral Strongly Disagree Disagree
Table 6.5: Points assigned
Response Points
Strongly agree = 5 points
Agree = 4 points
Neutral = 3 points
Disagree = 2 points
Strongly disagree = 1 point
usability of the Ehealth app and Telematics app according to the integrated privacy
features. Five features are positive (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ) and the remaining five are negative (5,
6, 7, 8, 9 ). The response from both questionnaires were based on a 5-point Likert-type
scale (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=Neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) which
respondents answered according to how they perceived the privacy measures integrated
in apps. These SUS based questions were designed specifically for this study. The results
of the study were then transcribed as shown in the Table 6.4.
6.6.1 Questionnaire analysis
To analyze the data collected from the questionnaires the samples were computed by
assigning values to the each response to get a single average value. The values were
assigned to the responses as shown in Table 6.5. To compute the values the responses
were split into two parts. First we computed the results of the positive responses followed
by the results of the negative responses for both the Telematics app and the eHealth app.
To compute the final results we took a hypothetical approach based on calculating the
percentages of the responses.
Table 6.6 illustrates how the points are assigned and computed. For example, given
20 participants who respond to a question with a “Strongly Agree” response, the number
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Table 6.6: Calculated points
Responses Points
20 strongly agree * 5 points = 100
13 agree * 4 points = 52
10 neutral * 3 points = 30
5 disagree * 2 points = 10





















Results to Question 2
Figure 6.15: Response to Question 1 and 2
of responses value is multiplied with the assigned value given in Table 6.5. An example of
the computation is shown in Table 6.6, given 50 participants who took part in the study,
we take 194/50 = 3.88 as the average value for the Telematics app. The remaining values
were further computed into averages.
Figure 6.15 shows the computed averages for Question 1 which is; "I think that I
would like to use this app frequently", and for Question 2 which is; "I thought
that there was too much inconsistency in this app" respectively. All values were
computed in this manner for all questions in Figures showing results 1 to 10 and for both
demo apps (Telematics and Ehealth) to determine the average values.
eHealth app: Of the 75 participants who were sent emails to complete the survey, a
total of 50 respondents were selected . Of these, 90% were male and 10% were female.
Participant responses to the apps differed significantly. Although both links to download
the apps were sent simultaneously, respondents were reluctant to complete the survey
about the Telematics app in comparison to the eHealth app. Question one required the
participants to respond to the following statement, “I think that I would like to use
166
























System Usability Scale Results 2
























System Usability Scale Results 4
Figure 6.17: Result 3 and 4
this app frequently.” Participants were asked to rate the app using a 5 Likert-type
scale anchored by Strongly agree/Strongly disagree. While statistical differences were
not found between both apps, results did indicate that users were willing to use the
eHealth fitness app more frequently, 44.4% responding with Agree, 22.2% Strongly agree,
22.2% Neutral, (t=-10.41, p<0.05). Analyzing the data to find out how users found
its integrated privacy features revealed that the eHealth app was easy to use (77.8%
Agree). In response to the consistency of using the app, it was found that 55.6% Agreed,
22.2% Strongly agreed and 22.2% were responded with Neutral. The statement“ I would
imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly” resulted
into 66.6% of the participants responding with Agree and 33.3% with Neutral.
Responses from the Telematics app differed moderately to those of the eHealth app,
in general participants are more familiar with using eHealth fitness apps compared to
Telematics apps. To the statement “I thought the app was easy to use.” 33.3% of the
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System Usability Scale Results 6
























System Usability Scale Results 8
























System Usability Scale Results 10
Figure 6.20: Result 9 and 10
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participants responded with Strongly agree, 16.7% Neutral and 50% Agree. Participants
found the apps consistency good and responded to the statement “I thought there was
a lot of consistency in using this app” with 66.6% Agree and 33.3% Neutral. The
apps ease of technical use was also found to be good with 66.7% respondents replying
with Strongly disagree and 33.3% Disagree to the statement “I think that I would need
the support of a technical person to be able to use this app”.
6.6.2 System Usability Scale scoring
The results were further analyzed using the System Usability Scale (SUS) Score. We used
the SUS scores because its a standard scoring system and its well established in measuring
usability of industrial systems. The score is obtained by first placing the positive and
negative items alternatively. That is the positive statements are situated in positions
1,3,5,7,9 and the negative statements in positions 2,4,6,8,10. To compute the final SUS
score the values in the positions 1,3,5,7 and 9 have a score contribution of scale position
minus 1. For positions 2,4,6,8 and 10, the score contribution is 5 minus the scale position.
The overall SUS score is got by multiplying the sum of the obtained scores by 2.5. [149]
and is summarized in [150] as follows;
• Step 1: Convert the scale into number for each of the 10 questions
 - Strongly Disagree: 1 point
 - Disagree: 2 points
 - Neutral: 3 points
 - Agree: 4 points
 - Strongly Agree: 5 points
• Step 2: Calculate
 - X = Sum of the points for all odd-numbered questions â€“ 5
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Table 6.7: System Usability Scores
SUS Questions Position Value SUS Score
I think that I would like to use this app frequently 5 5-1 4
I thought that there was too much inconsistency in this app 1 5-1 4
I thought the app was easy to use 5 5-1 4
I found the system very cumbersome to use. 1 5-1 3
I thought there was a lot of consistency in using this app. 4 4-1 3
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this app 1 5-1 4
I found the various functions of the app were well integrated 5 5-1 4
I think that I would need assistance to be able to use this app 4 4-1 3
I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this app 2 5-2 3
TOTAL 80
 - Y = 25 - Sum of the points for all even-numbered questions
SUS Score = (X + Y) x 2.5
An illustration of the SUS scoring is shown in table 6.7 to give a final SUS score of
80. However, it is important to note that SUS scores which range from 0 - 100 are not
percentages and should not be mistaken for percentage values. The scores are graded
as follows; 51 points(F) and below are a Fail, 51-68 points(D) are Poor, 68 points(C) is
Okay, 68 - 80.3 points(B) is Good and above 80.3 points (A) is Excellent. Understanding
what the scores mean is explained by Bangor et. al [151] and in [150].
On the whole, products with a score below 51 are a cause of significant concern as
this is considered as a fail. An overall score of 68.9 was obtained in the System Usability
scale scores. A minimum of 50 was recorded and the maximum score was 92.5. According
to the rating in [151], the mean score of 68.9 got in this study indicated that the apps
were perceived to be good.
6.6.3 Assessment of User Behaviour attitudes
To further analyze the data, a Mann-Whitney U test [152],[153] was used to identify the
behavioural attitude of the users towards the two apps and to find out how satisfied users
were when using the apps. The Mann-Whitney U Test is also referred to as the Wilcoxon
rank-sum test and is computed using the formula below:
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Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
z =




Subject: this test is specifically designed to determine whether two independent samples
came from equivalent populations. Note: this test is an alternative to the Two-Sample t
test, however it does not require that the two populations follow the normal distribution
and have equal population variances.
where:
• n1 is the number of observations of the first population which is the eHealth app
population in this thesis.
• n2 is the number of observations of the second population which is the telematics
app population in this thesis.
• W is the sum of the ranks from the first population.
The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric test that is used to compare two
sample means coming from the same population. Its used to test if the means are equal
or not. It is widely used in fields like health care, psychology and business to compare
attitudes or behavioural trends. For example, in business it can be used to find out the
preferences of different people and see if these preferences change according to a given
factor [154]. In this context, we carried out a Mann-Whitney U test to determine which
app do the users prefer. We used an online Social science statistics calculator [155] to
compare the median values of the responses to the SUS questions for both the eHealth
app and the Telematics app. This was done to determine if there should be any changes
in the design and implementation of the apps. We carried out the tests for the following
positive questions;
1. I think that I would like to use this app frequently.
2. I thought the app was easy to use.
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3. I thought there was a lot of consistency in using this app.
4. I found the various functions of the app were well integrated.
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the median of population 1 and
the median of population 2.
H0 = the null hypothesis is that the two medians are the same.
H1 = the alternative hypothesis is that the two medians are not the same
We ran a Mann-Whitney U test to evaluate the differences in the responses of the
Likert results reported in the apps. We found non significant effects of the two groups for
all questions. For example, the Mann-Whitney U test result for question 1 was (Z score
is -0.22024, the p-value is 0.82588), so the result is not significant at p<0.05. From the
results obtained we have no evidence to reject the null hypothesis because the median
for the two groups is the same. Therefore, from the analysis of the data reported, we
conclude that the apps were equally perceived by the participants, and consequently, the
design and implementation of the apps did not have to be changed.
6.6.4 Alternative usability analysis methods
Several methods have been proposed to measure usability through questionnaires. There
are a number of alternatives to the SUS which can be used e.g. the Net Promoter Score,
Usability Metric for User Experience (UMUX)[156], UMUX-LITE [157], SUPR-Q [158].
We chose to use the SUS as its well documented and easier to use. The methodology used
in this study is the standard SUS questionnaire format. This questionnaire is based on
the scientific analysis originally created by John Brooke [149]. However, approaches like
the Net Promoter Score [159] are similarly widely used. The Net Promoter score consists
of a questionnaire with one question and is used to measure customer experience.
Limitations: Limitations with the apps was depicted mainly in the new functionality
that was integrated in the app which users were not familiar with. Response to the
statement “I found the various functions of the app were well integrated.”
resulted into 77.8% participants responding with Agree, 11.1% with Neutral and 11.1%
with Disagree. The evidence suggests that some features were not well perceived by the
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participants and need to be revised. Despite the high positive ratings of the apps, more
effort has to be done in educating participants in how to perceive new approaches of
integrating privacy in mobile applications. It can therefore, be inferred that users are
not used to limiting the amount of data when using mobile apps. They openly expose
their data to the apps in turn for better functionality. Limiting data exposure is seen as
a burden especially in new technologies. Consequently, users are willing to give up their
privacy in return for quicker and faster technologies.
General Overview: Overall, the usability of the developed apps was positively perceived
by respondents to the study. The study met the design requirements that were positively
assessed using the SUS scale and measured using the Likert scale. This study found
high acceptance of the privacy features that were integrated in the eHealth fitness and
Telematics apps. Therefore, the findings of this study suggest that users are capable of
accepting new privacy implementations in future mobile applications once these are put
on the market. In the following, we elaborate more on the key findings observed during
the evaluation of the apps.
Privacy requirements: The evaluation of the apps shows that the privacy requirements
we proposed have been met and are well perceived by users. The framework we designed
that uses the methodology of privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default, to implement the
trade off between functionality and privacy, improves the design of mobile applications as
proposed in this thesis. Strong evidence has been given to emphasize that the privacy aware
framework proposed has a high degree of accuracy when meeting privacy requirements,
that its adaptable to real world scenarios as presented in the generated mobile applications,
and that it is valid as we observed in the responses from the survey that we undertook.
Therefore, the analysis given in this chapter has shown that the TRANK framework
meets the objectives of the thesis that were put forward in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
Trust in new mobile applications applications: In the course of the studies we
carried out, we observed that users have key trust issues in new mobile technologies. This
was highly depicted in the choice of the apps they wanted to test. We noticed that users
were reluctant to use the telematics app as this was considered very privacy infringing
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compared to the eHealth privacy app. Once users are informed of the effects of sharing
their data and location information, they are hesitant in using a mobile application.
Therefore, mobile application developers should design easy to use applications that
reduce the amount of PII collected. They should also inform users of the effects of the
data that is collected. Currently applications on the market provide an On and Off
solution to choose which features to be used without informing them of the exact impact
of the data collected. In our this research we clearly, informed the users of the data
collection methodologies used and what is used with the submitted data. This included,
the location based information in telematics apps, the surveillance methods used as well
as the type of billing used. This enabled the users to determine which app gathered
more data and which did not. Much as the eHealth fitness app gathered data, users were
willing to use it in comparison to the Telematics app.
6.7 Summary
This chapter presents the prototype implementation of the privacy aware trade-off analysis
framework TRANK. The first application is a telematics application developed based
on the TRANK framework. The second application is an eHealth fitness application
developed using the TRANK framework. The implementation includes the following
packages, the User interface (UI) package which contains the classes for running the
user interface, the Data package which contains the classes that manage the data, and
the Privacy package that contains classes for running the privacy related functionality.
The Telematics prototype contains the following packages; Data, Privacy, UI which are
similar to the ones in the eHealth prototype and a Helper package. The Helper package
contains helper classes that manage the applicaton views. The chapter illustrates how we
developed the telematics and eHealth prototypes which are based on the TRANK privacy
aware trade-off analysis framework we introduced in chapter 5.
Furthermore, this chapter presents an evaluation of the prototype implementation
of the TRANK framework. The TRANK framework was applied to two applications.
The applications were evaluated using three approaches, (a)based on a privacy evaluation
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survey (b) based on a usability survey of the developed apps and (c) the amount of
data they collect and the privacy policies they use as implemented in the apps. Privacy-
by-design mechanisms were integrated in the applications to generate privacy aware
applications with less amounts of data collection and better privacy policy design as
compared to apps provided in current App stores. Overall the results of the application
implementation is positive. We conclude that TRANK is a suitable method for privacy




The mobile application development domain is rapidly evolving. This thesis has demon-
strated that the integration of privacy preserving methodologies over the past years has
improved and indications of new privacy enhancing methodologies are being developed.
However, the increase of privacy breaches and data leakages suggests that there is need
for enhanced privacy preserving mechanisms to reduce privacy invasion in future mobile
applications. More than one half of the mobile applications investigated do collect data
that is not required for system functionality and is privacy invasive. The studies carried
out in this research make this observation as per the data collected and the analysis
performed in this thesis. This observation is driven by the existence of third party service
provider companies which aggressively collect massive amounts of data for advertising
purposes.
Current mobile applications have integrated privacy policies as a means of integrating
privacy in mobile apps, however, existing privacy policies come with a variety of limitations.
They are not easily understood by customers and the majority of privacy policies are
long and tedious to read such that users do not read them as required. In addition, the
privacy policies are not in sync with the actual data that is collected by the apps both in
the companies sites and within the apps.
Prior research has focused on encryption methods in an attempt to secure mobile
applications. Although some research has emphasized on the need to protect user privacy,
Chapter 7
little has been done to implement these ideas. Therefore there remains a gap to integrate
privacy-by-design methodologies at the initial stages of product development. The tech
giants e.g. Google and Facebook are the main funnels of data collection and we have
seen reports about privacy invasion both from users and the data collecting companies-
This phenomenon does not only increase mistrust in users but calls for proper privacy
preserving solutions that ensure that user personal identifiable information is protected.
This can be implemented not only in technical terms but with the introduction of legal
structures that generate binding laws governing user privacy and that regulate the industry
with a stronger upper-hand. Current regulations are either not suitable for the rapidly
growing mobile application industry or are not enforced strongly leaving companies an
option of massive data collection of private information and thus the increase of privacy
abuse.
There is a sense that users are increasingly getting concerned about their information
being abused by data collecting companies. This has been widely reported in the media
when companies used this data to manipulate elections. Collaboration of both data
collecting companies, users and privacy engineers is therefore required to ensure that
a collective approach to protect user privacy is obtained. Otherwise users will have to
live with the fears of their private information collected by tech giants and mobile apps
especially with sensitive data like medical data of being compromised and exposed. Large
companies like Google are keen in improving privacy protection in their applications but
smaller app developers and mobile applications that have a limited budget but continue
collecting sensitive data will be prone to future privacy attacks and data breaches. Never
the less the willingness to improve user privacy in future mobile applications is increasing
as users are gradually concerned about their private identifiable information being leaked
to other companies like insurance companies or employment companies. Therefore,
the work introduced in this thesis which introduces a privacy aware trade-off analysis
framework plays a major role in the development of privacy preservation methodologies
in future mobile applications and acts as a stepping stone in privacy research. The study
would be furthered by implementing the framework and the framework based prototypes
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using a different mobile application operating system to investigate the impact it has in
another experimental setup.
This chapter concludes by revisiting the aims and objectives of the thesis presented in
chapter 1. We analyze and evaluate to what extent the aims and objectives have been met.
The purpose of this work is to enhance the integration of privacy preserving methods in
future mobile applications. To achieve this goal, this thesis presents a novel privacy aware
trade-off analysis framework (TRANK) which integrates privacy-by-design concepts in
mobile applications while considering the trade-off between privacy and functionality.
The aims and objectives were achieved in the following ways:
• Chapter 1 provides user awareness about data being collected by current mobile
applications and highlights some of the data breaches that have occured in recent
years.
• Chapter 3 reports on the surveys we performed to show the challenges of privacy
implementation in V2X mobile applications.
• Chapter 5 illustrates how the privacy trade-off analysis is generated and implemented
on two applications; the Telematics application and an eHealth fitness application.
The objective met here is to support application designers in decision making on
how to integrate privacy at the initial stages of application development at the same
time considering the trade-offs between privacy and functionality.
• Chapter 6 presents how the framework is implemented and highlights on the
improvement in privacy preservation gained by using the framework to design
privacy aware mobile applications. It further presents an evaluation of the prototype
implementation of the TRANK framework. The prototypes were evaluated based
on average results, a Privacy user study, a System Usability Scale scoring, and a
Man-Whitney U test to determine how users perceived the developed apps.
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7.1 Contributions of this thesis
This thesis made minor and major contributions to the preservation of privacy in mobile
applications in using the following procedures:
A. Major contributions:
• We developed a privacy aware Trade-off Analysis Framework (TRANK) that
ensures that privacy-by-design principles are integrated in the initial stages
of application development. We identified that when designing privacy aware
applications, the trade-off between privacy, functionality and performance
needs to be addressed. We developed guidelines on how to implement the
framework in other domains using the Telematics and eHealth applications.
• We developed guidelines for resolving privacy and functionality trade-offs
including suggestions of using a trade-off matrix.
• We developed an implementation prototype for the Trade-off Analysis Frame-
work to serve as a proof of concept for TRANK. Data Collection Scores
and Privacy Policy Scores used to evaluate the framework were significantly
improved by more that 70%.
B. Minor contributions:
• This thesis has highlighted current data breaches both in the media and
literature to sensitize users about the risks involved when sharing Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) to data controllers and processing companies.
• We investigated privacy implementations in eHealth applications and V2X
telematics applications to identify gaps in designing privacy aware mobile
applications through an exploratory study.
In particular, the main contribution of this thesis is the privacy Aware Trade-off
Analysis Framework TRANK. The framework does the following:
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• Defines privacy goals of the system under development to determine which goals are
important for system functionality and how they interplay with other goals under
consideration.
• Maintains and manages privacy goals and requirements both at the mobile applica-
tion level and the privacy policy level.
• Defines privacy, functional and performance requirements and how these interfere
with each other to enhance privacy protection at large using privacy policies and
enforcing GDPR compliance.
• Leverages the privacy requirements and functionality by reducing the amount of
personal data collected without negatively affecting app functionality.
• Evaluates the privacy-by-design principles developed within the envisaged design
framework, TRANK and in order to present the generic design principles, the
prototype further evaluates over representative application domains that are prone
to privacy breaches.
In the following sections, we elaborate on the key concepts of privacy preservation in
relation to data collection, privacy policies and privacy regulation to mitigate the risks of
designing privacy aware applications as observed in this research.
7.2 Data collection in mobile applications
Data collection in mobile applications plays a great role in designing privacy aware
applications. Current mobile applications collect data to enable them perform according
to the desired functionality. However, according to studies we made, data processing
companies accumulate an immense amount of data that is not required for system
functionality without users consent. Users have significantly lost any control over the data
given to mobile companies through the services they provide. Mobile application services
that currently gather a lot of data include; social networking services, web services and
business applications. Customers provide personal information to such companies in
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return for the functionality they provide. It is estimated that 50% of users are willing
to provide their purchasing history e.g. when buying products online for any discounts
offered. Although data breaches are often reported, users continue to submit their personal
data in exchange for the services provided.
In this thesis, we therefore, call for a "minimal data collection" approach from
application developers. App developers must request for only the data they need for
app functionality. We also call for app developers to increase user awareness about the
data collected. Application developer companies should inform users explicitly how they
collect the data and for which purposes its collected for. Recognizing that minimal data
collection is an important way of mitigating the risks of the data being compromised,
consumers need guidance on how to achieve this goal and improve privacy in mobile
applications. Currently most users have adapted to controlling with whom their data is
shared especially in OSNs where they are given choices e.g., sharing with family, friends
and to the general public. This option, however, has not been implemented in mobile apps.
The data collected by app developer companies is solely controlled by the companies.
They decide with whom to share the data e.g. with third party service providers. The
user therefore has no control of their data.
We recommend app developers to allow for user empowerment over collected data so
that users can be able to opt-in and out of the application. There should be measures
that enable users to anonymize their data in cases where data sets are required for
app functionality. The idea of opting in-and-out of the data should not, however, lead
to application failure. Therefore, privacy engineers, software engineers and regulators
should enforce minimal data collection as well as users ability to opt out of applications
without losing functionality. This way the amount of data collected and eventually that
is compromised in case of any imminent attacks is minimized.
7.3 Privacy policies in mobile applications
Privacy policies are designed with the aim of disclosing how personal information in
mobile applications is used. All apps must include privacy policies in the Apple store
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and Google Play store. The disclosures in privacy policies provide transparency on how
the data is to be used. In this study, we found that mobile applications have integrated
privacy policies on company websites and Google Play Store. However, most apps do
not employ privacy policies during app installation. Some apps do have in-app privacy
policies but they are not easily readable. We therefore, call for a better design of in-app
privacy policies to enable users understand why companies collect data and how they
use it. Furthermore, we observed that the privacy policies are lengthy and not readable
on small portable devices like hand held phones. The highly technological terms in the
policies make it very hard for a lay user to understand. We observed that users only tick
policies presented to them without understanding what they are committing to when
they check the boxes with "Yes" or "No". We therefore, call upon app designers to find
means of simplifying the privacy policy design to enable users fully understand the terms
given in the privacy policies and how they relate to their personal data.
7.4 Privacy regulation in mobile applications
We have seen an improvement in privacy regulation in the course of our study. In May
2018, the GDPR was enforced. This has led to companies integrating GDPR privacy
regulations to protect user privacy. Furthermore, California introduced the California
Online Privacy Protection Act (CALLOPA) law which ensures that application designers
in California integrate privacy policies in system design. We, however, observed that,
few mobile apps are GDPR compliant. Much as these laws have been passed, major
online giants like Google and Facebook have not fully implemented them in their systems
[57]. More regulation control should be enforced to ensure that mobile applications are
compliant to the existing enacted laws and regulations. The major problem faced in
enforcement of the law is that the regulators are often reactive and not preventive. This
means that only when, for example, a massive data breach has occurred do the regulators
respond. We therefore, call for regulators to be more proactive in privacy law enforcement.
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7.5 Reflections on the research undertaken
This thesis presents the following key outcomes based on the research performed and the
empirical studies undertaken.
7.5.1 The Privacy aware Trade-off analysis framework (TRANK)
The thesis initially presents the TRANK framework, which is a privacy-by-design method-
ology that aids system developers, privacy engineers ad system analysts to integrate
privacy at the initial stages of system development putting into consideration the trade-offs
that occur between privacy, system functionality and performance. TRANK is a design
framework. To integrate privacy in the system development life-cycle we initially define
the privacy goals the system has to fulfil. This can be achieved on a high level as required
by the requirements process or detailed based on the architecture to be implemented.
Based on the generated goals a privacy and functionality goals trade-off analysis is devel-
oped. This is the phase which initially introduces the aspect of trade-offs. Trade-offs are
integrated at the first stages of the framework to enable a consistent approach in designing
the privacy aware application. This is mainly because if the trade-offs are integrated at a
later stage, more work has to be implemented in the development phase. Therefore, it
is important to consider the trade-offs prior to reaching the system development stage.
For each of the generated goals a trade-off analysis is performed, which is then used
to generate the privacy requirements. The elicited privacy requirements are used to
generate the privacy and functionality trade-off matrix. The matrix is developed based
on a privacy trade-off analysis template. Finally the generated requirements are managed
using a requirements management tool. This step is crucial in the mobile application
software development phase. Due to the rapid development of mobile applications, privacy
requirements keep evolving and thus need to be managed whenever new technologies are
developed. These five steps are the core development aspects of TRANK. Once these steps
are implemented in the requirements development phase, then an enhanced privacy aware
application can be achieved that puts into consideration the privacy and functionality
trade-offs during the initial mobile application development.
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7.5.2 Empirical evaluation of the TRANK based eHealth and Telematics
prototypes.
The evaluation of TRANK was done by performing two major surveys. A privacy
evaluation survey and a Usability evaluation survey. The surveys were undertaken using
the developed TRANK based prototypes. TRANK is a design methodology and complex
to fully implement automatically. We therefore, used the survey approach in order to get
an insight on how users perceived the applications both from a privacy perspective and a
usability perspective. The surveys were used to determine the privacy concerns of users
while using the apps especially with data collection and data sharing of sensitive private
information entailed in PII. Another aspect that users were asked was how they perceived
the privacy features that were newly integrated in the apps which enabled users to have
control of the data being transferred to the app for further processing. The usability
study on the other hand mainly focused on how users perceived the app based on 10 key
questions used to determine the usability and quality of a developed system or product.
The questions were based on three major usability components which are learnability,
re-usability and system potential. Overall the TRANK based prototypes performed well.
The participants perceived the apps positively and the general feedback on the usability
and ease of use of the app reported from the participants was positive.
7.6 Research implications for emerging privacy-aware mobile
applications
We recognise that designing privacy aware mobile applications is very important to
mitigate privacy breaches and minimise current privacy abuse in mobile applications.
This research has pointed out privacy concerns as reported in chapter 1. In an attempt
to address these challenges, this research has proposed the use of a privacy-by-design
framework that integrates privacy-aware design in future mobile applications using the
proposed privacy aware trade-off analysis frame work TRANK. Based on the researched
literature that has been presented in chapter 2, we emphasize that the use of TRANK as
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a design methodology greatly improves privacy preservation in future mobile application
development.
7.6.1 User sensitization
Sensitization of users about the risks involved in sharing private information is required
especially by the app developers. Although most of the apps do have a privacy policy
during app download, most of them do not have in-app privacy policies. I addition to
integrating in-app policies in mobile applications, other forms of user sensitization can be
implemented in the form of nudging users to use privacy related features when downloading
the apps. The privacy settings should be integrated as the default settings in mobile
applications, from here the users can then decide on which other features to use. Another
way of nudging users to use privacy related features is to include privacy permissions as a
default set up. Android permissions have been redesigned to inform users about which
permissions to use, however most users do not understand what the permissions mean
and so do not know how to use them. This means that more sensitization has to be done
in an effort to improve privacy in future mobile applications.
7.7 Future Work
This section discusses future directions in which the privacy of mobile applications can be
improved on the basis of the research findings of this thesis.
7.7.1 TRANK based design for other domains
One of the possible future directions is to integrate TRANK in other domains e.g.
Finance, Manufacturing, Healthcare, eCommerce, Entertainment, to determine the privacy
violations through the amount of data collection that these applications collect and address
them using the TRANK framework. Detecting and identifying data collection in different
domains enables privacy engineers determine which functionality require more data
collection than others. In identifying the functionality of different domains, app designers
are able to reduce the amount of data collected based on the chosen functionality. The
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core aim of this approach is to identify which domain collects immense amounts of data in
an effort to regulate it. There have been reports about massive data collection especially
in domains like Online Social Networks [160] and the lack of trust towards user privacy but
consumers continue to use these products. While it was shown that the TRANK framework
improved user perception of privacy and privacy integration in the two mobile applications
studied in this thesis, it is hypothesized that a detailed study on integrating TRANK
in other domains will further contribute to the improvement of privacy preservation in
these domains by producing better privacy-aware applications. Considering different
domains as Financial mobile applications, OSNs or Online eCommerce domains like
Amazon is important not only to the consumers but also privacy engineering researchers
and developers in an attempt to improve privacy integration in future mobile applications.
7.7.2 Tool support for the trade-off analysis framework
The privacy trade-off analysis framework introduced in chapter 5 is manual. Application
designers and privacy-by-design engineers will need to create the steps involved and
generate the framework carefully and gradually. The privacy and functionality matrix
needs to be clearly and thoroughly automated. An automated approach for designing the
framework is beneficial to aid in implementing the framework from a privacy modeling
design perspective. This can be achieved by automatically generating the privacy, per-
formance and functionality matrix based on the requirements of the mobile application.
This automated design can then be used in subsequent steps of the the framework to
create applications that are easily and quickly implemented.
7.7.3 Regulated privacy-by-design templates
There is a need for privacy engineers to develop applications based on regulated app
design templates that are uniform to reduce unnecessary data collection. A potential
future development, therefore, is to design mobile apps using easily understood privacy
preserving templates that emphasize privacy implementation and minimal data collection.
Current research efforts have focused on privacy policy templates that aid application
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designers to generate privacy policies [161], however, these templates are legally focused
and not technically focused in terms of privacy enforcement. We observe that although the
privacy policies generated are legally binding, they are no privacy enhancing technologies
to integrate privacy-by-design concepts in mobile application development. Therefore,
there is a need for designing templates that offer both the privacy-by-design concepts
incorporated with the legally binding aspects of privacy preservation which can be utilized
during mobile application development.
7.7.4 Data Collection Analysis
Big data analytics is able to examine large data sets from various sources to discover trends
in marketing and predictive analysis. We are all aware that currently, large data mobile
app controllers and processors (e.g. Facebook, Messenger, Whatsup, Youtube) use big
data like Facebook Amazonsolutions for analyzing future market trends and uncovering
hidden patterns and correlations about the products we buy or the services they offer
[162]. A potential future technological development in privacy data analysis, therefore,
would be to use big data technologies to analyze data collection trends especially with the
new mobile applications on the market. We observer that data processors are increasingly
collecting PII, health related data, marketing data with the promise of improving service
through, for example, targeted advertising, however it would be worth investigating from
a reverse engineering perspective which models are used to generate these adverts in an
attempt to educate users on protecting their data. This way customers are cautious about
the data they are willing to provide and which privacy preserving measures they need to
undertake when using future mobile applications.
7.7.5 Regulated privacy enforcement in application development lifecycle
With the enactment of the GDPR regulation which governs personal data processing,
companies which have been penalized for privacy and data breaches have been minimal.
We therefore,like Facebook Amazon call for a more stringent privacy enforcement strategy
that puts in place strict consequences to data controllers and processors when user privacy
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has been compromised. At present, the legal framework presented through the GDPR
regulations and other legal governing bodies are not being thoroughly implemented by
companies. It is reported that six months after the GDPR was applicable big corporations
like Facebook, Amazon and Google privacy policies’ were not compliant to GDPR
regulations [163]. As more private data published to large corporations, a further area for
investigation is to enhance privacy enforcement during application development of mobile
application.
7.7.6 Reflections and closing remarks
This thesis has introduced a privacy preserving Trade-off analysis framework and empiri-
cally evaluated it using a prototypical methodology and through privacy and usability
surveys based on our findings. Using both qualitative and quantitative research method-
ologies, the results obtained are promising especially in exhibiting the importance of
privacy preservation in future mobile applications. This observation goes beyond the
aspects that have been assessed and calls for future enhanced methods of integrating
privacy in the development process of mobile apps.
Users should be encouraged to take privacy preservation in a systematic way based on
the type of data they would like to make public to the tech giants and that they should
keep private. While existing privacy preserving frameworks support privacy protection,
this research has added value to the privacy knowledge base especially when integrating
privacy using the privacy-by-design notion. This is required especially to improve and
support of the evolving privacy concerns. Therefore, future work should put an emphasis
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Study Title:  Privacy preservation in mobile apps – Usability study. 
 
The purpose of this consent form is to check that you are aware of your rights, understand what will 
be required of you and agree to take part in the study.  If you have any concerns before signing the 





1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet and fully 
understand what is expected of me within this study  
2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask any questions 
about the research and have them answered satisfactorily.  
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw anytime within two (2) weeks after the interview 
without giving any reason. 
4. I understand that the information collected during the study will     
be pooled with that of other participants, anonymised and 
aggregated before being published. 
5. I understand that once my data have been anonymised and 
incorporated into themes it might not be possible for it to be 
withdrawn, though every attempt will be made to extract my 
data, up to the point of publication. 
6. I am satisfied that the information I provide will be treated 
confidentially by the researchers. 
7. I agree that quotations from the interviews can be used in the 
project reports and in other publications (if applicable). I 
understand that my quotations will be used anonymously. 




________________________          _______________               ________________ 
Name of Participant                         Date                                        Signature 
 
 


























Figure 2: Participant consent form
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For further information about how Lancaster University processes personal data for research    
purposes and your data rights please visit our webpage:    
www.lancaster.ac.uk/research/data-protection   
   
Participant Information Sheet 
 
I am a PhD researcher at Lancaster University and I would like to invite you to take part in a research 
study about privacy preservation in future mobile applications.    
Please take time to read the following information carefully before you decide whether you wish to 
take part.   
What is the study about?   
This study is aimed at designing better privacy aware mobile applications. There has been a surge in 
privacy breaches in mobile applications ranging from data exposure to data manipulation of the data 
collected by mobile applications as in the case of Facebook and Yahoo data leaks. Previous research 
in this area has looked at data breaches and found that users are concerned about the data collected. 
However, at present there are no solutions proposed to tackle this gap. Taking part in this research 
aids researchers in designing better privacy aware mobile apps.   
We have designed two demo mock-up apps to investigate privacy infringement in current mobile 
apps. We designed a mock-up Telematics insurance app and an eHealth fitness app. Telematics 
insurance is a type of car insurance which uses telematics technology to determine the cost of the 
insurance policy used. Instead of using a yearly or monthly policy that is based on risk and factors 
like, where you live, make of the car, model of the car, telematics insurance is different. It is based on 
the driving behaviour using a black box that monitors a user’s driving style.   
The eHealth app is used to determine how a user keeps fit by making fitness activities like riding a 
bicycle and monitoring the heart rate. Fitness apps are used to encourage users to improve on their 
fitness activities.   
If you take part in this study, you will be asked to investigate and give us feedback on the usability of 
the Telematics and eHealth fitness apps. The apps do not collect any personal data of any activities 
you will perform.   
Why have I been invited?   
I have approached you because I want to get your ideas and views on how to improve mobile 
applications on the market today.  I want to know what you consider important when using the 
mobile applications to be tested, the features you would like to see in mobile apps with regards to 
data collection and privacy preservation. In short, I want you to help me design a better interface to 
solve users’ privacy in mobile applications. This is an open invitation to people who use mobile apps 
on a regular basis and have submitted private data to mobile applications.    
The demo apps have inbuilt privacy preserving features which you will investigate and give feedback 
subsequently. The apps are on Github a software source code management service. You will be given 
the links to the apps which you will download on your android based phone.   
I will be very grateful if you agree to take part in this study.   
Figure 3: Participant Information sheet
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